6 OCTOBER 1923, Page 4

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

WHO ARE THE FRIENDS OF FRANCE ?

" Whosoever would have one full, lively and complete view of a self- opinion'd Grandee, let him cast his Eye upon Ahab in the midst of his false Prophets (1 Kings 22). We have them all with one Voice for sending him, in a Compliment, to be Knodct on the Head at Ramoth Gilead. But, says Jehoslwphat (who smelt the Parasite through the Prophet), Is there not a Prophet of the Lord besides, that we may enquire of him 1 Why yes, says Ahab, there is yet one man by whom we may enquire of the Lord ; but I hate him, for he cloth not prophesy Good concerning me, but Evil. Ah ! that was his crime ; the poor man was so good a Subject, and so bad a Courtier, as to venture to serve, and save his Friend, whether he would or no ; for, it seems, to give Ahab such warning, as might infallibly have prevented his Destruction, was esteemed by him Evil, and to push him on headlong into, it, because he was fond of it, was accounted Good. These were his new measures of Good and Evil. . . But what cared they if they knew that it would please, and that was enough for them ; there being always a sort of Men in the TVorld, who had rather a great deal be pleased, than be safe."—(From a Sermon by Dr. -Sours, May 9th, 1680.) WE are arraigned by a section of our readers, a perfectly sincere section, we arc sure, for not being any longer friends to France. We oppose her policy on the Ruhr, blame her actions, put evil constructions on the motives of her Government, and prophesy evil things as the inevitable results of the course she is pursuing.

We repudiate this suggestion of unfriendliness. We ask thoSe into whose heads it has entered to consider for a few minutes quietly and patiently whether we are really open to the charge. If they will do that, we are certain that they will admit the injustice of it.- Unless flattery is the test of friendship, we have been truer friends of France than those who have hidden their anxiety at the actions of her Government for fear of displeasing our late Allies. We do not, of course, mean by this to suggest that all those who-refrain from criticizing French policy in the Ruhr, or who strongly support that policy, are in truth no friends of France. Such supporters are, no doubt, most friendly in intent, though, as we think, mistaken. In any case they have as good a right to their views as we have to ours. All we want to do to-day is to remind people of the very elementary fact that if you believe a friend- to be in the wrong and, therefore, • in peril, you must say so plainly, hoivever disagreeable it is, and however much you may expose yourself to the charge of enmity. The more sincere your friendship, the mare necessary it is for you to speak out. You may refrain from disagreeable warnings in the case of a person' to whose fate you are indifferent. You dare not do so in the ease of a true friend.

Of the danger, of the ultimate injury done by the essential unfriendliness, of refraining from warnings we had a signal example last January. Mr. Bonar Law was deeply anxious to show friendship to France, for in him that friendship was strong and sincere. He was also convinced that France was about to commit a capital error in invading the Ruhr. Unfortunately, he let his fears of being mistaken for an enemy of France, if he made his warning too clear, have their way. He did this, no doubt, from the best motives, if with a singular lack of judgment for one essentially so wise and so sincere. In effect he sent France " in a Compliment " to flounder it the quick-sands of the Ruhr. We are glad to remember that we raised our voice in warning last January. • Unfor- tunately those warnings by us, and others, were not heard or heeded. The half-hearted policy adopted -by the British Government in this vital matter went; in effect, unchallenged.

tn. ifriendk to-try"lo Make. inen-safe' lather -than to please them ; if smooth things are the Mark of good

intent, and true things of hatred, then, but only then, can we be expected to plead guilty to unfriendliness towards France.

But we are very little concerned to excuse ourselves, or to show the unfairneSS of those who mistake our attitude. Matters are far too serious for such small adjustments. We only want to get those who can affect the course of action to face the facts and to consider what will be the result if France, instead of withdrawing from her tragic blunder in occupying the Ruhr in search of immediate Reparations and ultimate security,-should persist in heaping up new and worse dangers on those already incurred. France has reached a point where, if she makes no change, the situation will rapidly develop for evil. On the other hand, her apparent triumph gives her Government, if only they had the wisdom and the fortitude to realize it and the courage to carry it out, the opportunity to alter their policy without losing face. Never was there a better occasion for cutting a serious loss with the air of making a positive success.

If we imagine a French leader of his Countrymen able to take a wide and brave view of the situation, how would he address his countrymen ? Would it not be something after this fashion ? " We have suffered great wrongs and great losses. Germany in the past has inflicted terrible injuries on us, and her spirit towards us is still revengeful and dangerous. Therefore we must take every precaution to protect ourselves effectually for the future. How shall we do this ? In times past we tried to get safety by annexations, by creating buffer-States, by striving to divide our Eastern neighbours into small warring - and jealous Powers. Germany, when she was the victor, pursued a similar policy with us. Her soldiers declared that she could be safe only if she had a scientific frontier, and that she could not have that type of frontier unless Alsace-Lorraine was annexed. In both cases the policy of annexation, subtle statecraft, and the scientific frontier proved a tragic failure. Napoleon III., by his intrigues and his opposition to German unity, Only helped to drive Germany together and to make the. War of 1870 inevitable. Bismarck held that he could not make the German Empire while- France was strong as well as hostile. Next, Germany was ruined by similar causes. Her present situation is due in the last resort to her annexation of the French Provinces. By that she made Europe an armed camp with war as its ultimate destiny. Let us learn and profit by this lesson, and seek safety in some better -way. Permanent and real security can be had only through a contented and peaceful people on our Eastern frontier. A people conquered, dis- membered, poor, unhappy, and influenced by hatred and revenge will never be that. Again, no race that has .once been united and is full of national consciousness and pride will ever submit to artificial separation. Till it is joined together once more it will have .a unity of purpose so intense that nothing will stand against it. If the German kin is left by itself to work out its own salvation it will be split by a hundred divergent interests, and so will-not trouble about the past or its neighbours. United by racial pride, it will become an infernal machine for restoring the Fatherland. Therefore our path to real security can never be through annexations, separatism and a scientific frontier. Let the Germans quarrel among themselves as to who brought them to their ruin. Do not let us substitute France for the Kaiser and the militarists, and .join Socialists, Communists and Mon- archists in a common hate- of us."

So might speak the Pericles of France. And he would be right It is because we feel this so strongly that we have run the risk of appearing to be . the enemies of France and not what we are—her true friends.