M. FERRY'S REAL DIFFICULTY.
GENERAL CAMPENON'S recent admissions, if they are correctly reported, show that the trying moment for M. Ferry is rapidly approaching. A very few days may severely test both his political nerve and his ascendancy over his countrymen. Hitherto his policy in Asia, by which he fully admits that he must stand or fall, has been moderately suc- cessful, and has looked more successful than it is. The object of that policy is a great one, larger than is quite understood in England, where its true meaning is concealed by a misconcep- tion of the word "colonial." M. Ferry is no% seeking to found any " colony " in Asia. He knows at least as well as his English critics that Frenchmen dislike emigration, that France has no working population to spare, that the middle-clam Frenchman seeks any career in preference to a struggle with the jungle or the prairie, and that if he conquers half a continent, its carrying-trade will fall to Englishmen and Germans. Even if it were not so, M. Ferry is a fairly cultivated man, and is about as unlikely to select fully-populated tropical deltas for experiments in colonisation as any English Secretary for the Colonies. He is animated by a very different and in one way much larger ambition,—to conquer, if he can, an India for France. Like all Continental statesmen, he overrates the value of India to Great Britain, and hopes to acquire for France a similar tropical empire, with industrious millions already settled, cultivations already flourishing, and wide plains where French planters, with their capacity for organising agri- cultural labour, may acquire rapid fortunes. His project is to conquer Indo-China—that is, French Cochin-China, Anam, Tonquin, Cambodia, Siam, and Hainan—and so form a vast dependent empire, covering in the aggregate about 500,000 square miles of the most fertile soil, with a coast line of a thousand miles, pierced in all directions by navigable rivers, and inhabited by 30,000,000 of industrious, unwarlike, and, on the whole, teachable people, who, whether they submit to be governed by planters or not—and they will submit—will pay millions of revenue, support a strong Asiatic army, and provide posts for thousands of French functionaries. This design he has pursued with great skill, great unscrupulousness, and a large measure of success. In the short space of two years he has so far advanced that he has acquired, besides the sovereignty of French Cochin-China, which he inherited from the Empire, full rights of control in Anam ; has occupied and partially pacified Tonquin ; has annexed Cambodia ; has started claims in pursuit of which he could at any moment occupy Bangkok, the nerve-centre of Siam ; and has so isolated Hainan that he has only to land troops to take complete possession of that grand island. He has, in addition, obtained coal-mines at Kelung, which will make him inde- pendent of foreign supplies. He is as near to the conquest of Indo-China as ever Dupleix was to the conquest of Southern India ; and if his countrymen were like him, or would even follow him steadily, we do not doubt that within ten years France would be in possession of a great and potentially rich Oriental Empire, as well worth having as Bengal Proper, where we English also live as soldiers, functionaries, traders, and planters, and not as Colonists in the proper sense.
Fortunately, or unfortunately for the world, M. Ferry has a dangerous, it may be an insuperable, obstacle in his way, and that is the character of his people. They are bold and ambitious, desirous of empire, and eager beyond measure for quickly-made fortunes ; but they will not sacrifice their money and their children steadily for years for an object which they cannot see, and which may interfere with the successful pursuit of objects underneath their eyes. If they would, all difficulties would be practically over; for there is only one obstacle other than the French nature worth considering, and that would, by September, 1885, be swept out of the way. That obstacle is China, and, if France were resolved, China would, in a few months, be compelled to make peace. The whole teaching of recent events in Asia goes to prove that the power of Pekin has lately been exaggerated,— that the efforts made by her statesmen to provide a mobile army have been only partially successful, that her soldiers will not stand up to artillery in the open, that her forts cannot resist European ships, and that her Fleet is of no account. Consequently, if France is willing to expend about as much money as we wasted in Afghanistan, and 50,000 soldiers of the Line, France can occupy Pekin and dictate a peace which will leave her in peaceful possession of Indo- China. There is no native resisting force in all the kingdoms which M. Ferry desires that could offer embarrassing resist- ance. The Indo-Chinese, a few mountaineers excepted, are not in themselves warriors ; and though they may give trouble here and there, and perhaps worry the departments seriously by the systematic poisoning of unpopular individuals—a method of assassination which already harasses French ad- ministration in Hu—they will only fight hard when they think themselves supported by China, to them the greatest Empire in the world. It is China alone which is in the way of the great project, and the French, if they please, can defeat China ; but then, will the French please? M. Ferry evidently thinks they will not, refuses to summon the Chambers, and strains every nerve to frighten Pekin into submission without actually landing an invading army. He is destroying the Chinese fleet, seizing the Chinese coal-mines, and battering down Chinese forts and arsenals, all in the hope that the Peace Party in Pekin may ultimately prevail, and that he may get his way without calling upon France for a great effort. We do not think he will succeed. It is impossible for any European to understand fully the interaction of the parties at Pekin, where a Ministry may be crashed by a memorial from a bold Censor, and difficult to feel certain as to the chances of insurrection ; but the known facts are not in favour of Chinese submission. The bombardment of Foochow has aroused nothing but anger at Pekin, and the populace are represented as eager for continued war. The dynasty would suffer greatly by consenting to yield territory to the threats of a single Power ; the Chinese statesmen have never appeared to care for attacks upon the outposts, or for the loss of Customs duties ; and the Government has the means of attacking France by land—a privilege not enjoyed in any former war with France or England. It can, if time is granted, pour troops in large numbers into Tonquin, and continue pouring them ; it has despatched General Tso to the South, with orders to attempt that enterprise, and with, it is believed, 60,000 well-armed troops who are slowly marching to Bacninh. As General Tso has hitherto never failed, it is hardly possible that until he is defeated Pekin should yield ; and if it does not yield, M. Ferry has but two courses to pursue. He may seize Hainan and defend Tonquin against the advancing multitudes, or he may march upon the capital. Either of those courses will, however, demand the support of the Chambers, which must sanction a large vote of money, and a dangerous dislocation of the "Continental Army" of France. The "Colonial Army" certainly cannot take Pekin, and almost as certainly cannot defend Tonquin against a persistent attack. The force of 18,000 men, of which that army consists, is already overtaxed with its work in Tunis, Madagascar, and Anam ; its ranks grow thinner every week from disease ; and General Millot is believed to have demanded rein- forcements in terms which have led to his honourable recall. At the same time, General Campenon, Minister of War, is reported to have stated positively that he can only send 6,000 men from the Continental Army without dislocating its organisation to such a degree that, if France were attacked, her Army could not be mobilised with sufficient speed. That is quite possible, as the men sent abroad cannot be first-year's men, or they would die too quickly, and cannot be third-year's men, or their time might expire while still engaged, and the statement virtually amounts to this. The Chamber must either consent to ran a grave risk, and part with a whole Corps d'Arrnee, held necessary for the defence of France, or call out the Reserves with no invasion in prospect, or refuse to sanction M. Ferry's schemes,—that is, abandon Tonquin. To the first proposal it is said General Campenon declares he will not listen ; the second is practically impossible ; and the third cannot be carried out by M. Ferry. It is possible, of course, that the Premier, with his decision and his success, may supersede General Campenon, and then persuade the Chamber into a great vote ; but it is more likely that the majority will refuse assent. The Deputies are able to say that they have voted hitherto in reliance on M. Ferry's declaration that there would be no war with China ; the peasants are sure to be aroused by the proposal, and the Army, however weary of inaction, is not in favour of war in regions where, as the soldiers well know, the losses in hos- pital and through invaliding will far exceed any to be suffered in the field. It is useless to predict, and we acknow- ledge fully that M. Ferry is a man of unusual energy and resource ; but still, we suspect that the Premier, like Dupleix, like Lally, like Labourdonnais, like Maximilian of Mexico, may find himself deserted at the eleventh hour, his employers being unwilling to endure the continuous sacrifices necessary in order to succeed. That has been the history of France in Asia, and a nation rarely departs from the line chalked-out for it by its own qualities. Frenchmen in business can be the most persistent of mankind ; but of all peoples, they are anxious for quick and large returns.
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