Great Britain and India
The purpose of this page is to ventilate that moderate Indian opinion which, recognizing all the difficulties, yet believes in the continued association of Great Britain and India within the loose framework of the British Commonwealth of Nations.
The Simon Commission and the Central Government
IT i8 impossible within the limits of space allotted by the Editor to express one's views upon all the important questions covered by the Simon Commission Report. I therefore propose to deal only with the problems connected with the constitution of the central government of British India. Excluding the question of Defence, this is the most important of the topics dealt with in the Report. I must content myself with giving the barest summary of the reasons for my conclusions.
The Commission observe that there is really one India, but that the unity of India includes the Indian States as well as British India. But this recognition is not followed up to all its logical consequences. They suggest nothing to bring about the realization of this unity, unless they consider that the formulation of the federal ideal is e. step towards the same.
Federalism implies the derivation and limitation of the central authority by the constituent States or provinces, the vesting of residuary powers in the constituent members, the comparative weakness of the central government, the potentiality of friction between the central government and the provincial or State governments, and the encouragement of particularism, communalism and provincial patriotism as opposed to a sense of Indian nationalism and broad-minded citizenship. The strong communal tendencies and other centrifugal forces of India can be checked and the national consolidation promoted, only by a strong central government with powers of intervention when necessary. This can be secured only by the adoption of a unitary form of government as the future ideal.
Unitary government is quite compatible with a very large amount of devolution and decentralization even by statute. The future ideal must be considered from the point of view (a) of British India, (b) of the Indian States. From the stand- point of British India, its consolidation has been effected by the present unitary structure, and national solidarity can be promoted only by the continuance of the same structure. Progress must be on the line of the existing system, i.e., by moving forward on the existing rails and not by reversing the engine and diverting it to a new line.
It is admitted by the Commission that the conditions necessary for the development of a federal structure do not now exist in India, that the present unitary government must be broken up, that new political entities with provincial patriotisms will have to be brought into existence, that it is a most difficult task to carry out the two processes of devolu- tion and integration simultaneously, that federalism is only an intermediate stage between separate States and a consoli- dated unitary State, that the general tendency of federations is towards increasing centralization, and that it is not now possible to predict or formulate the structure or form of the federal government which they hold out as a remote ideal. Nevertheless, the Commission are anxious to destroy the present structure of the Indian Legislature for the purpose of leaving the door open for the Indian States to walk in at some future time. The implications and obligations of genuine federalism are not realized by the Indian Princes, and they are not likely to be realized fora long time to come. The false and vicious analogies of the old German Federation and the League of Nations, suggested by the Commission, make one doubt whether the Commission themselves have realized the realities of the situation. From the standpoint of the Indian States also, the federal ideal is not practicable for a long time. For a detailed exposition of the subject I would refer readers to my book on Indian Constitutional Problems. The term "federal union" appeals to minds without any clear conception of the subject, to communalists and to Indian Princes.
Before proceeding to consider the changes in the structure of the central legislature recommended by the Simon Commis- sion, I should like to point out that their bald endorsement without argument of the view of the -Butler Committee in favour of the theory of direct relations between the Indian Princes and the British Crown as distinguished from the Government of India cannot command any acceptance in British India. This doctrine must prove a permanent wedge between British India and the Indian States, and prevent the political union of all-India and its advance towards Dominion status. Can this be an explanation of the readiness with which the Princes' theory has been accepted by the Butler Committee and by the Simon Commission ?
It is argued by the Simon Commission that a federal structure can alone provide a framework for the union of dements of diverse internal constitution and of communities in different stages of development and of special and backward areas. One would have thought that this was a strong argument for the unitary type of government. The federal type of government implies the union of provincial govern- ments with complete internal autonomy. Whatever may be the form of internal government, federalism implies the non-interference of the central government in matters of internal administration and the absense of all control or guidance. When it is said that the federal structure alone will enable the inclusion of special and backward areas, do the Commission mean that they are fit for internal autonomy and that no control from the centre is necessary ? It is hardly credible that they do. But if they do not, the facts indicate the need for a unitary structure. The diversity of conditions and needs can be provided for by decentralization by a unitary government as much as by a federal type. But the existence of a supreme central government will serve the essential purpose of preventing serious aberrations of the provinces from their proper orbits.
It is said that, during the march of India to her goal, it is essential to maintain the strength of the central administra- tion to ensure peace and safety. This need will continue even after the attainment of the goal and can be best met by a unitary type accompanied by decentralization.
It is urged that the area and population of India require a system of indirect election and that that system is more in keeping with, or rather calls for, a federal structure. The electioneering difficulties referred to by the Commission must be solved by the development of party organizations for which the Commission do not wish to provide any facilities. The adoption of the indirect method will be attended by serious disadvantages It would prevent that contact between the voter and the member which, the Commission admit, is essential to representative democracy, (2) it would afford no training to the voter in the decision of all-India issues. Probably the Commission do not desire to promote the competency of the elector in such matters.
The Commission would apparently be content with a unicameral legislature, though they are prepared to tolerate the existence of the Council of State. According to their scheme, the federal assembly must be representative of the ultimate units of federation, i.e., the provinces.
Unless the representatives of each province are required to record a single block vote, it is difficult to see how they can prevent .difference of opinion among the representatives of the same province. Indirect election will not really secure the object. We do not know of any case of a unicameral federal legislature. The two principles which underlie the structure of every federal government -are that, while the -upper chamber is a sop to the desire for equality of the con- stituent States, the lower chamber is invariably elected directly by the people and represents the sovereignty of the nation and the responsibility of the legislature to it. What trace is there of any recognition of this fundamental principle of federalism in the structure of the central government proposed by the Commission ? The principle of indirect election to the Senate was tried in America and abandoned. The Commission take a very long view indeed of the develop- ment of Indian self-government, so long that it cannot be realized within any -measurable distance of tune.
What India needs .is a strong central government founded
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