6 SEPTEMBER 1957, Page 8

A Link in a Chain

By GUY WINT and PETER CALVOCORESSI Between the Russian deal with Egypt two years ago and the deal with Syria today lies a chain reaction. The links are plain—the rebuff to Egypt over the Aswan Dam, the nationalisation of the Canal, the Suez adventure, the Eisenhower Doctrine, King Saud's reception in Washington, plot and counter-plot in Jordan (with warships off). A sequence like this goes on until it gets out of control. The Middle East today is what the Balkans were before 1914.

Can the chain reaction be broken? History has more examples of rivalry consummated in con- vulsion than dissipated by prudence. But it is clear that the interest of the West would be served best by a disengagement of the Great Powers, which would leave the Arab countries free to work out their own destiny, by conflict or agree- ments, without the intervention of external Great Powers. The supreme interest of the West in the Arab lands is to purchase oil. Whatever Arab power came to the top as the result of an Arab free-for-all would be willing and anxious to sell its oil. Is it Utopian to think that the axe might even now be laid to the root of the competition between the Great Powers?

Some encouragement may be found in past history. The Anglo-Russian understanding of 1907 called off competition in three countries; and the agreement was honcktred. At the end of the last century there was competition between the Western Powers fur spheres of influence in China. This might have led to tension as acute as in the Middle East today.

But with the turn of the century there began a new tolerence by the powers of one another's activities in China, based upon the principle that China war to be open to them all, and it con- tinued ur.,t1 Japan created a new situation. A consortium of the powers was formed for the purpose of lending to China without competing among themselves.

That may be a model to stimulate new diplo- matic effort over the Middle East. But certainly. it will be foolish not to recognise how great are the difficulties. The Americans and the Russians are no doubt afraid of war, but they are not seriously afraid of anything else, and they have no cause to be afraid of anybody at all except one another. So they are under no external com- pulsion to compose or control their differences. There is, too, a second general reason for being gloomy. The Cold War is being conducted upon an assumption that was once valid but is so no longer, and until this false assumption is cleared away, clear thinking and right action are unlikely.

It used to be true, and it is still generally be- lieved, that the Russo-American conflict was an unequal one—that the Americans had something more than the Russians, and could threaten and scare the Russians more than the Russians could threaten and scare the Americans. Policies took account of this useful fact. But the first Russian H-bomb explosion altered the facts, if not the attitudes, and now on the heels of the Syrian affair comes the news that the Russians, succeed- ing where the Americans recently misfired, have launched an intercontinental rocket missile. The competition is no longer unequal and it has be- come hopeless for the Americans to try and prevent the Russians from doing in the Middle East anything that they themselves are trying to do. The RuSsian advance in Syria is indeed an illustration of the equivalence of the two great powers since by it the Russians acquire in Syria just the sort of foothold that the Americans have in Saudi Arabia.

The Great Power rivalry which must be stopped is firstly competition in the sale of arms, secondly in economic aid at bargain prices. Do any instru- ments exist which can be adapted for the pur- pose? The Tripartite Declaration, today too lightly written off because of past history, aimed at the international rationing of arms for the region. It became obsolete when Russia set itself up as an independent source, and broke the, Cartel. The only way to restore the position is to reconstitute the Cartel with Russia on the inside. The next requirement is an international system for the supply of economic needs, likewise includ- ing Russia. It might take the form of a Middle East Development Corporation, perhaps a special- ised agency of the United Nations. Competitive offers by the powers to give aid would thus be superseded.

What would have to be sacrificed in present Western policies and commitments• if these new lines were followed? The Baghdad Pact would take a new colour. It need not be abrogated; treaties of this kind are seldom terminated. But its emphasis might change so that the parts providing for economic co-operation became predominant, in harmony with any larger international plans. The West would lose little if the military part of the alliance faded into the background.

The instinct of the Western countries in a crisis in the Middle East has been to reach out for the Baghdad alliance; but this has added to tension and has given the West no extra military strength. The Eisenhower Doctrine needs less change pro- vided flat it is implemented as it was first' envisaged. It is a policy of being firm to th' Russians and bountiful to the Arabs. It ought no to be changed. .

But it is a policy for the short term, and the problem for Washington is to look beyond, an( meanwhile not to foul the policy by inconsisten actions such as displaying military might in Arat affairs instead of reserving it for keeping out th( Russians. The military agreement with King Saw and the movement of the Sixth Fleet at the tiro( of the Jordan crisis are mistakes in point.

If advances of this kind were made to Russia now, they would very possibly be rejected. Russia may be elated by its Syrian success. But the sam( motives which impel the West to search for tranquilliser may in the long run operate will Moscow; the Middle East, in present conditions is too dangerous as the source from which ma) come the Third World War, or a limited wal whose control would strain diplomacy too far.

But a Great Power concert is at least a pos. sibility. Until it has been explored, it is foolish tc be too sceptical. The alternatives are reasonably clear—either a continuation of the present com• petition, leading to more incidents and final disaster; or agreement, open or tacit, to call ofl the competition. If the first prevails, we shall con- tinue along a bad road which has already shaken us severely, and has worse in store.