CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S ANXIETIES
Commonwealth and Foreign
[To the Editor of Tax Seac-rAron .1 SIR,—Like all visitors to this country I have been amazed by the calm with which the events of the past few weeks have been received. Not understanding altogether how the Austro-German agreement could be regarded with such equanimity, nor how far direct negotiation with Germany could be welcomed by one of the smaller of her neighbours, I have tried to gauge well-informed opinion on the present international situation.
The results of the London Conference are accepted here as satisfactory. After the reoccupation of the Rhine and the unopposed denunciation of the Locarno Treaty it was realised in Prague that direct negotiations with Germany were essential. Everything, however, it is considered, depends on what basis these negotiations arc to take place. It is an essential principle of Czechoslovak policy that the map of Europe is indivisible. Though Czechoslovakia will welcome a guarantee of the Rhine as of great value to her also, she believes that peace cannot be secured anywhere in Europe unless it is secured everywhere, and that if in return for a new Locarno Germany is given a free hand in the East, war will break out as certainly and as disas- trously over the whole of Europe as if it had broken out on the Rhine. If it is dangerous to allow Europe to develop into two hostile blocs, it is even more dangerous to divide it into secure and insecure frontiers.
Even were it desirable it is not here considered possible to limit negotiations to Western Europe. France is too closely tied to her Eastern European allies, for reasons of interest alone, to regard their fate with indifference. Moreover, it is believed in Prague that as the danger of war grows, the realisation will grow in England that the interests of the British Empire can also be threatened in Central Europe. This " fortress erected by God," as Bismarck called Bohemia, is the strongest bulwark, in Central Europe against pan-German expansion in the East and South-East of Europe. If this bulwark is once broken, not only will Central Europe and the Balkans be exposed, but the way will lie open to the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Prague, for Germany at any rate, lies on the route to India ; Czechoslovakia, moreover, is the keystone in the present European structure. The route from Germany to Russia is usually thought to lie through the Baltic countries, through Lithuania and Estonia. Once Czechoslovakia had lost her independence, it could run profitably-through the oil-fields of Roumania and the corn-fields of the Ukraine. It is for these reasons that Czechoslovakia believes that in all European negotiations the question of Central Europe must arise. Appreciation of this fact is seen in M. Delbos' declaration to M. Masaryk, Czechoslovak Minister in London, that in all European negotiations France would take into account the interests of her Central European allies, and especially those of Czechoslovakia, and the assurance which Mr. Eden gave to Dr. Krofta, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister, at Geneva, that England would not forget the interests of the Danubian countries. It is believed here that the inde- pendent and undisturbed existence of Czechoslovakia is a European interest, and that if this is recognised by France and by England, the danger of an attack is infinitesimal. Czechs are firmly opposed to the view that territorial revision can in any way solve the difficulties of Central Europe, for they believe that these are primarily economic and must be SolVed by peaceful means., Taking into account the present serious international situation, the news of the Austro-German. pact was received calmly in Prague. It was fully understood • that it could enormously assist the Nazi penetratiOU of Austria,and it is realised that the danger of an internal gleichschaltung is imminent. But, as the . danger of . a Greater Germany increases, the danger of an active Italian-German alliance diminishes. Italy could .never welcome a strong, nationalist Germany on the Brenner Pass, nor could she afford to have Trieste threatened. For this reason, Prague has never Eelieved in the solid, firm and active alliance between Berlin and Rome which has been the bogey of England and France during the last twelve months. Ari internal 8/eiclischaltUng of Austria and Germany represents too great a danger for Italian political and economic interests in the Balkans and for her post-War frontier for her to he altogether at her ease in a Europe which is divided either into two blocs or into a secure Western and insecure • Eastern zone. The collaboration of Italy and Germany is limited by the interests of the one' and of the other, and the more these are defined, the more they conflict.
The immediate effect of 'the Austro-German Agree- ment, concluded under the auspices of Italy, was to strengthen the Little Entente. Jugoslavia had: been toying with. the advances of Germany, both:for economic reasons and as a means of defying Italy.. The disclosure of the Italian-German detente was a shock which reminded her that only in the framework of her traditional' allies could she be certain 'of defending her own' interests. Separated as she was from Germany by Austria, She had tended to underestimate the danger of pan-German- ism. The approach. to the Danube which the agreement may mean woke her to the dangers which pan-Germanism had in store for her also.
However, manifest though the potential:, dangers of the Austro-German Agreement are, it is wrong to suppose that the agreement was regarded -only negatively in Prague. It was appreciated that it had diminished the immediate danger of war by eliminating one 'of the most dangerous questions of Central Europe. Furthermore, it is hoped that Germany, now that she has, for the moment at any rate, settled her :conflict . with Austria, will be able to take a part in solving the .economic problems of . the Danubian countries. Czechoslovakia has always emphasised the impossibility of making any durable economic arrangements for South-Eastern Europe, either without or in opposition to -Germany. Every attempt which has been made to 'organise the economic life of the Danube basin has failed through the opposition either of Italy or of Gerrnany. Czecho- slovakia is willing to enter into new negotiations, and believes that the extent to which Italy and Germany are ready , to co-ordinate their economic and political interests in South-Eastern. Europe will be the measure of the efficacy of the German-Italian detente. The questions to- be solved are complicated not only from the -economic but from the political angle. Dr. Krofta in his speech:, to the National: Asseinbly in May stressed the fact that Czechoslovakia desired '" a purely economic co-operation, free from all specific political influences from whatever quarter they might come." To . this end Czechoslovakia is willing to enter into negotiations with the Powers concerned, but 'she cat- egorically denies that this will ever be done without the full. knowledge and full agreement of her allies of. the Little Entente, France and Russia.----1 am, Sir, yours, &c., A CORRESPONDENT IN PRAGUE.
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