POLITICS
George Robertson has done well out of the war the peace will be harder
BRUCE ANDERSON
Sir Michael Jackson has suddenly become everyone's favourite General. Not since Sir John Harding was Governor of Cyprus has any soldier stood so high in pub- lic esteem, and rightly so. But George Robertson has a special reason for being grateful to Mike Jackson. The General's con- duct on the morning when Nato moved into Kosovo helped to ensure that Mr Robertson became the next Secretary-General of Nato.
While the troops went into action, Nato's supreme commander (Saceur), Wes Clark, was clucking around his headquarters like a demented hen. He was constantly telephon- ing General Jackson, whose patience finally snapped. In robust Anglo-Saxon monosylla- bles, Mike Jackson told his superior officer to get off the phone and stay off; he needed the line free for his own command purposes. When General Clark took umbrage, Gener- al Jackson interrupted him. If you are unhappy about me, he told the American, ask Sir Charles Guthrie to sack me. Wes Clark retired hurt.
News of the exchange spread rapidly round the Pentagon; the universal reaction was one of unalloyed delight. Wes Clark had been a political appointment to Nato, by a President whom most of the American senior military despise. Although he had been a brave — and decorated — company commander in Vietnam, he had little subse- quent experience of operational command and is a compulsive interferer. One evening ' last summer, some Serb thugs arrived in Banja Luka with baseball clubs. There was every likelihood of broken heads before close of play. A British company comman- der would be expected to sort out such a sit- uation; if he radioed to battalion HQ for guidance, he would be marked down. But the American commander in Banja Luka was being phoned every quarter of an hour by General Clark, who was virtually taking personal command of a police operation. This and similar incidents led many observers to conclude that Wes Clark was much the worst Saceur ever.
He was appointed to Nato because he came from Arkansas and was prepared to truckle to political correctness. The Ameri- can military feared that these same qualities might propel him to a further promotion, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. But Wes Clark's telephonic dithering, followed by his hysterical reaction to the Russians' dash for Pristina, equipped his many enemies in Washington with the ammunition they need- ed to destroy his career. So in the Pentagon, General Jackson is a hero and Britophilia is rampant. George Robertson had a good Kosovo, and had already built up excellent relations with the US top brass; his appoint- ment is welcomed. As one American put it, 'With George, we feel that we are dealing with one of our own.'
There had been another strong British candidate: John Major. But Bill Clinton has never forgiven Mr Major for the Tories' sup- posed role in uncovering damaging material about him during the 1992 presidential cam- paign. After Mr Clinton was elected, Robin Renwick, our then ambassador to the US, was sure that the resentments would quickly fade. They had been most strongly felt among 'the kids who had gone to Little Rock with their sleeping bags'. They would not be seeing much of the President for the next few years, while Mr Clinton himself would quick- ly discover that office brought wider perspec- tives. But Sir Robin had overestimated the new President's maturity. Far too many of the kids merely moved their sleeping bags to the White House, and the wide perspectives quickly gave way to the character issue which has dogged the Clinton presidency. No wonder the Tories' 1992 research — about which Mr Major knew nothing — offended Bill Clinton; he knows better than anyone how much dirt there is to dig. It is a pity that the Tories were not more successful.
John Major also has enemies on the Con- tinent. The Belgians have not forgiven him for blocking Jean-Luc Dehaene's appoint- ment as President of the European Commis- sion. Indeed, the Belgians are now trying to push M. Dehaene for Nato, and have man- aged to delay the Robertson appointment for a few hours. M. Dehaene is a respectable Belgian politician, in that he has not been accused of child molestation. In military matters, Belgium made its one significant post-war contribution during the build-up to the Gulf war: it refused to sell ammunition to Britain. Its armed forces would just about be capable of mounting an honour guard outside a chocolate factory, and as for its involvement in the high councils of Nato, there is an Afrikaner word to describe that, which may also work in Flemish — kortgat- syndroem: short-arse syndrome.
In one respect, it is surprising that Mr Blair was prepared to countenance the Robertson appointment, for Mr Robertson is the only one of his Cabinet ministers who has been a consistent success. Never a flashy per- former, he is always a safe pair of hands. He would not only be a good Ulster Secretary; he is the only plausible alternative Foreign Secretary available to Mr Blair (with the pos- sible exception of Kenneth Clarke). Admit- tedly, Robin Cook has discovered a strategy for survival, the only one which could possi- bly work for him: to do nothing. But if Mr Blair should need a gaffe-free Foreign Sec- retary between now and the election, he might regret Mr Robertson's departure.
Unlike the hapless M. Dehaene, George Robertson is well qualified for Nato. But he will inherit one problem. It is no longer clear what Nato is for. In purely military terms, Kosovo was a success. But it created at least as many difficulties as it resolved; anyone who thought that the war was troublesome should contemplate the peace. Kosovo raised complex questions about Nato's out- of-area role, without assuaging fears over Euro-American divergence. There are hopes that matters will be eased by General Clark's departure. But there are also fears that American military doctrine is still corrupted by the casualty-averse mentality created by Vietnam. It was premature to believe that this had been cured in the Gulf.
Some Americans think that Kosovo can be a paradigm for all future wars, and for any American involvement in European defence. The bombers will take off from their bases in Missouri at first light, drop their load, and be home by nightfall. But it is easy to envisage circumstances in which Europe will need the Americans on the ground and in force.
Yet some Europeans are unwittingly encouraging those Americans who are attracted by disengagement. If the EU calls for a European defence policy, plenty of American politicians will agree. Your GDP is greater than ours, they will say; why should you not pay for your own defence? If the EU persists in pretending to have a com- mon defence policy, there may come a day when a US administration pretends to believe it. Then we would be in a mess.
George Robertson owes his new job to Kosovo, but Kosovo will be of little use to him as he undertakes his responsibilities. Intellectually, he is a keen European but, in his viscera, he is a good British patriot. It is to be hoped that in any gut versus brain con- flict, the viscera will come out on top.
Previous page
