7 DECEMBER 1861, Page 10

THE ATTITUDE OF FRANCE ON THE SAN jACINTO AFFAIR. TF

the French press were free, its tone on the San 1 Jacinto affair might be accepted as eminently satis- factory, for its arguments, compliments, and invectives, all lead to the same conclusion : the public law of Europe must be maintained, whatever the exigencies under cover of which a new State may endeavour to set it aside. Indeed, the French journalists, in their anxiety lest we should permit our honour to suffer, are actually just to England, and allow, with a natural sigh of regret, that magnanimous self-re- straint is compatible with a free and vigorous national life. Unfortunately every journal in France is either " official," or " denii-official," or " officious," or " inspired," or " quasi- inspired," or deserves some other one of the hdndred epithets by which Frenchmen strive to conceal from themselves that in France free thought is an Imperial prerogative. English- men are therefore compelled to ask what this sudden amity may mean. Louis Napoleon is not a man to be moved by the spectacle of popular self-restraint, nor is he in any marked degree a fanatic for international law, yet with a great loan still to raise, and a great deficit yet to fill up, he seems to be eager for a war, which, for a time at least, will shake every Bourse in. Europe. Sovereigns think of their own States first, and for the hour the first need of France would seem to be a high price for Rentes. Yet the Emperor obviously urges war, and the " inspired." papers shrewdly enough call on. England to resist an outrage which France would ere this have avenged. We believe that a war between 1 gland and the North would delight the Emperor for the same reason that it would please some of the cotton spinners—it would make cotton cheap. The failure of the cotton supply presses on France even more heavily than on England, so heavily, indeed, that the French Embassy has been suspected at Washington of an actual wish to produce a war, or such a suspension of in- tercourse as should excuse them in breaking the blockade. The discontent of the workmen affects the Cabinet even more than the deficit, for the latter only menaces France, while the former threatens the throne. At the same time the Emperor, unwilling to engage in maritime war, until secure of British support, is only too glad to see us engage in a correspondence which may solve his difficulty and set cotton free, yet throw on him none of the odium of breaking the general peace. There may be a side glance, too, at the diminished part which England, hampered by war in the West, must play in the politics of Europe, a thought that, the financial difficulty once removed, the spring might be the hour for the Rhine. Nor do we deny that the wrath of France against America is in part a genuine feeling. France, unless misled by her own interests, seldom approves of high- handed breaches of law, and is by no means inclined to violate those rules which conduce to the self-respect of neutrals. But beneath and beyond all these motives there exists a de- lighted conviction that England must take on herself the responsibility which the Emperor knows neither how to ac- cept or avoid. We believe, therefore, all the assurances reiterated by the French press, so far as they indicate that the Emperor ap- proves our action. If Louis Napoleon be, as he professes, the armed protector of civilization, the cause is one which, as it stands, may well enlist him on our side. If, on the other hand, he is simply a despot, a little abler than most or his class, he has selfish reasons enough to engage his strongest support. But while willing to recognize any amount of approval, and grateful for any cessation of groundless attacks, we deprecate attempts to carry good feeling further than the expressions of friendly concern. We protest in limine against any attempt to devise a plan of joint action against America. England cannot, with any due regard to her interests, con- sent to a joint interpretation of her right to the freedom of the seas. Still less can she suffer France to decide on the limit or mode of the reparation to be exacted from the United States. There are questions on which joint action is possible, and some few, as for example the MexiCan one, on which it is beneficial. But no American quarrel can ever be reckoned among them. The American traditions of the two Powers are too widely distinct to admit of coherent action. The French still believe, with a pardonable national pride, that the people who over half Canada still retain their lan- guage, long for the country they have lost for a century, and contrast freedom and Cmsarism to the praise of the modern. Cmsar. Canada may yet be invaded, and the efforts England would make to defend her dependency would not be those most highly appreciated in France. Thee.— though if the war once begins, England may break the blockade—she has no genuine sympathy with slaveholders, no toleration for the extension of slavery, no wish to see President Davis ruling from the White House. France— though we believe her sentiment is strong against slavery- makes every principle bow to the passion for military success. Then England has frontiers to guard on the American con- tinent, and France, when tired of the war, would scarcely fight on in order that British boundaries might not be exposed to a menace. It might be difficult, too, in joint ope- rations, absolutely to forbid the landing of Freneh brigades within our colonial borders ; and the French army is not precisely the body which Lord Monck desires or expects in Lower Canada. Above all, our commercial interests are not identical, and it is when the terms of peace come to be settled that alliances are so onerous. The North is certain in such a contingency to look to France as the mediator, and the Emperor—as the Crimean war showed—can placably play that part. " Codlin's your friend, not Short," said the showman to Little Nell, and we know no speech in fiction more irresistibly moving to laughter. But the part, when played by an Emperor to a State just thinking of making peace, would cease, we fear, to be comic. We are strong enough to do our own work, and bear our own burden ; and we must, in this instance, do and endure alone. To unite with France in to weaken our right to make war in our own way, to destroy our right to make peace at our own time, and to place our interests at the mercy of an ally who looks to ends other than the tranquil and regulated friendliness, which is the only relation to Ameriea this country desires to bear. We cannot protest, or even complain, at any action of France on her own behalf. If she breaks the blockade, or follows our steps in breaking it, or makes alliances with the South, or presses her own complaints, it is no part of our duty to interfere ; but any alliance to help us to maintain our rights might be as injurious to our interests as it would certainly- be derogatory to our honour.