TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE ASPECT OF THE WAR.
THE shouting which was so loud last week died away early this week into an apprehensive silence. It was suddenly per- ceived that the work to be done in Afghanistan had scarcely commenced, and that the country had undertaken a serious campaign. Bodies of Hillmen, estimated by the experienced correspondent of the Daily News at 4,000 men, had collected in the Khyber Pass, and had so cut off General Browne's commu- nications that he had been compelled to send back a European regiment to protect Ali Musjid ; General Biddulph, at Pisheen, was unable to advance, for want of supplies and supports ; and General Roberts, in the Koorum Valley, had suffered a repulse. He had on Friday made a " reconnaissance," or rather a tentative attack, on Peiwar, which convinced him that it could not be attacked in front, and he had therefore retired upon the Koorum Fort. A pause of some days in the receipt of intelligence suggested fears that he had been either repulsed again or had abandoned the undertaking, and it was half believed that the " check " so much talked of had occurred. All men familiar with the subject knew that such a " check " would be followed by a revolt among the Hillmen, who for ages have sided with the stronger party, and that with twenty or thirty thousand mountaineers eager for plunder and the slaughter of white Infidels, both Generals Browne and Biddulph might be placed in extreme danger.
Fortunately the choice of General Roberts has proved a wise one. He discovered a route by which the Peiwar position could be turned, a road called the Spin Gawi, and through this, on the night of 1st December, he made a most adven- turous and severe march, which brought him at daybreak on the flank of the enemy, who were driven in on the Peiwar Kotel, or position on the crest of the Peiwar. An attempt was made to carry this point by a direct attack, but the Afghans resisted desperately, and favoured by their position, as we understand the long telegram in the Standard, published on Friday, convinced General Roberts that his attack must fail. The impression on that correspondent—an officer, evidently—is that if this attack had been the only way of assault, the enterprise must have failed ; but General Roberts pushed his first brigade by another turning-path, till it was fairly in the rear of Peiwar Kotel. Then the Afghans, who up to this had offered a desperate resistance, and had caused a loss of four officers and about eighty men, lost heart, and as at Ali Musjid, fled in the night, leaving eighteen guns, their wounded, and considerable stores behind. The entire enterprise—carried on as it was, over the wildest of roads, up an ascent which, at Peiwar Kotel, is 8,000 feet above the level of the sea, and in the teeth of skilled artillerists—was a grand feat of arms ; but it is satisfac- tory to see that success was ultimately obtained by judgment, as well as valour. General Roberts is evidently a good choice, and in pressing on, as he is doing, to clear the Shaturgardan, reliance may well be placed upon his judgment. That Pass, in the opinion of many experienced soldiers, cannot, if defended, be carried ; but it is quite possible that the Afghans, who, like other Asiatics, are demoralised by retreat, and who have a habit when beaten of deserting in shoals, may leave the Camel's Neck to take care of itself, and fly on towards Cabul. In that event, General Roberts will have been the first of the three Generals to complete his work, and seize every obstacle which on his side separates India from Cabul. We believe the war unjust, but it is impossible to resist a feeling of national pride at the evidence which this success affords that the almost reckless dash of the Anglo-Indian Armies has suffered no diminution. Europeans in the Peiwar Kotel would have smashed the invading expedition, but it is just because our Generals recognise the difference between Europeans and Asiatics that we have been able to conquer India.
The second danger, the closing of the Bolan, remains as before. General Stewart, with his staff, is hurrying forward to take the command at Pisheen ; but he has left his division to move on more slowly, and it is so hampered by difficulties of transport, the camels perishing as in the old war, that it will be a month, at least, before it fairly reaches Quetta. Advance through the snow will be nearly impossible, and Candahar, therefore, must be left till the spring, or carried by a most risky, not to say foolhardy, rush, made by 5,000 men, almost without European support. The stay of the Division in Pisheen through the winter will not be enviable, but there are provisions and water, and we presume in time there will be a sufficiency of great-coats, although, to the disgrace of the Com- missariat, there are none now. Meanwhile, Sir Samuel Browne may be able to reach Jellalabad. The Viceroy believes that this fortified city has been evacuated, and certainly the most de- fensible Afghan position, the narrow defile, three-quarters of a mile long, in the Khoord Khyber Pass, has been left clear, and. the General may therefore before Christmas be safely housed.. General Maude has reached Peshawur with his Division, thereby securing the quiet of that dangerous Afghan city—the only one in India always held down by visible force—and standing ready to clear the Khyber, or to forward necessary rein- forcements to General Browne, who will need at least one more full Brigade before he ventures on his final advance.
The total result of the week, therefore, is most satisfactory:. The British hold, amidst snow and doubtful Hillmen, but still hold, the Afghan side of the mountains from Pisheen, past the Shaturgardan, north-east to Jellalabad, with positions in which they can, amidst much suffering, wait for propitious weather. It is now alleged that the Government intend to pause there, being in possession of what they consider a scientific frontier, and either make a Treaty with the Ameer, by which he shall cede the mountains and agree to accept Residents ; or if he is still refractory, await attack at his hands. If this report is correct, they will, as- the result of their expedition, stand in one of two positions. Either the Ameer will yield, or he will not. If he does yield, we shall be direct masters of the mountain barrier, and must- at vast expense coerce its tribes into obedience and order ; must erect a fortress in the Pisheen Valley, with forts on the Camel's Neck ; and must garrison the three positions with at least ten thousand men, who will in the end be a clear addition to the Indian Army. We must, moreover, watch, and control—that is, practically govern—all Afghanistan, a territory as large as France ; and help the Ameer in organising a thorough defence for the Passes of the Hindoo Koosh, besides inducing him to place his army, which will then be our own advance-guard, in thorough equipment and condition. Afghanistan, in short, will be the Indian frontier province,. though held as the Deccan plateau, which is nearly as large,. is held, through a native; rince, instead of a British Governor. That will be a most expensive and laborious task, undertaken,. as we think, without necessity, and for purposes which would be much better answered by the fortification of our own. side of the Suleiman. On the other hand, if the Ameer does not yield, we are in for a most tedious and exhaust- ing war. The Afghans will not leave us undisturbed ; they- care nothing about waste of life or prosperity ; and if we stand on the defensive, we shall be exposed to attacks in every month in the year, attacks intended to devastate every district upon which we must depend for supplies, and to excite every hill- tribe that happens to be discontented to armed revolt. Suck attacks may be repulsed, as similar attacks on a small scale are repulsed, in the Derajat ; but every month will cost us some good • officers' lives, while the attention of the Government of India will be permanently directed to the military position in Afghanistan. That situation is certain to end in conquest, in the transfer of the Army Northward, and the shifting of the Indian pivot of power from the coast, which is our true base, to the extreme North, where we are cut off from the sea, and hemmed in by a semi-hostile population. Short of the genuine conciliation of the Afghans and Hillmen—which we regard as impossible—that result of the war is one which, even if we held the war to be just, we could regard neither with confidence nor pleasure.
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