BOOKS.
POLITICIANS OF TO-DAY.* THESE sketches, Mr. Reid tells us, were "originally written to supply the readers of a provincial newspaper with informa- tion which they might have found it difficult to obtain in any other shape." The texture of the essays, it must be owned, par- takes largely of the ephemeral nature of their origin. They do not go much below the surface of any of the questions or characters which they discuss ; but they are pleasant reading, and display here and there considerable acuteness and insight into character. Mr. Reid is also very outspoken, and deals out what he considers justice impartially to friend and foe. His sketches of Sir William Harcourt and Mr. Edward Jenkins do not spare what Mr. Reid regards as serious drawbacks to their talents and usefulness ; nor does his somewhat unreasoning Russophobia blind him to the political inconsistencies and dis- loyalty to Liberal principles which characterised so large a portion of the late Mr. Roebuck's public life. The least satisfactory essays in the volumes are those on Lord Derby, Prince Gortchakoff, and Mr. Joseph Cowen. Either Mr. Reid has not seriously studied the literature of the Eastern Question, or his hatred of Russia and everything Russian has so obscured his judgment that he cannot see facts as they are and have been. "The Eastern Question," says Mr. Reid, "has exercised so marked an influence, not merely over Lord Derby's career, but over the position which he holds in the esteem of both political parties, that I may be forgiven if, in writing of him now, I consider almost exclusively his connection with that Question." The essay on Lord Derby is accordingly a defence of the late Foreign Secretary's conduct on the Eastern Question. Now we do not at present say that Lord Derby's conduct is not capable of defence ; but we do say most emphatically that Mr. Reid's defence of him does not fit the facts, and is therefore cal- culated to do Lord Derby more harm than good. We shall give Mr. Reid's defence, in his own words, and then compare it with the facts.
"The one offence with which Lord Derby was justly charge- able," according to Mr. Reid, "was that of having rejected the Berlin Memorandum." This is not strictly accurate, as we shall show presently ; but let it be so, for the moment. Mr. Reid thinks that Lord Derby had good and sufficient reasons for rejecting the Berlin Memorandum :—
"No one can read the despatches he wrote at this time without seeing that Lord Derby was fully impressed with the belief that there was—I will not say a plot—but at any rate a secret under- standing, between the three Emperors, with regard to Turkey. And even the superficial outsider, who had not access to those sources of information which Lord Derby could command, might have been forgiven if he came to a similar conclusion. The manner in which the three Emperors piled up one proposition upon another for the consideration of the wretched Sultan, offering him a fresh series of suggestions before even he had time to digest those which had pre- ceded them, whilst the evil genius of Abdul Aziz, the Russian General Ignatieff, was all the time acting as the practical director of the internal government of Turkey, must, I think, suggest, even to the most unprejudiced of men, that the Triple Alli- ance was bent upon pursuing some secret purposes of its own. Lord Derby, at any rate, saw clearly that Turkey was in part being lured, and was in part marching voluntarily, to its ruin ; and it is evident that he had no faith either in the real intentions or the public professions of the three Empires. When, therefore, having privately arranged a scheme of their own which must inevitably pat an end to the independence of Turkey, the Emperors invited England, by telegram, to make herself a party, on an hour's notice, to the scheme, he refused, and thus put an end to
'the concert of Europe' for the subjugation of the Porte In other words, he refused to support Russia, Germany, and Austria, in a course which he believed would lead, and was intended to lead, to a bloody and ruthless war, and to the partition of Turkey."
What strikes us most in this apology is its marvellous incon- sequence. Russia, Germany, and Austria, says Mr. Reid, were engaged in a secret plot to bring about a bloody war, which had for its object the partition of the Turkish Empire. Lord Derby strongly disapproved of this, and was anxious to prevent its execution. Therefore he "put an end to 'the concert of Europe," put an end, that is, to the only possible means of frustrating the conspiracy ! This is, in fact, to accuse Lord Derby either of political imbecility, or of secret participation in the conspiracy. And a cynic might point out that the only possible result of such diplomacy was what actually happened,—namely, "a bloody and ruthless war, and the partition of Turkey." We believe that Lord Derby, with the best intentions, and perhaps under the stress • Politicians of To-Day. By T. Wemyss Reid. 2 vols. London: Griffith and Farran. 1880.
of influences as yet unknown to the public, made serious an disastrous mistakes all through his diplomacy on the Eastern Question. But we have too much respect for his intellect and honesty to believe a word of the strange defence which Mr Reidhas set up for him. We proceed, therefore, to confront that defence with the facts, as they appear in official evidence.
Mr. Reid is in error in supposing that Liberals date the mis- takes of Lord Derby's diplomacy from the Berlin Memorandum. That was by no means the first blow which Lord Derby struck at "the concert of Europe." Lord Derby's first mistake was to underrate the significance of the insurrection in Bosnia and the Herzegovina. He called it "a petty local disturbance," and blamed the Porte for not promptly suppressing it. In his fear of political complications he forgot that the insurgents were more than justified in rebelling. When the "petty local disturbance" reached the dimensions of a dangerous insurrec- tion, Austria proposed a delegation of Consuls from the Great Powers to visit the chiefs of the insurgents, inquire into their grievances, and consult together as to their remedies. This proposal was at first opposed by Lord Derby. He yielded under pressure ; but, in doing so, he instructed the British Consul to "abstain from collective steps," and "rather act individually: This was the first blow at the European concert. The next was Lord Derby's treatment of the Andrassy Note. He agreed to it very reluctantly, and then wrote a despatch against it, an& instructed the British Ambassador at the Porte to abstain from supporting it in concert with the Ambassadors of the other Powers. This was his second decided blow at the European: concert. Then came the Berlin Memorandum, with its very mild proposals. Mr. Reid tells us that these proposals were "intended to lead to a bloody and ruthless war, and to the par- tition of Turkey." For this statement he offers no proof, and the facts are all against it. The Berlin Memorandum was un- doubtedly calculated to prevent war, and the French and Italian Governments implored Lord Derby to agree to it on that very ground. Moreover, Lord Derby's own proposals at the Constantinople Conference, seven months later, went far beyond the suggestions of the Berlin Memorandum. Nor is there any truth in the statement that "the three Emperors invited England by telegram to make herself a party, on an hour's notice, to the scheme." There is a plethora of evidence- to the contrary in the Parliamentary papers. Lord Derby was entreated not once, but repeatedly, by all the other Powers—by France most of all—to agree at least to the principle of the Memorandum,—namely, intervention on behalf of the insurgents in Bosnia and Herzegovina.. "Prince Bismarck admitted," says the British Ambassador at Berlin, "that the several articles of the Memorandum were open to discussion, and might be modified according to circumstances,. and that he, for one, would willingly entertain any improvement her Majesty's Government might have to propose."
The Russian Government appealed to Lord Derby to suggest an alternative policy :—" What was the solution of the difficulty which England desired to see adopted? What was the drift and object of British policy? If the London Cabinet has in view any means for obtaining this end, whether on the basis already proposed, or by a more complete solution, without stirring up a general conflagration, perhaps even a war of ex- termination, in the East, we are ready to welcome any idea which the Cabinet might communicate to us, for we sincerely desire a good understanding with them." To this Russian appeal Lord Derby replied :—" Nothing, I thought, remained, except to allow the renewal of the struggle, until success should have declared itself more or less decisively on one side or the other." A little later, the Russian Government suggested "an administrative autonomy" for the disturbed provinces. This suggestion Lord Derby characterised as "outside the range of practical politics." Yet it is one of the proposals which he himself made through Lord Salisbury at the Conference of Constantinople.
Is this the conduct of a man who knew that the three Emperors were engaged in a plot to bring on a bloody war for the partition of the Turkish Empire There is no proof whatever of any such plot, and the suggestion of it is an after-thought. It is likely enough that the three Chancellors discussed among themselves the various con- sequences that might be expected from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, should such a contingency occur. But that is a very different matter from the deliberate concoction of a plot to produce that contingency. Besides, the way to frus- trate such a plot, as we have already said, was by jealously guarding the European concert, and thereby preventing the three Emperors from having AA their own way, assuming, for the sake of argument, that their way was bad.
Mr. Reid need be under no anxiety as to Lord Derby's future. The English people are not extreme to mark what is done amiss in the case of persons whom they credit with up- right intentions. Lord Derby's honesty of purpose, we believe, was never seriously doubted even by those who most strongly dis- approved of his diplomacy ; and for the faults of his diplomacy, they held his chief more responsible than himself. His resig- nation of office, and his dignified bearing under unmerited abuse, have long ago dispelled the unpopularity which he owed to the foreign policy of the Government. It has been seen that that policy has gone from bad to worse since he left the Govern- ment, and he has received full credit for preventing the legerde- main and clandestine intrigue which have been so painful a feature in the transactions of the Foreign Office since he left it. We doubt whether Lord Derby was ever more generally popular than he is at this moment. His reputation can easily bear the weight of a frank admission that he made mistakes, for some of which he was doubtless not mainly responsible, in his diplomacy on the Eastern Question. It is a defence like that of Mr. Reid which is likely to injure Lord Derby, because it irritates by its violation of probability and its collision with plain facts ; and. would, moreover—if it couid be sustained, which it cannot be—convict Lord Derby of the most abject incompetency. Mr. Reid's sketch of Mr. Cowen is open to the same criti- cism as his sketch of Lord Derby. Where is the proof that "up to the point" at which "Russia and Turkey were left face to face," "Mr. Cowen had been as warm an advocate of Mr. Gladstone's policy as any other Member of the House of Com- mons," and was "willing to employ the might of England in repressing Turkish tyranny and misrule "? In the House of Commons, at all events, Mr. Gladstone received no support from Mr. Cowen. On the contrary, it was his fate to listen to a violent attack on himself and his policy from the lips of Mr. Cowen,—an attack which elicited the enthusiastic applause of the Tory party. "Mr. Cowen," says Mr. Reid, "declined to admit that no change had been made in the situation by the substitution of Russia for Europe as the dictator to Turkey." But what brought about that "substitu- tion ?" Undoubtedly that very break-up of "the concert of Europe" which, as we have seen, Mr. Reid regards as a bril- liant stroke of diplomacy, and of which Mr. Cowen heartily app roved. Mr. Reid praises Mr. Cowen because "his tradi- tional jealousy of Russia enabled him to keep his head, and to judge events upon their merits," during what he is pleased to call the "temporary delirium" of the agitation against the Bul- garian atrocities. Did Mr. Cowen show a clear head, and a power "to judge events upon their merits," when he lectured Mr. Glad- stone for his ignorance of Turkish law and customs, and illus- trated his own superior knowledge by an extravagant eulogy on the religious toleration of the Turkish Government ; the truth being that religious toleration does not so much as exist under the Turkish Government, and never has existed under any Mussulman Government wielding independent sway ? The toleration of the Turkish Government is just the toleration of the Spanish Inquisition,—toleration for " Infidels " to prey upon . each other, but no toleration at all for the "heretic." The truth is, "traditional jealousy of Russia" has smitten a number of excellent people with a sort of political colour-blindness as to Eastern politics, and lured them into an unnatural sympathy with Ottoman tyranny, and into a most illiberal contempt for the Christian victims of that tyranny.
Mr. Reid's sketch of Prince Gortchakoff is a mere caricature. The Russian Chancellor has faults, and is probably as little immaculate as the general run of distinguished diplomatists ; but he is as far as possible from being the subtle, intriguing Machiavelli which Mr. Reid represents him to be. "A policy which is not secret, sinister, and tortuous, is apparently some- thing which he cannot understand. He declines to take a straight road in any given direction, if he can only find a crooked one. He will not walk in the daylight, if he can possibly march by night." Such is Mr. Reid's picture of Prince Gortchakoff. If he does not mean it for mere burlesque, it proves that he has no knowledge whatever either of Prince Gortchakoff's character or of his career. Whatever else Prince Gortchakoff may be, he is not a fool ; and a fool of the most egregious kind he would be, if he declined "to take a straight road in any given direction, if he can only find& crooked one," leading to the same point. People may differ about Prince Gortchakoff's policy on the Eastern Question, but the English Blue-books prove conclusively that it was open and above-board.
We should be sorry, however, if our criticism of Mr. Reid's, errors should deter any one from reading his pleasant volumes, The essays which we have not criticised, because we agree with their general drift, form the bulk of his two volumes, and they are worth reading. Having found fault with him in some things, we have all the greater pleasure in vindicating his accu- racy against the Pall Mall Gazette. He is quite right in saying that Prince Bismarck's sobriquet of "the man of blood and iron" is derived "from a phrase of his own,"—that is, of Bismarck's. Bismarck used the phrase, and not avowedly as a quotation, in the Prussian Parliament, on September 29th, 1862. It is quite true that the original author of the phrase is the lyrical German poet Mosem, but it is equally true that Prince Bismarck made it his own on the occasion referred to.
Previous page
