Angola

A gloomy outlook for South Africa

Benjamin Pc.grund

Johannesburg The current South African joke has Van der Merwe, the local equivalent of Paddy and Abie, saying about Angola: "Where we wasn't, we isn't", and Van der Merwe again, drafting a South African cabinet announcement about withdrawal: "Remember our statement that we were not fighting in Angola?Well,now it's true." The stories point up the most astonishing aspect of the entire South African involvement in Angola: that the mass of South Africans have known less about it than anyone else in the world. An effective censorship of press, radio and the new TV service at home has seen to this. All details remotely concerning military matters require official permission for publicati an, and during the past five months extremely little has been made known to the public. Even after allowing for the secrecy and manipulation of information by governments in time of war, the South African application has been extraordinary. Only too clearly, the country was taken to the brink of war, and probably even somewhat beyond it, without any attempt to disclose the true facts or to obtain public sanction. This in itself is a revealing and important commentary on the strength of the Nationalist government and its determination and ability to rule as it believes it should in protection of white interest, and particularly white Afrikaner interest, in southern Africa.

Of course, people have been able to listen to overseas radio broadcasts and have had access to foreign newspapers freely on sale with their detailed accounts of the presence in strength of South African soldiers. But most people have been left to flounder and have had to read between the lines of whatever the press has been able to convey through euphemistic references such as "white troops" and "UNITA's White ally". Inevitably, as a result, rumour and speculation have proliferated, with wild stories about casualties going the rounds.

Having never admitted any real military presence the government has had understandable difficulty in making a formal announcement about withdrawal. But that a withdrawal had taken place became evident late in January and this was then tacitly admitted. The secrecy and uncertainty have, however, struck deep and have added immeasurably to a sense of unease which has been developing among white South Africans.

Until less than two years ago white confidence was strong and unchallenged. The rumblings of African discontent, so evident and ominous in the Durban labour strikes of 1973, had died down and whites could forget that there had been any cause for worry. The changes in long-standing apartheid patterns were getting under way and, even though the English-language press kept saying that they were not extensive or rapid enough, they did convey the comfortable notion that South Africa was adjusting to the times. And emphasising this, prime minister John Vorster's efforts at détente with the continent, to get the country out of its years-long isolation, was just getting off the ground.

Then. suddenly, there was the April 1974 coup in Portugal and white-ruled Mozambique collapsed overnight as a protective barrier in the east Again, however, white concern soon died down as it emerged that the Frelimo government had so many problems of its own and relied so much on cooperation with South Africa for survival that there was little immediate prospect of it interfering in its neighbour's affairs. Next, Rhodesia. It has become obvious that Mr Ian Smith's days are numbered; even worse, if he does not adjust to his African majority a violent racial confrontation could ensue. The South African government has fully realised this and has been playing a leading role in trying to persuade Mr Smith to bend. Whichever way it goes, South Africa's whites cannot fail to note that their northern buffer is going to disappear.

And then Angola. At first it hardly seemed of importance: it was far away and the struggle between the rival African nationalist movements seemed to guarantee that, whatever problems the end of Portuguese rule might bring, Angola would not be any kind of a threat in the foreseeable future. But with the direct entry into the conflict of the Soviet Union, Cuba and South Africa itself, the situation was transformed. Angola alow looms large in South African existence, dominating all else.

Whatever the reasons for it, the inescapable fact is that South Africa has failed to block the MPLA and to keep out the Soviet Union. Whatever the gloss put upon it, the fact is that it is South Africa which has had to withdraw. Apart from any effects which this may still have on white morale it is obvious to everyone that the most serious consequences can now result. If the MPLA sweeps to total victory, as is expected will happen, South Africa could have an implacable enemy on the South West African border, only too eager to give free passage to raiding parties — and more — of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). The border is so long that it cannot be totally protected. Accompanying this, and posing additional ,.aarries, is the renewed United Nations initiative on South West Africa with the latest ultimatum giving South Africa until August to submit to supervised elections.

And there is, too, South Africa's military presence at the Cunene River project, about twenty-five kilometres inside Angola, which is surely going to be challenged. The hydroelectric water-pumping scheme is being built with South African money and is intended to serve the northern areas of South West Africa. South Africa's attitude thus far has been one of defiance: it says it will beat off any attackers. But the project lies inside Angola — so how can South Africa validate its occupation?

For the moment, the government's response to the changing situation is in the direction of withdrawing into a defensive laager. Patriotism is being stressed as a dominant theme. The communist enemy is at the border and everyone must stand together. Those who will not do so are the "enemy at home" and steps are already being taken to give government greater powers to get at them. Mr Vorster has introduced a bill to set up a permanent parliamentary commission on internal security with the Opposition fearful that it will result in McCarthy-like smearing, and worse, of government critics.

Underlying the government's attitude — and that of the majority of whites who support it — is the fervent belief that South Africa's involvement in Angola served both its own interests and those of the West. There is open bitterness that the West has failed to recognise the dire menace of Soviet intervention, both in regard to the sub-continent and the Cape sea route. An essential part of South Africa's motivation in going into Angola was the idea that the West, and particularly the United States, would come to its senses and enter the battle. When this did not come about, South Africa had to accept that it could not fight on its own.

And what of continental detente? Granted that South Africa's involvement has made firm friends of some African countries such as Zambia and Zaire, and has been undertaken in close cooperation with them; but the involvement has simultaneously angered a goodly part of the rest of the continent and is likely to spur anti-apartheid thrusts. In this atmosphere of pressure and strain the attempt to make friends in Africa could be seriously set back, affecting also the cooperative nature of the drive to achieve a settlement in Rhodesia.

So the outlook is distinctly gloomy and whites cannot fail to be aware of it. Hence the anxiety and unease. But, at the same time, all the factors which make for white dismay act in reverse in regard to the country's blacks. On the specific issue of Angola there would seem to be considerable support for the MPLA — if only because South Africa is opposing it. In more general terms, blacks feel that the succession of events in the sub-continent is on their side, that the tide of history is flowing in their favour. Black confidence is slowly mounting, and greater assertiveness and aggression are likely. That, however, will not come about overnight: the armoury of controlling laws which the government has at its command, allied with an efficient security police, acts as an effective dampener.

The total picture, although gloomy, is not unrelievedly bleak. There are those internal changes which are still under way . . they might not yet have gone to the heart of apartheid but they are important in the South African context and generate still further changes. In South West Africa, the government is pushing ahead with its 'multinational' constitutional conference . . . which, again, is hardly likely to be the answer to the world's demand but still represents a step forward. In Africa, however great South Africa's unpopularity, it is recognised as a wealthy country able and willing to give assistance . . . and there is evidence of growing numbers of black states prepared to take advantage of this and to hope that closer contact will influence whites to faster change at home.

And from the South African government's point of view, its key to a peaceful and stable future is its policy of separate development: the balkanisation of South Africa, the creation of a series of mini-states giving independence to the country's African tribal groups. Here once more the gap between what is intended and what may ensue could be a wide one. But the importance of the separate development programme could be seen as offering the prospect of continuing change, however uncertain the direction. That, in South Africa, is reason in itself for hope.