7 JANUARY 1888, Page 16

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE FORGED LETTERS.

WE are not much inclined to attach importance to the " reassuring " telegrams just now pouring in from every capital of Europe. Statesmen always "reassure" news- paper correspondents so long as a hope remains ; and the few men who will give the final orders, besides being nearly unapproachable, are keenly alive to the value of even three days priority in their ability to mobilise. Nor do we care much for speculations as to the secret motives of this or that politician, or for the °biter dicta attributed to diplomatists or Generals. The cause of the danger is that two great Empires, with hostile interests, divergent views, and immense armies, are placing those armies in positions which show that their rulers anticipate collision. Whether those rulers are acting out of anger or out of fear, makes little difference ; in either case the thunder-clouds, driven in reality by national hates and aspirations, are approaching closely ; and if they collide, an explosion is inevitable, be the results what they may. Nor can we attach genuine importance to the "forged letters" of which Prince Bismarck makes so much. Diplomatists, even when they are as great as he is, always exaggerate the importance alike of individuals and their moods. The letters are part of an exceedingly curious and interesting intrigue, which will one day exercise the ingenuity of historians as much as did the romance of "the Diamond Necklace ;" but their publication will not alter the relations of great States. The history of the forgeries is this. A few days after the arrival of the Czar at the Castle of Fredensborg on his visit to Copenhagen, when he was probably at his ease and happy, being exempt for, a few hours from danger from the Nihilists, three letters were placed in his hands which greatly irritated and disturbed him. They professed to be letters written by Prince Ferdinand of Bulgaria to the Countess of Flanders, a lady who was born a Princess of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, and is sister of the King of Roumania. They describe the position of the Prince, and ask the aid of her good offices with her brother-in-law, the King of the Belgians, and her brother, the King of Roumania, to induce the Czar to be less hostile to the Prince's adventure. That is their whole ostensible motive, and so far they are of little importance, or even interest, except as they indicate—or would indicate if they were genuine—the strength of the personal relation among Sovereigns. Scattered through them, however, are assurances, naturally interesting and important to a Hohenzollern, that Germany is secretly on the side of the Prince, and only waits the settlement of some serious questions between herself and Russia to reveal her bene- volence towards him. A proof is even offered of the truth of this story in the shape of a fourth but unsigned letter from Prince Reuss, the German Ambassador in Vienna, who, though describing Prince Ferdinand's candidature as "a personal adventure," says definitely that the German Government secretly entertains sentiments towards him which "may brighten into the clearness of a full day" The Czar, reading these letters, was naturally annoyed. His Majesty has probably small literary skill, or he might have detected evidence in the internal style of the epistles of something unusual or odd. It is not usual to write to a Princess who is not a relative, letters full of secret politics, because of "a motherly interest" she had seemed to take in the writer ; and there is in Prince Reuss's letter a definite flavour of the literary rather than the diplomatic style. The Czar, however, received the letters through a trusted and honest in- termediary—most probably either the King or Queen of Greece —believed in their genuineness, and thought himself not only cheated by Prince Bismarck, but even befooled. The Prin had been assuring him for months that Germany cared nothing about Bulgaria or her Prince. He refused, therefore, to go to Stettin to meet his great-uncle, accelerated prepara- tions long since commenced, and when, being compelled by the frost to pass through Berlin, he received Prince Bismarck, he roundly taxed him—at least, this is the St. Petersburg version of the story, and it looks true— with underhand intrigue. The Prince, who has managed the greatest monarchs in the world, and once said publicly that no mortal knew the limits of their vanity, asked for the evidence ihich had so impressed his Russian Majesty ; the letters were produced, and were at once pronounced to be forgeries. The Prince had heard of them, and knew that they were not written by Prince Ferdinand, that they had not been received by the Countess of Flanders, and that the letter attributed to Prince Reuss had never been written by him, though, as we imagine, from a very singular reserve in the official denial, it did express Prince Reuss's personal opinion. The Czar listened and was convinced, and returned to St. Petersburg with his mind less embittered against Prince Bismarck, but with no intention of relaxing his preparations against Austria. They continued, and are going on now, pausing only, if they do pause, for certain important negotiations of which the out- side world hears that they are proceeding, but no more. So stands the story at present, and, of course, the Continentd world is busy guessing at the authorship of the letters. It may be assumed, we think, that they are forgeries. Diploma- tists do not always in high emergencies quite trust Prince Bismarck, who, frank as he'usually is, still holds and acts on the doctrine that he "who wills the end wills the means ;" but the denial in this instance is not only his. If the letters are real, not only Prince Ferdinand, but the Countess of Flanders and Prince Reuss have combined in a deception to please Prince Bismarck, which is improbable, to say the least of it ; and the Princess must, in forwarding the letter to Copenhagen, have betrayed the Hohenzollerns, which is as morally impossible as it is conceivable for an imputation to be. The theory of the reality of the letters is, in truth, untenable, and we only men- tion it to exhaust the possible explanations. Then who forged them A jobbing financier ? Not likely, for their pecuniary result could not be foretold with sufficient accuracy as to time, while very able financiers very seldom desire to " bear " the market. Their interest cannot lie in crashes. The natural deduction from the facts is that the letters were written by politicians who risked little, and were therefore not Russians or Germans—for to have the Czar, and Prince Bismarck, and the Viennese Court, in a white rage with you, would not be pleasant for any Russian or German alive—who desired war, and who honestly thought that war would be a good thing for the world. It is always a mistake in an inquiry of the kind to assume exceptional wickedness, which is always rare, and the wickedness of this forgery, if committed by men not convinced that the war ought to be waged, would be beyond all historic precedent. In other words, the forgery was committed by some Chauvinist Frenchman, instructed by some fanatic Panslavist or Hungarian equally anxious for war, who knew exactly how the land lay, and what would move the mind of Alexander III. Some one sure to be present at Fredensborg was induced to believe in their genuineness, and they were laid before the Czar.

The incident, except as a historic cariosity, has little im- portance. The world is much governed by individuals, but great wars do not now begin because individuals are annoyed. Russia is not quarrelling directly with Germany, but with Austria ; and Austria is not involved in the deception practised on the Czar. Indeed, she is represented as unfavourable to Prince Ferdinand ; and it is one strong argument in favour of the French authorship of the letters that their object is to make the Czar distrust Germany only, and not the Austrian Court. A man who did not hate Germany, but only wanted war, would have tried to increase the Czar's belief that Austria is pre- paring a serious attack on Russia with a view to eventual sovereignty in the Balkans. The forger, whoever he is, wants war, but wants it between Russia and Germany, and does not care, if that end is secure, what part Austria may play, or what her fate may be. It is a French Chauvinist who has conceived this plan, and who, but that he had Prince Bismarck for an opponent, might have carried it to success.