Giscard's complacency
Douglas Johnson
Continuity and Change in France Edited by Vincent Wright (Allen and Unwin £18)
This book suffers from the considerable disadvantage of having been written too early and published too late. It was largely compiled before the French elec- tions of 1981, and the editor readily admits that it was conceived in the expectation that it would be Giscard d'Estaing who would be the victor. There is therefore more about Giscard in the book than there is about Mitterrand, and the post-1981 period is necessarily incomplete, with even the 1983 ministerial changes escaping men- tion.
But the main thesis is valid enough. It argues that the supposedly great change of direction which France experienced in 1981 was not so great after all, and by looking at the new socialist regime within the pers- pective of the seven Giscardian years that had preceded it, we can assess even the euphoric period of Mitterrandism as being much less dramatic than it appeared at the time. The book also has the advantage of having appeared late enough to coincide with the re-emergence of Giscard d'Es- taing as an active politician. Now that by publications, speeches and interviews, the ex-President has shown that he seeks to have a political future, and he has even posed his candidature for the as yet non- existent post of President of the United States of Europe, we can consider his own assessment of what went wrong for him in 1981.
It goes very well with what Vincent Wright says in his, the longest contribution to the volume. The outstanding character- istic of Giscard is his complacency. In spite of a number of warning signs, it never occurred to him that he might be defeated. In spite of rising unemployment, trouble- some scandals and a deep quarrel within the ranks of his majority, he was always convinced that he would win through. And this was not so much because he possessed the character of someone who had invari- ably been successful throughout the sort of career that is usually described as brilliant, but the natural effect of the powerful Presidency of the Fifth Republic. The incumbent, secure in his supremacy over all other political figures, is only too easily convinced that he can control the hearts and minds of his fellow countrymen.
Raymond Kuhn emphasises the complete control which Giscard established over tele- vision. Although before his Presidency, he had claimed that he wished to abolish the state monopoly over broadcasting (and his brother had introduced a parliamentary amendment to that effect in 1972), the changes that he introduced were fairly minimal. For example, the communist leader Georges Marchais was given much readier access to the television, and even became something of a star in his own right, but this did not make him more effective as a politician, indeed, he became more of a turn than a vote-catcher. There was no pretence at impartiality or balance. A disproportionate time was accorded to Giscard, and whenever he was interviewed he was treated with obsequious courtesy by journalists who were only fierce when they confronted an opponent. Embarrassing topics, such as the Bokassa diamonds, were usually avoided, and controversial matters such as France's commitment to nuclear defence were soft-pedalled. Dur- ing the 1981 Presidential campaign, it was clear that the media had difficulty in distinguishing between Giscard, the Presi- dent who was still in office, and Giscard the candidate. The televised debate be- tween Giscard and Mitterrand, which was watched by an audience of more than 25 million, only took place at all after Mitter- rand's advisers had insisted upon some extremely detailed conditions which de- monstrated their distrust of the system.
It was only to be expected therefore that Mitterrand's victory would be followed by a large-scale dismissal of Giscard's men and their replacement by loyal socialists. To some extent this did happen. But this was not what Mitterrand in his campaign had meant by a fundamental change. A switch in personnel was very different from the proclaimed socialist aim of making the state broadcasting services politically inde-
pendent and removed from the field of political controversy. Hence in 1982 a number of structural changes were made, including the establishment of an indepen- dent High Authority.
Dr Kuhn is necessarily tentative in his judgment of the outcome so far of these reforms. But he points out that the govern- ment, by claiming that they are bringing about a new era in French life, are hoping to modify the assumptions of French poli- tical culture. He suspects that so far this has not happened, since the nature of the changes tends to be superficial and verbal. What is true for the media may well be true for other areas of socialist activity. The measures on decentralisation, for example, which are discussed in this volume by Yves Wily, are nothing like as radical as were expected, and the recent attempts to bring Catholic schools within the same admin- strative framework as state schools have only revived the most traditional of quar- rels. It could be that the controversial `restructuration' of the steel industry, or President Mitterrand's ambitious but still vague plans for the reform of the European Community, will make fundamental turn- ing points for French society. But whereas in 1981 time seemed plentiful for the President, with his seven-year mandate, and for the socialist majority, with its five year term, now in the summer of 1984 there is the impression that time is begin- ning to run out. Mitterrand's force tran- quille is becoming agitee.
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