TOPICS OF THE DAY.

REPUBLICANS AND DEMOCRATS.

VERY shortly after the appearance of these pages President Wilson will return to America and begin his campaign of conversion—i.e., the conversion of the Senate, the bulk of the Republican Party, and of the people of the United States as a whole, to the Treaty constituting the League of Nations and all that it involves. Though we have thought it our duty to criticize certain of that Treaty's provisions, and though rightly or wrongly we hold that there are not a few things that would be better out of the Covenant, and certain other things that would be much better in, we most sincerely hope that the President will succeed in his task, and that we shall not end the war tragedy by a greater tragedy. For it would be no less then a tragedy if America rejected a genuine effort to put an end to all wars, or rather, since that we fear must be a vain hope, to reduce the vast sums now spent upon arma- ments, and to provide a valid insurance to nations who have the courage to trust to the sanctity of the contracts upon which the League of Nations is to be founded.

But though we most ardently hope that a compromise will be arrived at which will prove satisfactory to the American people generally and yet not destroy the League, we cannot help feeling a great deal of anxiety upon the subject. We cannot conceal from ourselves that Mr. Wilson, though no doubt with the best intentions, ran grave risks when he neglected the obviously best method to carry the Republican Party and its representatives in the Senate with him in the matter of the League of Nations. Even at the risk of being thought impertinent, we feel bound to say that he should have much more clearly and openly recognized the essential conditions of the problem with which he was faced. That those conditions are difficult and irksome, and that any man may be pardoned for wishing them different and for trying to find ways of avoid- ing them, we entirely understand. Still, they are there, and they are irremovable except through compromise and goodwill. Therefore the sound plan was to have met them fairly and squarely, and not to have assumed that they would bow of themselves to the wishes of great men, or could be brushed aside by invoking, not the law of the Constitution, but the whirlwind of popular indignation.

The essential fact of the American Constitution, when it conies to a matter of Covenants and vital pacts with other nations, is the power conferred, not only upon the Senate, but upon a body, somewhat intangible but none the less real, which consists of one-third plus one of the Senators present when the final vote of that august and potent Assembly is taken. Into the hands of this body, a body the nature of which was perhaps hardly realized by the draftsmen of the Constitution, is given the tremendous power of an absolute veto over all Treaties. Under the American Constitution Treaties with Foreign Powers become part of the Law and Constitution of the United States. Till abrogated their clauses are as binding on the Supreme Court, and are enforced by that Court as exactly and as peremptorily, as if they were parts of the Constitu- tion. But before a Treaty can acquire this tremendous status in the law, it must be ratified by the Senate, and ratified, not by a mere majority vote, but by a vote of two- thirds' of the Senators present. For practical purposes this means that any group consisting of one-third of the Senators attending plus one (or even less than one-third if some of the Senators are absent, as is almost certain) has a right of veto as absolute as that of any autocrat in the world. As long as the group of one-third plus one .hold together, they can create an impassable barrier to a Treaty. This may or may not be a wise regulation. We are inclined to think that our old friend the simple majority, the rule of the odd man if you Will, is safer than sterilization by a fraction. But who are we that we should criticize the Constitution of the United States ? The undeniable fact remains that power belongs to this group of one-third plus one of " the Senators present." Further, the fact remains that they feel themselves trustees in the matter, and that they must discharge their trust without fear or favour. In these circumstances we cannot help feeling, indeed we have felt all along, that in order to give full recognition to the powers entrusted to the Senate, and even to a

minority of the Senate, it would have been wiser if President Wilson had from the very beginning said in effect to the Senators : " The Constitution gives to a minority of your body a right of veto in the matter of Treaties. Therefore, though I claim, and mean to exercise without diminution, the full rights of the President in all matters of War and Peace, and in the direction of the Navy and Army of the Republic, I realize that in Treaty-making I am not the master or overlord of the Senate but their colleague. Both they and I are, of course, servants of the people as a whole. Subject to that supreme will, I must and do recognize the authority of the Senate. Therefore, though it would obviously not be convenient, or even possible, to turn the Senate into a branch of the American State Department

for Foreign Affairs, I must in the case of an undertaking

so vital as the making of a League of Nations take repre- sentatives, not merely of the majority of the Senate, but of the minority, with me to the seat of the negotiations-

i.e., to Paris. I must make them cognisant of all that takes place, and so; if possible, win their approval at every step. If I come hack with a Treaty which they do not think the best Treaty in the world, it must be one which the Senate will be able to recommend and will not think it their duty to veto."

It is impossible to deny that if the President had acted on these lines, and members of the Senate had been asked to see and note the difficulties that arise every day

and every hour in Treaty negotiations, and how it is often necessary not to do the thing which is best in the abstract

but rather the thing which will command the greatest

amount of assent, the Senators who were made colleagues of the President and the Secretary of State would have in all

probability been converted to the Treaty as it now stands. But if that had happened there would have been now no talk of the Treaty being thrown over. Even if the Senate

had been inclined to say that their representatives plus

the President had not been as successful as they wished, the Senate, we may feel sure, would not have risked earning the reputation of impossibilists by rejecting the League. As it is, the Senate, instead of having no ground for stub- bornness, have unfortunately been given excuses for exercising their rights, and for showing that these rights can never be ignored.

It is no good, however, to cry over spilt milk. We can only hope that even though the Senate think they have not been fairly used, or rather that they have not received

the consideration that they ought to have received and which the Constitution demands that they should have,

they will in a matter so vital throw all thought of wounded

amour propre, and even of their express rights, to the winds, and will think only of what is best for humanity and for

the cause of Peace. If they do, if they tread under their feet all thoughts of the Party advantage which no doubt they could snatch in the circumstances, they will

indeed have deserved well of all the Nations and Peoples of the Earth. The wide world will feel that they have made the most splendid renunciation, and have shown the finest example of a statesmanlike temper ever recorded of mortal men. It would be only human, and therefore excusable, if they stood on their rights. If instead they think not of their rights but of their higher duties, and of Everyman in his agony, they will be immortal.

One word more. We feel that a great mistake has been made in letting the issue ever become one of this kind. Since, however, it has been made so, the only thing is to pray that the good sense of the Senate and the American people may prevail even at the eleventh hour to rectify a dangerous blunder. And lot us remember that in the details compromise is still possible. Nobody wants to suggest that the Senate have not the right to make amendments but must swallow the Treaty whole, or not at all. Even if the Treaty had to be ratified "pro forma as it stands, it would be quite easy for the Great Powers concerned to pledge themselves to make the first Act of the League of Nations a' rectification of the terms in regard to particulars, adjudged by the Senate to be inimical to the best interests of the United States.