SPINOZA.*

THERE is a little book entitled A Sketch of the Denominations of the Christian World, by Mr. John Evans, of Islington, which originally appeared about the end of the last century, and went through several editions. The twelfth edition, of date .1811, contains a short introductory notice of Atheism, as to which the following statement is made :—" In the seventeenth century, Spinoza, a foreigner, was its noted defender." Nowhere else have we seen the popular estimate of Spinoza given with such crudity and conciseness. Such has been, until recently, the only reward in this country of the man who denied that the existence of anything could even be conceived apart from God, in whose mind the love of God was the sole abiding good and the highest aim of philo- sophy, and whose system of thought was in a great measure deter- mined by that conception. It may seem incredible that a philosopher proceeding on these principles should be held a dangerous enemy of religion and morality. But Spinoza's conceptions are arrived at by ways and means altogether foreign to ordinary ways of thinking, and altogether intolerable to ordinary prejudices ; and even when those who have dared to follow him in his arduous course find his conclusions resuming the language of common belief, yet the voice that speaks to them in familiar words fills those words with strange new meanings and unexpected contradic- tions. By the admission of those who agree least with him, Spinoza is the clearest and most outspoken of writers ; yet no one has been more constantly misunderstood. For English readers in particular, the difficulties of fairly apprehending or judging his works are enormous. He constructs from the very beginning, without considering anything whatever as already established ; and the English mind is most averse to taking such a course, either in theory or in practice, when it can possibly be avoided. He is rigorously consistent and fearless of consequences ; while English common-sense is supported chiefly by the dread of conse- quences, and hates to be disturbed in the enjoyment at one time of several inconsistent opinions. Much has been done however since the date of Mr. Evans' contemptuous anathema towards making Spinoza's personal worth and his wide-reaching influence on modern speculation better appreciated in this country. Dr. Willis, writing in a spirit of almost enthusiastic admiration, now not only gives us an account of Spinoza's life, and briefly traces the later developments and criticisms that have sprung from his doctrine, but offers an English version of his most important and elaborate work, the Ethics, and of his extant letters so far as they serve to throw light on his philosophy. The book is much too large to handle with comfort, and it would have been better to make two volumes of it, one for the introductory matter, and another for the translation; but it may reasonably be expected that readers who are not deterred by this physical objection will bring an impartial consideration to its contents, and whether or not they agree with the author in other respects, will hold that his labour is spent on no unworthy object. Dr. Willis seems to antici- pate more of unreasoning opposition, and perhaps less of reasonable and philosophical dissent, than in fact has to be met. He some- what overrates the sentimental and moral difficulties of Spinoza's system, and underrates the real intellectual perplexities ; so that the reader who wants not controversy but explanation may possibly be dissatisfied. The remarks and annotations sometimes fall into a tone of needless and unpleasant polemic, and are embittered by certain traces of odium theologicum in its latest and not least malig- nant form,—that namely which has become anti-theologic, and finds nothing good which savours in any degree of orthodoxy.

The first and perhaps the hardest stumbling-block in the philo- sophy of Spinoza is encountered at the outset. What he undertakes is not to suggest or conjecture some plausible manner in which we may regard the universe if we choose, but to prove with geometri- cal rigour what it is, and how right reason must regard it. His science is nothing if not exact, and human motives and passions are to be dealt with by the philosopher no otherwise than lines and surfaces. In Spinoza's eyes this method is all-important. All truth is in itself equally necessary, and such things as seem to us contingent seem so merely from our ignorance of their causes. Truth is its own teat, and requires no external mark to be recog- nized by ; to have a true idea and to be convinced of its truth are

• Benedict de Spinoza ; Life, Correspondence, and Ethics. By S. Willis, XII London: Trlibner and Co. 1870. the same thing. To obtain certain knowledge we must seek to acquire true ideas in a due and proper order, excluding every- thing that is confused or indistinct. We are called on, if we do not deny the supremacy of reason altogether, to submit to it without reserve, and admit the results that follow as necessary. Here, then, arises controversy from more than one quarter. Those who hold a reasoned philosophy impossible, and those who hold reason subordinate to something else, alike make indignant pro- test ; even the recent translator of Schwegler's History, who has a decidedly more speculative mind than most British critics, accuses Spinoza of following a clumsy metaphor. The method depends on the analogy of metaphysical to mathematical science. It is, then, an important question whether the analogy is rightly assumed. It is commonly supposed that the superior exactness of geometry depends on its objects being not such as are actually found in nature, but such as they are defined to be ; and that other sciences are less exact because they deal with things as they actually are. And on this supposition a good deal of the objection to Spinoza's method proceeds. But the distinction is not really a sound one. Geometry is in fact as much a physical science as any other. It deals with the physical fact we call space, and with actual things insomuch as they occupy space. What we really mean by calling it more exact than the other sciences is not that the definitions as such are more clear, or that the reasoning as such is more strict ; but that the properties of things with which the science is concerned are more simple, and the ideas we work with in reasoning correspond more closely with the things as we find them when we come to apply the results of the reasoning. In other sciences we have to falsify the ideas in various ways to gain simplicity (as when in mechanics bodies are supposed rigid, strings without weight, and so on); we are in less close communion with real things than in geometry, and the results require to be more widely modified in application. Yet no one condemns this procedure as futile. Why, then, should defini- tions be expected to exhaust the reality of the subject-matter in metaphysical more than in any other kind of inquiry ? But it is said that the notions of metaphysics are not clear enough to be matter of definition, or cannot be made so without some sacrifice of reality. Surely the beat way to make notions clearer is to try to define them ; the definition may be provisional, and be at last changed or set aside, but it does its work in the meantime. As to sacrifice of reality, that takes place, as we have said, in most scientific ideas. It is also objected that these notions cannot be verified. Spinoza himself has foreseen the objection, and is well aware of the danger of dealing in unverified abstractions, as appears from several passages, particularly is the treatise "De Intellectus Emendatione," which we must leave to speak for themselves.

After all, the charges of futility and unreality against Spinoza, as well as other philosophers, mostly amount to this : that lan- guage cannot adequately express the ideas which are the ground- work of all knowledge. But that does not show that the ideas themselves are illusory. On the contrary, the real discomfiture of philosophy would be the possibility, if such there were, of comprehending it within the terms of any particulai system.

Leaving this preliminary controversy, we find the definitions on which Spinoza's Ethics rest by no means free from difficulty. Substance is defined as that which exists in itself, and is conceived by itself (that is, without a conception of any other thing being presupposed), Attribute, as that which the intellect perceives as constituting the reality (essentiam) of substance : God, as a being absolutely infinite, that is, substance consisting of infinite attributes, whereof every one expresses the eternal and infinite reality of his nature. These attributes, of course, are entirely different from logical attributes, and in con- sidering them we must utterly discard the ordinary sense of the word. But what is in fact the precise meaning of these infinite attribut.s, and of their defined relation to substance, has been much discussed. Two of them, as it in due course appears, are Thought and Extension ; and these are the only two of which the human mind can have any cognizance. The rest, then, do not concern us, and cannot be the means of explaining any part of the universe as it is known to us. It is hardly fair to accuse Spinoza, as Mr. Lewes does, of pretending to deduce from two attributes the infinite results of infinite attributes ; the explanation he gives on this head to a correspondent (Letters 66 and 68) shows that he makes no such claim. But why speak of infinite attributes at all? They are inferred from the impossibility of setting bounds to infinite being. Everything is expressed, says Spinoza, in infinite ways in the infinite intellect of God. We cannot now go farther into this, but we mention Mr. Froude's remarks in his essay

on Spinoza (Short Shunt.; Vol. IL, p. 36) as very well worthy of

attention. As to thageneral conception of infinity, we fortunately have a letter of Spinoza (No. 29, to Dr. Meyer), in-which he speaks of

it at large, thereby throwing much light on the leading ideas of the Ethics. It is instructive to note how Spinoza marked and escaped the fallacies which the so-called Philosophy of the Conditioned has exalted into factitious prominence in this country, and the letter is altogether so interesting that we cannot forbear quoting from it at some length :— " The question of the infinite has seemed to all men at all times an 'extremely difficult, nay, an insoluble one ; because they have not dis- tinguished between that which is concluded to be infinite by its very nature or by mere virtue of its definition, and that which, though with- -out limit, is so by virtue not of its own nature, but of its cause ; or, .again, because they have not distinguished between that which is called infinite as having no limit, and that whose parts cannot be adequately represented by any number, though a greatest and a least magnitude of the thing itself can be assigned ; finally, because they have not distin- .guished between that whieh we can understand but not imagine, and that which we can as well imagine as understand."

Further on, he says that the ideas of time and measure arise as aids to the imagination, when we consider duration and quantity apart from the reality of substance ; and together with that of number, 'which is produced in like manner, are nothing else than modes of

-thought, or rather of imagination. (Hence it is to be observed that in Spinoza's view the notion of Extension as an eternal attribute of Substance is distinct from that of space as measurable or made zap of parts.) Then he points out that,—

"It is no wonder that all who have attempted by the help of notions .-of this kind, and those, too, not rightly understood, to interpret the order of nature, have so marvelously entangled themselves as at last to find no means of release except by breaking all bounds and admitting pro- positions of an absurdity beyond measure As it appears, then, from what wo have said that neither number, nor measure, nor time, liming, as they are, only aids to the imagination, can be infinite (for other- wise they would not be what they are), we may now- clearly see why many persons who, not knowing the true nature of things, have con- founded theae three aids with actual things, have denied the infinite as existing in fact. How ill they have reasoned let the mathematicians judge, who have never suffered arguments of this fashion to hinder them in treating of such things as they clearly and distinctly perceive."

In the first book of the Ethics, entitled De Dee, the definitions above

spoken of lead to some hard sayings. It is shown that God necessarily -exists, is the only substance (in the meaning previously defined),

and is the cause of all things. Further, as his action is determined

solely by the necessity of his own nature-and by no external con- straint, he is a free cause. This is the only sense in which Spinoza recognizes freedom, and he is at great pains to explain that he wholly rejects the notion of any arbitrary power which might have

made things otherwise than they are. This is meant as no ,disparagement to the supreme perfection of the Divine nature ;

on the contrary, it is held to be a necessary consequence of that .perfection that the order of the universe is eternal and unchange- .able. But may it not depend on the sovereign will what shall constitute perfection, so that what is in fact perfection might have -been the contrary ? That supposition, says Spinoza, comes to .asserting that God might choose to understand things otherwise than he does ; that omnipotence might falsify omniscience. Still less does he'consent to regard God as a moral agent in the ordinary sense :—

"I admit that this opinion, which places a supposed absolute will of

• God above all, and holds that all things depend on his pleasure, is less wide of the truth than the opinion of those who hold that he does all things under a moral rule (sub ratione boni). For this is to assume .something apart from God and not depending on him, which God regards .as a pattern for his work, or at which he aims as at a fixed mark, which amounts to placing fate above God." (Eth. i. 33, Sahel. 2.)

a similar spirit is the appendix to -the first book, which denounces the whole doctrine of final causes as springing from 'the presumptuous fallacy of looking on the world as made for 'man's special benefit, and as giving rise to endless prejudice and mischief.

We may now easily understand how anyone who had not vatienee to follow Spinoza into his further developments might exclaim against this teaching as tending to destroy all foundations -of morality. Spinoza, however, has -not left his defence to be undertaken by others ; the matter is discussed in his corre- epondence, and on this point, as on many others, his own letters furnish the best commentary. He writes to Oldenburg, who had Informed him that his theory of universal necessity would seem to 'many readers such as to "cut through the very sinews of virtue and religion," in- these terms (Letter 23) :— "I by no means put fate above God, but conceive all things to follow by unavoidable neoessity from his nature in the same way as every one . conceives it to follow from the very nature of God, that he understands himself. Surely it is denied by no one that this last is a necessary con-

sequence of the divine nature ; yet Gad is not conceived as being herein constrained by any fate, but as understanding himself with perfect free- dom, though necessarily."

And he points out that this necessity of all things does not make good less desirable ; that the consequences of ill-doing are not the less to be feared if they are necessary consequences ; and that the motives of human action remain unaffected. But although infin- ite understanding and even love are ascribed to God, yet intellect, being but a certain mode of the attribute of thought, does not belong to the nature of God considered merely as the absolute free cause. Hence in the language of modern criticism it is said that Spinoza's God must be impersonal; and this imper- sonality asserted in terms is hard to reconcile with the spirit of almost mystical devotion pervading the final part of the Ethics. Spinoza himself has no such term as personality or impersonality. He seems to have regarded consciousness as a function of thought complex in proportion as the corresponding function of extension, that is the bodily organism, is complex ; but he nowhere explicitly says so. He avoids as much as he can the egoistic point of view, and very seldom appeals to what we now call the testimony of consciousness. If the question of personality had ever been distinctly put to him, he would probably have answered, as Mr. Herbert Spencer does in a remarkable passage, that the alternative is not something lower, but something higher ; certainly he held the position, which in that passage is suggested as possible, that "there is a mode of being as much transcending intelligen6e and will as these transcend mechanical motion."

It is quite clear, however, that Spinoza's scientific conception of deity and the relation of God to the universe is extremely different from any theological conception which has ever been generally ac- cepted. The contrast is summed up clearly and forcibly by Kuno Fischer as follows :—Let the Deity be likened to unlimited space. Then Monotheism is to Spinoza's mind like the assertion that this unlimited space is external to bounded figures (which are analogous to the finite creation) ; Polytheism, like supposing it to consist of certain figures alone ; Christianity, like holding that unlimited Space is aontamed in one single figure. No separation of God from the world is admissible. God is the sum of being regarded as eternal cause (natura naturans), Nature is the sum of being regarded as eternal effect (natura naturata), but their reality is one and indivisible.

From the contemplation of necessity as thus eternal and divine arises another question, which, however, is made an objection to all philosophical theories almost indifferently. Is not God, as cause of all things, the cause of crime, error, and evil generally ? Spinoza's answer is that God is truly the cause of all things that have any reality. But the things we call criminal, false, and so forth, have as such no reality. The notions of good and bad are derived from finite relations ; good is what we know to be for our advantage, bad is whatever hinders us from attaining good ; but they have no meaning when applied to things considered in them- selves. This doctrine is in truth, however ,paradoxical, more widely entertained than one would suppose at first sight. One of our own poets, whose way of thinking is imgeneral by no means coincident with Spinoza's, has said, "The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound." Nor would it be difficult to find many other modern authorities to the same effect. A fragment belong- ing to this part of the doctrine is noticed, for the first time in Eng- lish, by Dr. Willis. It is a brief chapter entitled "De Diabolis," from the treatise "De Deo et Homine," recently published by Van Vloten. The Devil is summarily abolished as a fiction not only superfluous but impossible. The ground on which this is put is

characteristic, namely, that it is a contradiction to assign existence to a thinking being having nothing in common with God, or wholly destitute of perfection. Not less characteristic is the fact that Spinoza did not think it worth while to retain this passage in his final revision of the Ethics.

We have seen that Spinoza did not admit any such despairing con- clusions as at first seem likely to follow from the unity and neces- sity of all things. Far different are the results he arrives at in the last book of the Ethics. It is entitled, "Of the Power of the Understanding or of Human Freedom," and sets forth the eternal love of God as constituting the only true happiness for man.

By clear and distinct knowledge the soul is lifted above selfish desires and the disappointments of transitory pleasure, and fixed on that which is eternal and unchangeable. Thus is attained the

utmost possible satisfaction of mind (acquiescentia), accompanied by the immediate consciousness of God as its cause. And this is what

Spinoza calls the intellectual love of God ; herein is the only true freedom and the highest welfare. And although memory and imaginatiop pass away with the body, there is a nobler and eternal element of the human mind compared with which the perishable part is of small moment. Not that immor- tality is to be looked on as a reward. The blessed state for man is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. And even if we knew not the eternal nature of the mind, the pre- eminence of virtue, having been established independently of this, would yet remain untouched. Spinoza's remarks against making morality depend on expectations of pleasure or pain in a future state are very strong. He wonders how people can regard duty and self-control as burdens borne in this life to gain a reward in the next. If men should, merely for want of believing them- selves immortal, cast off moral restraint, it would be as absurd as if one should choose to feed on poison because by taking whole- some food he could not keep his body alive for ever. These last exalted assertions of human freedom may be objected to as incom- patible with the view of God as the sole free cause. But man is looked on as free only so far as he realizes his union with God. Law is the environment of freedom and freedom is the conscious- ness of law.

We have touched thus hastily on a few of the more striking and peculiar points of Spinoza's doctrine, in the hope not so much of -throwing any light on them, as of commending the study of them 116 set forth in the author's own words. Spinoza is his own best expounder, and his thought cannot possibly be appreciated at second-hand. Whatever may be urged against his system, and however real and serious the obstacles to accepting it as a whole may be, it embodies ideas fruitful of imperishable truth, which few . have perceived with clearer insight or announced with fuller con- 'Action. And we cannot but welcome as an agency for good the labours of any man who endeavours to increase among us the knowledge of his life and work.