CONSOLIDATING CHINA
Commonwealth and Foreign
From A SHANGHAI CORRESPONDENT
WHEN a Japanese bankdr, in -charge of the Shanghai branch of one of the leading financial institutions in Tokyo, warns his countrymen that the Chinese people are no longer incohesive like a tray of sand, but are hardening into cement in consequence of external pressure, wide interest is aroused as to the truth of the statement and its implications. Mr. Seiji Yoshida, as representative of the Mitsubishi Bank and Chairman of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, must be regarded as having some authority to express the views of the local business community of which he is a prominent member, and in a pamphlet he has written (which has been widely distributed among Japanese business-men by the Tokyo Chamber of Commerce) he calls attention to the necessity of the Japanese Government and people correcting their mistaken ideas about political, economic, and general conditions in China.
It has been said that China's foreign policy—and more especially her attitude toward Japan—has undergone a marked change during the past year. To some extent that is true, and it is also true that Japan's attitude toward China has been modified, to the extent that the terrific pressure brought into operation six years ago has been relaxed. There was a moment when China's position was so desperate that the very existence of the National Government was in danger of collapse. There was a period when scores of urgent telegrams passing between Mr. Wang Ching-wei, President of the Executive Yuan, General Chiang Kai-shek, Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission, and General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, clearly revealed to the readers of these messages the appalling weakness of China's position, threatened within by armed Communist forces and without by a foe whose tremendous strength was overpowering. Desperate though the situation was at that time, Mr. Wang Ching-wei—far from being ready to surrender to Japanese aggression—told the Central Party authorities that he was prepared to take full responsibility for the consequences of immediate armed resistance and opening hostilities, but he warned his colleagues of the Central Executive Committee and Central Political Council what the probable consequences of such a decision would be. If, however, with full knowledge of the facts laid before them, they decided that the moment had come to resort to warlike measures, he, as President of the Executive Yuan, was prepared to carry out their instructions.
_Those instructions were not given. Instead, the Party leaders approved Mr. Wang Ching-wei's policy—not of absolute non-resistance, but of gaining time for -" sand" ta• become "cement." They realised the folly of attempting to offer resistance before the nation was sufficiently" hardened" to make such action effective, and the wisdom of their decision ind of Mr. Wang's general policy (which General Chiang Kai- shek fully endorsed) has been since proved by events. Yet it was not long before some of those who had approved con- centrating upon defence rather than defiance were criticising the National Government for its "weakness," and complaining that Mr. Wang's policy was merely encouraging further aggression. The Tangku truce—like that which brought the Shanghai hostilities to an end—was bitterly criticised by those who failed to appreciate either the meaning of a truce, or the circumstances which made such a pact desirable for China. The so-called Ho-Umetsu "Agreement "—which was simply an exchange of letters—was also vigorously denounced by some Chinese critics as further evidence of Mr. Wang Ching-wei's "weakness," whereas actually all that passed between the Minister of War and the Japanese General was a note demanding certain action, and a reply stating that these things had already been done. Th;-, letter was written with the knowledge and approval of the Central }arty authorities, and was in no sense a hole-and-corner scheme planned in the Waichiaopu without full consultation with oth-gr responsible quarters. There was some excuse for those in ignorance of facts of vital importance being doubtful of the possible out- come of the Wang-Chiang theory that national unification must precede any effective challenge by China to aggression, but there was no justification for certain people who were
seized of these facts denouncing the civilian head of the National Government, and misrepresenting his attitude as one of non-resistance and abject surrender. Such was not the case, and they knew it, but it pleased them to pretend the contrary, and to pretend further that Mr. Wang's " weak " policy was leading the nation to destruction.
If China today stands in a stronger position than she did a year ago, if—as the Japanese banker says—the " sand " is hardening into "cement "—it is because the National Govern- ment's policy since 1931 has enabled that change to come about. If the Sian affair of the "Double Twelfth" last year failed to precipitate the country into another disastrous period of civil war, it was because the foundations of the National Government no longer rested on sand, but on solid concrete. If General Chiang Kai-shek last autumn was able to deal swiftly and effectively with recalcitrant elements in Kwangtung and Kwangsi, it was because the National Government was in a position to establish its authority over those who challenged it. If China's refusal to accept Japan's demands produced a diplomatic deadlock, that attitude was possible because the National Government was in a better position in 1936 to take a firm stand than it was two or three years earlier. No longer distracted by constant military operations against Communist forces, no longer weakened by the aloofness of the South-West faction, and strengthened by the knowledge that military preparedness had made progress along with economic develop- ment, the National Government was in a position not only to reject Japan's demands but to present some of its own. There has been no change of policy, but a change of conditions, and that change was brought about by the restrained and far- sighted attitude adopted when China stood on the very brink of disaster.
During his long term of office as President of the Executive Yuan, Mr. Wang Ching-wei's views on and responsibility for national policy were shared by General Chiang Kai-shek, and his actions were approved by one or other of the Central Party authorities. In regard to Japan, that policy was one of consistent resistance to aggression without closing the doors of diplomacy—a difficult policy to follow, and one which rather lends itself to wilful misrepresentation by hostile critics, but the only one which made it possible for " sand " to become hardened into "cement." Never did Mr. Wang advocate a policy of non-resistance ; what he did oppose most strongly was precipitate recourse to action which might easily prove disastrous because of its hopeless ineffectiveness, but he repeatedly declared that if pushed to the limit of endurance China would not hesitate to make a sacrifice that she knew would be equivalent to national extinction.
What has happened during the last two years goes to show that Japan realised this was no idle threat. China's protest against Doihara's attempt to create a "North China Autono- mous Council" led to the recall to Japan of the instigator of this plan, and no serious attempt has been since made to extend the East Hopei " autonomous " area under Japanese protection. The establishment of the Hopei-Chahar Political Council in December, 1935, seems to have marked a truce in the open dash of Sino-Japanese interests in the North, and today there is in Tokyo a Foreign Minister who boldly asks in the Diet : "In the whole course of diplomatic negotiations between Japan and China, have the principles of equality and reciprocity always been upheld ? " and left the consciences of his hearers to provide the answer. Mr. Sato supplied whatever hint may have been needed of his own opinion by saying that so long as China had the impression that she was not being treated as an equal, there could be little hope of Sino-Japanese negotiations being successful. These words can be read as a paraphrase of the views repeatedly expressed by Mr. Wang Ching-wei when he held the portfolio of Foreign Minister in addition to his post as head of the Executive Yuan. They give ground for hoping that a new phase in Sino-Japanese relations is about to develop—a phase which will eventually make real co-operation possible and solve diffi- culties which have hitherto defied solution.
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