The action of Germany we do not care to characterise
in explicit terms; but though we do not wish to do anything to increase the present friction, we are bound to state our belief that the German Government suddenly insisted on making the Casablanca incident acute in order to distract attention from the ugly turn given not only to the internal situation in Germany, but also to the international situation, by the Emperor's indiscretion in the matter of the Daily Telegraph, interview. While German foreign policy is conducted in the spirit manifested in the publication of the interview, and in the incidents that have succeeded it, we can only say that such policy is bound to be regarded as a menace to the peace of Europe. That this feeling is shared by the more serious portion of German public opinion is evident. The German people as a whole, we believe, desire peace, and desire to respect the rights of their neighbours, but we do not wonder that they feel extremely anxious as to whether they will be able to make their desires prevail. We are very apt to talk platitudes about the force of public opinion in Germany, but unfortunately such opinion counts for comparatively little in shaping German policy. It does not guide the ship. It is, indeed, little more than a despairing wail from the stern of the vessel raised by those who note the erratic character of her wake. Such wails cannot, unhappily, preclude the risk either of collisions with other ships or of the vessel being run on the rocks. We have only one more word to say about the Casablanca incident, and that is to assure our French friends and neighbours that, had things come to the worst in spite of the manly and sensible way in which their Govern- ment handled the incident, they would not have found Britain wanting, however tremendous the responsibilities incurred in doing her duty.
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