TOPICS OF THE DAY.
ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.
THE proposal which it is understood that the Czar of Russia has made to Austria,—and, perhaps, to all the Powers, —for an Austrian occupation of Bosnia, a Russian occupation of Bulgaria, and an occupation of the Turkish seas by the united Navies of the Powers, has been made the signal for another anti-Russian outcry, without our having, however, any means of knowing in what form the Russian proposal was made, or what it really meant. In spite, indeed, of Lord Beaconsfield's announcement at Aylesbury that England had the most cordial understanding with Russia, it is evidently regarded as the true cue of all the supporters of the Government in the Press to cry out with one voice against the craft and ambition and cruelty and barbarism of this close ally of England's. But to our minds, if there is real danger from Russia, that danger has been enormously increased, if not entirely created, by the policy of the present Government,—a policy which, however unintentionally and involuntarily, has played all along into the hands of Russia. The cold and almost reluctant assent to the Andrassy- Note ; the brusque refusal not merely to concur in the Berlin Memorandum, but to suggest an alternative policy which would have better answered the same purpose ; the attempt to discredit the Bulgarian horrors at first, and the illusory proposals, made without the demand of any adequate guarantees for their fulfilment, put forth afterwards, all were so many encouragements to Russia to regard herself as the only real champion of the Christian subjects of the Porte, and to con- sider England as her principal antagonist, instead of her col- league and counsellor in the duty of giving to the oppressed Christian States of Turkey the protection which they demanded and required. Now that all the world is crying out that effectual protection is needed and must be given, Russia is in a position which she could never have attained, if the British Government had done their duty in supporting the reasonable demands of Russia, while insisting that no interested Power should take any leading or predominant part in securing the reforms needed. The mischief, to some extent, is now past remedy. By its timidity and weakness the British Govern- ment has given that very lead to Russia which makes the organs of that Government so angry. But still much might be done to secure the legitimate ends which popular opinion, alike in Russia and England, demands, without throwing the control of the reconstructive policy now needful in Turkey into Russian hands. There is at least enough truth in the assertion of the gross barbarities deliberately ordered, both in Poland and in the East, by Russian commanders, to make it very undesirable—quite apart from considerations of political policy—that Russia should be entrusted with the Protectorate of the new Slavonic States which must soon arise on the south of the Danube.
Now, there is every reason to believe from Lord Derby's own statements,—especially from his eulogy on the local autonomy given to Crete, as the type of the autonomy which he wished to see established in Bosnia and Bulgaria,— that if the English conditions of peace had been accepted by Turkey, instead of being refused, no demand would have been made that the Powers should have the right to see them carried into execution, and to keep them in full working order and force. So far as we can form any opinion of the Russian suggestion of a joint occupation, it was put forward,—ostensibly, at least,—to make up for this omission of the most necessary condition of the whole. If that were so, whatever Russia's ultimate intentions, whatever her arriere pensie may have been, she was undoubtedly taking up very strong ground. If the Powers had proposed to Turkey to make a new set of promises, and to carry them out on her own responsibility in the worthless way in which she has carried out her grant of a constitution to Crete, they would have proposed a farce ; and Russia would have had a very good case indeed for asking Austria to join in a military occupation, of which the object should be to see the reforms promised really and effectually carried out. Indeed, after one fashion or another, unquestionably it will take military power of some sort to set the new chain of States working with any- thing like a chance of order and peace. And though it may be most undesirable that the military force applied should be the military force of States so deeply and so selfishly interested in special developments of the new constitutions as are Russia and Austria, it is the fault of the other Powers if no alternative has been proposed. Russia was fulfilling strictly her proper function,—if the terms pro- posed were proposed with no better guarantee for their efficacy than was given in the case of Crete,—in suggesting a military occupation for the purpose of giving effect to these reforms. And though it was most objectionable that the military occupa- tions in question should be that she proposed, the fault lies not with her for offering to step in and do what would otherwise have been left undone, but with the Powers which had omitted the one essential con- dition of all,—the guarantee that the reforms should be made, and should be realities, and not like the absurd autonomy of Crete, a name. Mr. Forster was quite wise in urging at Bradford on Thursday that though Russia might be wrong if she took the matter into her own hands, even in de- fault of the Six Powers promptly doing their duty, she is absolutely right if she is simply insisting that whatever auto- nomy is to mean, it is to be secured to the new States by a power external to that of Turkey itself. He might have gone further, and said that not only must it be secured to the new States by a power external to that of Turkey, but it must be a genuine political and military autonomy ; and this we do not in the least believe that autonomy in Lord Derby's sense,—which he himself illustrated by the autonomy in Crete,. —was ever intended to be. It would be just as useless to secure even by treaty, and by the intervention of the Powers, a sort of autonomy which could neither keep out corrupt Turkish Governors, nor barbarous Turkish soldiers, as to give nominally a much better autonomy, and yet not secure it at all. Mr. Forster is quite right in insisting that what is given at all shall be really secured ; but it is at least as necessary, as he himself, we have no doubt, will explain to-night at Bradford,. that what is given and secured, shall be effectual to keep out the vicious tyranny and cruelty of Turkish administration.
Now, if we are to countermine the Russian designs on Bul- garia,—supposing there be such designs—it must be by offering to secure to the Christian provinces of the Porte as real an autonomy as Russia would offer to secure, though without leaving Bulgaria to her mercy. If our Govern- ment simply opposes Russia in the interest of Turkey, it will fail ignominiously, and will deserve to fail. Barbarous as the Russian power may be, and cruel as some of her dealings with alien races may have been, we could trust her to govern a Slavonic people after a fashion far better than Turkey can or will govern them ; and the people of England therefore wilt not support their Government in supplanting Russia, unless it secures to these provinces a government at least as good as Russia would secure to them. If the Government really wishes to foil,—even at this late hour,—Russian designs, it must change its policy altogether, and offer conditions as good as Russia offers, on less dangerous terms. If Lord Carnarvon were at the Foreign Office, this is what his speech at Derby on Monday would lead us to hope that he would aim at. Un- fortunately, a statesman of very inferior tone is at the Foreign Office, with a chief over him who moulds his Foreign Secretary's indecision into wrong decision, and his Foreign Secretary's timidity into the worst kind of rashness,—the rashness which, is always sanguine of making way, without any steam, against both wind and tide.
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