TOPICS OF THE DAY„
lith WAR. THE Turco-Italian War provides a superlative example of the value of sea-power. By means of their ships the Italians are able to rail off, as it were, a certain area of the theatre of war and do there just what they please and at their leisure. This one-sidedness of the war in naval strength is responsible for the extraordinary slowness with which events are developing. If the combatants had been fairly well matched at sea we should have been watching with breathless interest before now rapid manoeuvres for bringing about a trial of naval strength on a grand scale and deciding which Power should control the sea. The Power that controls the sea is necessarily free to seize or to hold Tripoli, as the case may be, for neither can bring troops thither overland. So far the Turkish Navy, apparently conscious of its hopeless inferiority, has made no attempt to challenge the Italian ships. It escaped from Beirut to the Dar- danelles, and, according to the latest accounts, has gone to the Golden Horn, perhaps to lend authority to the wishes of the Committee of Union and Progress. It is strange that the Italian ships did not search it out on its way to the Dardanelles, for such small risks as will be rim by the Italian expedition which has yet to reach Tripoli from Italy will arise entirely from the existence of the Turkish fleet. It is so strange, indeed, that a naval action was apparently not seriously sought for that it has been suggested that Italy purposely left the Turkish ships alone in order to prove that she has no desire to attack Turkey except in Tripoli. Against this supposition we must set the fact that the Duke of Abruzzi showed no hesitation in attacking some insignificant and poorly armed Turkish ships at Preveza. From the naval point of view he was, of course, absolutely right. Preveza would be an obvious point from which the Turks might sally forth to attack Italian transports on their way to Tripoli. For a time it was even suggested that the Turkish fleet was not really in the Dardanelles. The evidence seemed good enough that it was there, but we must remember that it is easy to be deceived. In the Spanish-American War of 1898 Admiral Schley was con- vinced that the Spanish ships were hidden in Cienfuegos harbour when they were really at Santiago de Cuba. The same war gave a very curious example of the extreme nervousness that may be caused by the fear of hostile ships, hitherto unaccounted for, turning up at inconvenient junctures. General Shafter's expeditionary army for Cuba was kept prisoner in Florida for some days solely by a few phantom Spanish ships which were supposed to be in the Gulf of Mexico. If, therefore, the main part of the Turkish fleet was deliberately allowed to escape Italy has given a greater proof of self-restraint than we could have expected in the circumstances.
To " localize " the war is one thing ; to refrain from landing troops in European Turkey or Asiatic Turkey is an inexpensive guarantee of good faith ; but to consent to the continued existence of the Turkish fleet is to consent to the possibility of raids on the blockading fleet at Tripoli. Probably, however, the Turkish Government will not think it worth while to try to retain Tripoli by means of naval raids, though it may send small ships to run the blockade and land men, supplies, and ammunition. When that has been done the Turkish garrison in Tripoli will still virtually be left to its own resources, and the chief hope for Turkey will rest in the action of the Arabs and Berbers. When the Italians have penetrated about three days' march from the coast they will have to pass through narrow defiles, where, no doubt, the natives will be waiting for them. Besides the natives there is another part of the Turkish garrison in the hinterland which has for some time been hovering about the nebulous confines of French territory—a proof that the Young Turks have no idea of reducing their Empire, but, on the contrary, wish to have their share in the rearrangement of Northern Africa. The lesson of the strategy of the war thus far is that Turkey overlooked the primary importance of naval power when she was choosing her friends and securing for herself the greatest amount of physical support. Tripoli was known to be a weak spot; yet the chosen friend, Germany, could not possibly give Turkey naval help against a member of the Triple Alliance. There is already much talk of mediation. We fancy that the optimistic statements issued in Berlin, however, amount to nothing more than a way of saying that Germany would like to help Turkey and of hinting that she has actually got a scheme for doing so, even though less-well-meaning people cannot imagine what it is. We would advise our readers not to hope anything of mediation till Italy has carried out the simple and obvious part of the programme which she has laid down for herself. Having announced her intention of occupying Tripoli she would no doubt think it weak and despicable not to do what she has advertised to the world. The next point is that an occupation of Tripoli would require more in the judgment of Italy than the mere occupation of the coast towns if the Turks and the natives should decide to leave the towns and give battle elsewhere. We must in that case postpone the hope of mediation a step further. Turkey on her side is no doubt very anxious for intervention, but when the seizure of the coast towns is an accomplished fact even she may hesitate for a little and ask herself whether it would not be as well to see what kind of resistance the natives will offer to the Italians before resigning herself to mediation on unfavour- able terms. For let us make no mistake that the terms must be unfavourable in the sense that unless a miraculous change comes over the war the substance of power in Tripoli is lost to Turkey for ever. If the occasion does arise for the Powers to try to make the best terms possible for Turkey it will be well not to spoil the attempt by aiming at too much. Though it will not be possible for the Powers to request Italy to leave Tripoli, it may be possible for them to invite her—for Italy will know that if she behaves churlishly she will earn the ill-will of Europe, which is already directed a good deal against her—to respect the suzerainty of Turkey in Tripoli and to pay for the territory she has annexed. Austria-Hungary paid for Bosnia and Herzegovina ; it would be absurd to pretend that Italy would be weak to make a similar payment in similar circumstances. We are all friends of peace, but we say that it is not sensible to pursue ideal policies which gratify their authors' humane instincts but achieve nothing and put an end to no sufferings.
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 are being quoted as justification for intervention. Italy, it is said, can be pulled up short for having criminally disregarded the precaution of first submitting her differences with Turkey to arbitration. But every. Power which makes war commits this same crime. And how is Italy to be checked ? To hold a pistol to her head is to declare war on her. Are the Powers prepared to inaugurate Armageddon by such an act ? The thing is not practical. Again, the Hague Conventions are cited as giving non-belligerent Powers authority to mediate between combatants without undue officiousness. But the Conventions are so worded that combatants are fortified with an equal authority for refusing media- tion. We earnestly hope that the Powers will be able to exercise a restraining influence on both Italy and Turkey ; that they will be able to confine the war to a certain area; and that they will make representa- tions to Italy in order to get the best terms for Turkey. All this is feasible and well worth doing. But we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that the annexation of Tripoli can be reversed. The policy of Italy is an un- pleasant fact, like the annexation of Bosnia and Herze- govina in violation of the Treaty of Berlin, and like the coercing of France by Germany in Morocco; but it is none the less a fact, and will remain a fact. It is one of the symptoms of a reaction in European morals. Great Britain has no logical ground whatever for interfering. What the Turks will do when they squarely recognize this fact we cannot guess. They are angry and sore at what they consider was the culpable inactivity of the late Vizier, Hakki Pasha. Now that the new Vizier, Said Pasha, has formed a Cabinet, he still has to reckon with the sus- picions of the Committee at Salonika. If he pleases the military party the war may be prosecuted desperately and ruinously ; if he walks cautiously he may be sacrificed to the fury of an affronted people, who can bear anything more easily than military disgrace. It would be foolish to prophesy till one sees what military action Turkey is likely to take.
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