LORD GRANVILLE IN ASIA.
rEvery guarded and careful statement on Asiatic affairs made by Lord Granville on Thursday night, does not throw as much light on the recent negotiations with Russia, as the "papers" ought to do, but it does throw some. It is quite evident, though the Foreign Secretary, for reasons of high courtesy, does not say so, that the Foreign Office was troubled by the reports of the great expedition to Khiva, and thereby induced to take up the thread of the negotiations of 1859 in good earnest. Those negotiations, managed by Mr. Forsyth under arrangements with Lord Clarendon, looked to an agree- ment that " Afghanistan " should be neutral, or rather, that Afghanistan should have a boundary which Russia engaged to respect, but did not settle definitively what regions should be included in Afghanistan. On the despatch of the Khiva re- connaissance, Lord Granville thought it necessary to rectify this omission, and certain representations were accordingly made to the Government of St. Petersburg. What these representa- tions were, we shall probably never know—any appearance of pressure being unadvisable,—but it seems clear from the Emperor's reply, summarised by Lord Granville in his speech, that the British Government had spoken of a certain "uneasi- ness in the public mind" excited by the movements against Khiva, and that the remonstrance was so seriously interpreted by the Czar, that his Majesty despatohed his most confidential agent, Count Schouvaloff, to explain among other things that "it was far from his intention to take possession of Khiva, that posi- tive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and that directions had been given that the conditions imposed by Russia should be such as could not in any way lead to the prolonged occupation of Khiva." With this strong assurance, which, as Lord Gran- ville said, is the more satisfactory owing "to the form of the Russian Government," that is, because it comes direct from the Czar himself, other assurances were conveyed that the rights of Afghanistan over Badakshan and Wakhan should not be a cause of difference between the two Governments. In undiplomatic language, Czar Alexander pledges himself per- sonally not to subjugate Khiva, but only to chastise it, and not to establish a protectorate there which might "involve a pro- longed Russian occupation." He further agrees not to invade Afghanistan, and not to decide without notice that Badakshan and Wakhan are not parts of that rather vague geographical description.
These assurances, so far as they go, are entirely satisfactory. Russia has a clear right to punish the Khan of Khiva, whose conduct in seizing and enslaving her subjects is quite intoler- able, and but intends, that work accomplished, to retire from a position in which she would be very dangerous, if not to us, at least to Persia. Moreover, in agreeing not to enter Afghanistan, Badakshan included, she agrees to keep her forts, artillery, and troops 500 miles from ourfrontier; that is, in fact, as nearly as we can calculate, to give us four months' warning at least of any intention to advance towards our northern boundary. We are no more or less able to stop her than before, but we shall know, if she crosses the "boundary," that she entertains some unfriendly design. This is precisely what we need, and we do not suspect the Czar of any double dealing. He does not, it is probable, desire to advance too fast, or to eat the artichoke at a bite, or to contend with Great Britain merely for barren plains. But it must not be forgotten that, however honest he may be, his Generals may be more ambitious than himself, that a repulse in Khiva might render retirement utterly impossible—lest all Russian Asia inspired with a new hope should try the experiment of insur- rection,—and that nothing whatever has been settled with respect to Persia. A victorious army retiring from Khiva might by a deflection of route become a tremendous menace to Teheran. The total silence of Lord Granville upon this point does not entirely reassure us ; but still, that danger can be met when it comes, and met by sea, and States cannot negotiate on a presumption of carefully prepared faithlessness.
• Lord Granville is probably right in keeping Teheran out of the affair, and for the rest, he appears to have conducted a • most delicate negotiation—delicate not only from the interests
• involved, but from the special position of the Russian Czar as a Sovereign who must not seem to be rebuffed—with
• spirit, discretion, and success. All he has now to do is to keep on watching, and watching strictly in Teheran, and to see that Lord Northbrook is always ready and well-informed. The danger Lord Derby seems to fear—that we are about to assume a Protectorate over Afghanistan—is, we are convinced, unreal. It is quite true that in Asia" friendly relations easily become Alliances, an Alliance is converted into a Protectorate, and a Protectorate ends in virtual annexation," but then one of the parties concerned must desire, or at all events acquiesce in such annexation. This will not be the case in India. No one there desires provinces beyond the mountains. The mili- tary spirit there is strong, and so is the greed of territory, but the military do not desire lonely positions on stony plains, nor do adventurers think they could make 100 per cent, by working the mineral treasures of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the Afghans dread interference from Calcutta with sleep- less apprehension ; they do not make the extraordinary mistake generated in England by the events of the Afghan war. They know that the Viceroy could crush them, scattered and thinly populated as their territories are, in a single campaign, for they remember that Nott and Pollock did do it, and know well what Anglo-Indians aware of the facts never willingly recall what a "war of retribution" really means. Our anxiety will be to have as little to do with them as possible ; theirs will be to see as little of us as possible. Share Ali, the extraordinary mono- maniac on the throne, may wish for a little money, and should his son Yakoob succeed,—we take Yakoob to be a kind of Ibrahim Pasha,—he may ask for rifles or a few artillerymen, but neither will accept willingly the quiet man in black, whom we send to so many Indian Courts, to have twice the influence of the ruler. If Russia will honestly keep outside Old Afghanistan, as her Emperor says she will, our policy in the North and West is simple and easily carried out. It is slightly and quietly to strengthen the hands of the Afghan dynasty,—for anarchy there might upset all calculations,— to garrison Quettah, or hold ourselves ready to garrison it on any alarm, and to watch sleeplessly all that is done, and said, and promised, and paid in Teheran. The weak point we repeat is there,—for there Russia sees the means of acquiring a power which might be used directly and fatally for her main end, which is not the acquisition of India,—that, as Mr. Disraeli said, has too much in it of the "distempered dream,"—but the overthrow of the Turkish monarchy and the possession of Constantinople, which may be, as he puts it, "a freak of ambition," but is indispensable to that "full entrance into the waters of the world" which, as he also says, is to Russia "a natural and an inevitable policy."
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