8 MAY 1942, Page 5

MADAGASCAR

By STRATEGICUS

1 HE first advantage of the landing in Madagascar is the possibility that it may remind those whose telescopes can see no her than Calais that the war ranges across the world. Everyone

Les to see an offensive launched against the western front, everylongs for the time when the Allied forces can attack the Germans

c.t!

y ; but Madagascar reminds us that there are a number of vital ixs that require immediate attention. Every student of military . s has been attempting to close his eyes to the problems raised the growing movement towards co-operation in Vichy. Mada

is only one of them. Tunisia has long been a thorn in our e. The coastal part of French West Africa, including Dakar, is other. Dr. Evatt now reminds us of a group of problems needing rtion in the Far East. I gather from a recent broadcast that he is stated that there is no absolute shortage of shipping, but merely

necessity for using the recognised tonnage in the critical direcps. The difficulty is that there are so many critical directions.

situation in Burma has gone from bad to worse. There shipg

,used before the fall of Rangoon, might have saved us from the

orn inious position in which we find ourselves today. But goon fell on March 7th. We were still fighting against time in southern Pacific at that moment. We were under the depressing ' sity of attempting to reinforce Java, Australia and Burma at same time. Japan was already at Singapore ; and the great diss which reinforcements must cover had been extended by the sity of giving it a wide berth. Most of the criticisms one is pted to make have to be discarded on full consideration. When entered the war our resources were strained to the uttermost. is what is meant by diversion. That is why Germany made pia with Japan, and why Japan attacked when and how she did. It is high time everyone really woke up. We are called upon to almost insuperable problems because we were unprepared when entered the war, because the Allies as a group are still unprepared the war as it actually exists today. Our unpreparedness causes to give to the enemy the gift every general prays for—the opporty to take his foe in detail. Our unpreparedness also prevents from making the best use of our present resources. It is the rich can spend fruitfully: the poor are condemned to live from hand mouth. If we could really view the course of the war with comb: detachment we should be compelled to admit that we have nived almost miraculously. What particular ordeal the Allies II be called on to survive next can only be matter for speculation. is, of course, difficult to imagine that Japan can contemplate a Si campaign in China any more than-a similar campaign in India. It Were earlier in the year such operations would be better worth tsideration ; but the Axis operations must somehow be articulated, id neither in China nor in India is it very clear how they can be. t the moment China seems the more probable theatre for the ifinese to exploit ; but, unless Marshal Chiang Kai-shek is much i!e vulnerable than we have reason to think, they may be content al merely holding him off while they deal with the Allies in ktma. It is not only the position of the British that gives cause !anxiety there. The Chinese troops were last reported about toggYi. They appear to be cut off, far from the British. They 17r certainly no link with the main forces in China. They have s obvious line of retreat, no power of manoeuvre. The weak spot st as usual, been the link with the flank armies. The Allied command appear to think the next extension of the %nese operations looks towards the west. Sooner or later they nat. look towards the west or the north, or both. Only by so rtg can they join hands with the rest of the Axis Powers ; and Pan. has struck so shrewdly up to the present that it is impossible I Imagine her acting in isolation during the whole year. One 'Portant inference which the landing on Madagascar appears to ktfY is official satisfaction with the defence of Ceylon. The cynical IlY suggest that such satisfaction will fill them with dismay ; but .t!laY surely be inferred that by this time we know a little more !Lt the Japanese, and in the time which has fortunately been /tell us we have concentrated sufficient force in the island to with

stand attack successfully. For, of course, apart from its influence upon the Indian situation, Ceylon contains in Trincomali one of the most important anchorages and dockyards of the British Navy.

Madagascar is a great island which would form an admirable base for a Japanese attempt to link up in the Atlantic with Germany, though fortunately for us the German navy appears to be in no great shape to make a sortie at present. Its possession by Japan v:ould, however, place her in a position to cut our lines of supply to the Middle East and Russia ; and, although there is a northern supply route to Russia, it is probable that the Middle Eastern communications would be completely disrupted. In this way the Japanese occupation of the island would fit into the Axis design very admirably. The German navy has been concentrated in the north for the purpose of disputing the northern supply route to Russia ; and, with the Persian line cut, our Ally could be deprived of all help except by air on the roundabout Alaskan route. As it is certain that Germany must again challenge Russia, and by no means certain that she feels any too confident about it if the Allies are permitted to pour in supplies, Japan' in Madagascar might provide that marginal aid upon which success may well turn. By cutting the supply-lines to the Middle East, Japan might be expected to dry up reinforcements and munitions both to Libya and the Transcaucasian areas, which also, presumably, figure in the German plans.

Its occupation by the Allies would tend to assure these supplylines. Installed in Madagascar, we should be able to cover the useful ports of Kilindi and Durban and make it a doubtful gamble to attempt to seize either the Seychelles or Mauritius. If Ceylon can also be retained, the problems of the western part of the India Ocean should be solved. It is for this reason that the Allied initiative must be cordially welcomed. It is not, of course, the first time that we have forestalled the enemy. We did that in Syria, Iraq and Persia, though in each case the threat was beginning to take shape. Here, apparently, it has been completely forestalled. The one thing that now remains is to press through the operations to a finish.

The Governor-General of the island has refused to surrender his charge, and that was presumably to be expected. Marshal Petain's and Darlan's exhortations are also a matter of course. None of these give us any sort of hint of the course the fighting may take. The one safe course for us to follow is to strike in such force that resistance shall at once be overawed. But whether we have been able to do that or not probably turns upon the availability of shipping, and with information on that point only a few ingenious journalists appear to be sufficiently provided. The island, however, is of so much importance that it is to be hoped that no notice has been taken of the view that the bulk of the French inhabitants are friends of General de Gaulle. His desires must be the same as our own, that there shall be as little fighting as possible, and this is much more likely if sufficient force has been despatched there to deal with an enemy population. We cannot afford another Dakar fiasco.

The repercussions of the landing on the attitude of Vichy may, however, be serious. It is a problem whether it is better to fight on in the uncertainty whether a former friend will fall on us in some sudden crisis or to challenge him to declare himself. Apparently the Allies have come to the conclusion that it is better to know at once how we stand, since the time is coming when we shall require to fight without the distractions that an undeclared enemy might provide. There are a number of consequences that follow from such a decision. We must be prepared to act resolutely in other directions if need be. But that speculative question can wait until the attitude of Vichy has been formally declared. For the moment it is sufficient to recognise, from the fragmentary reports that have come to hand, that the landing has been made with great skill, and we must hope that only purely military considerations will be allowed to govern its development. I have spoken of the "occupation" of Madagascar, and though this may seem a big undertaking, there can be little doubt that it is necessary. To control the island from Diego Suarez would be like holding England and Scotland from Mount's Bay.