THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION.
AS we write the fate of Botha and of the last remnants of the Boer Army still hangs in the balance, but nothing can now avert the final overthrow of the Boers. We may conceivably have to face a reverse or two more, may even have another Spion Kop, but the end is certain. In other words, Lord Roberts's so-called proclamation of annexation was not premature.—It cannot of course have been really a proclamation of annexation, for you cannot annex what is yours already, but merely a proclamation annulling the grants (not contracts, remember) made in the two Conventions, and resuming complete sovereignty.— Bat the resumption of complete sovereignty necessarily raises the question what steps ought now to be taken to secure the permanent peace of South Africa. The -first thing is obviously to stamp out the last embers of war. That this must be done sternly and thoroughly goes with- out saying, but there should of course be no attempt to treat the Boers in arms in the Lydenburg district as rebels. These men must be accorded the full rights of belligerents, even though their Government has ceased to exist. The men who have taken the oath of neutrality and violated it are, however, on a perfectly different footing, and to them no special consideration need be shown. Their lives are forfeit. We do not say we would exact the forfeit, but in properly proved cases strong action should be taken to show the Boers that a breach of the most solemn pledges shall never go unpunished. Confiscation of their lands would certainly not be too severe a penalty. The farmers took the oath deliberately and of their own free will. If their patriotism was too strong to allow them to keep the oath, why was it not too strong to allow them to take it? But though we would treat the unperj ured burghers with all the consideration due to brave belligerents, we admit that it 'will not be possible indefinitely to extend the period of war. After the last action that can fairly be called a battle has been fought, and after there has ceased to be any organised body of troops left in the Lydenburg or Barberton districts, it will be perfectly fair to say to the burghers that they must stop fighting, and that if they do not they must take the consequences of being regarded as outlaws in the new State estab- lished in the Transvaal. We would take action, not by proclaiming them rebels, but in the following way. We would take all farms on which the owners were not residing into the hands of the State, and then give notice that if within a month or six weeks the owners appeared and took the oath of neutrality their farms would be given back to them. If not they would be considered as derelict, and would be resumed by the State, and sold or granted to fresh owners. If this were done we may feel sure that thousands of Boers would leave their commandos and return. Those who did not return would still be accorded the rights of belligerents, but it would be understood that they had not only ceased to own land in the Transvaal, but that they would in future have to reacquire the rights of citizenship. But though this would in most cases bring back the Boers to their farms, it would not, of course, complete the settlement. There would still be a great deal of discontent, and no doubt the large sums of money lodged by the-Boers in Europe would be persistently used to foment disaffection. But that disaffection, though tiresome, if properly treated need cause no very great alarm. We must remember that three or four years after the mines are again in full swing, and while public works in the shape of railways, roads, and irrigation dams are being made, the population will advance by leaps and bounds. The Boers in the first year of the new regime may be an important part of the population. In three years' time they will be a small minority. In ten years' time they will be a ne4ligible quantity. In an old country old hates are easily kept up. In a new country, and exposed to a flood of immigration, they soon die out. All we have got to do is to manage the Boers properly during the next three or four years. After that the problem will settle itself. In our view, the best way of managing the Boers will be to let them alone as long as they commit no °yea acts._._ Let them talk-and Preach as they choose as long as it is only talking and preaching. But one of the most effective ways of letting the Boers alone is not to tax them directly. If you do not tax..them they cannot indulge in a passive strike against taxes, which is the sort of thing a body of Boer farmers would regard with great satisfaction. If we had not taxed the Boers after the first annexation, we should probably never have had the movement engi- neered by ex-President Kreger. No doubt in those days it was almost impossible not to tax the farmers, for there was no other source of revenue open. Now, however, that there are plenty of other sources of revenue, it would be most unwise to try to exact direct taxes from the Boers. Possibly it will be said that a good land-tax will have an excellent disciplinary effect on the Boers, -will make them cultivate their farms better, and will break up their huge holdings, but we most sincerely trust that we shall not fall into this error. The tax would cost more than it was worth to collect, and resistance to it would give just the rallying point the Boer agitators will want. It will be quite time enough to make the Boer farmers pay their share in taxation when they receive self-government in four or five years' time.
Though we do not suppose that the settlement will be an easy task, we would warn our readers against being too pessimistic as to the condition of affairs in the Transvaal after the cessation of hostilities. The long duration of the war has been in many ways a great misfor- tune, but it has had one good result. It has certainly made the settlement easier. If the Boers had col- lapsed before they were really conquered, they would have been far more difficult to deal with. As it is, they have had the thorough beating they required, and they cannot now say : Oh, if we had only held out a little longer we should have won.' They have really fought to a finish, and will not want to begin again as do men who are only half beaten. Again, the length of the war, their long absence from their homes, their actual losses in- the field, their dispersal, and the destruction of their property have all tended to break up the iron-clad caste which existed before the war. The Boer left his farm the member of what for all the dirt and uncouth- ness was a dominant oligarchy accustomed to rule over black and white, kept in comparative idleness by State doles, and filled with spiritual and racial pride. He was the lord of the land, feared by his black dependants, and able to make his will prevail over the white not of his race. Now he will go back a beaten man, and though he may still affect to despise the " rooinek," he must really acknowledge that he has failed. The black will not treat him with the old servility, and there will be no more money and horses to be got from the State. The Boer, that is, will have his work cut out for him. He must try to regain his command over the native, and without the assistance of a law under which the white man was always in the right. He must probably rebuild his house, and certainly reorganise his flocks and herds. In a word, the Boer after a year's war will have plenty to do to keep him quiet. His caste has been as completely shattered by the long war as was that of the Southern slaveholders after the collapse of the Con- federacy. If the South had given in after, say, Antie- tam, there would almost certainly have been a second war. The fact that they fought it out to the bitter end made the settlement when it came far easier. Hence we do not feel that the final settlement will really prove so difficult as is often imagined. It will be difficult no doubt to stop the raiding and to wipe out the last of the bands of overflies, but when once this state of " dacoity " has been stopped we have little fear as to the result. We must never forget that the Boer at bottom is much like the rest of mankind. The harder a man fights and the longer, the more complete his collapse when he does go down.
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