PRUSSIAN POLICY—FORTIFICATIONS ON THE RHINE.
lix the cotirse of a search, last night, among some long-neglected manuscripts, we were attracted to one by the handwriting of the excellent Correspondent who, many months ago, favoured our pages with a number of agreeable, well-informed, and popular communications, under the signature of "A Spectator in the Netherlands." We found it was a paper relating to the fortifications on the Rhine, and the policy of Prussia and some other German states. The theatre of our Correspon'dent's observation again presents a scene of stirring interest. The
• extracts which we subjoin derive some adventitious value from that circumstance ; but, taking them as the discriminating remarks of a shrewd and sensible traveller, they can hardly be out of place at any time.]
"The treaties by which Prussia acquired the districts on the Rhine which formerly belonged to the bishopiicks of Munster, Cologne, Treves, &c., have not produced any advantage to these countries : on the contrary, they feel the iron rod of a government most absurdly devoted to -a military system. Nor has Prussia gained any strength by the acquisition of that extensive territory. The strength of a country depends on the good will of the inhabitants to the government ; and that never can be obtained where every young man is obliged to serve three years in the army and nine years in the militia—where every parish is directed, by military placards, to what regiment of militia it belongs, placed conspicuously on every road, as if playing the soldier was the sole object of society. This is mighty foolish on the part of Prussia, for if ever she come to be pressed by an enemy, all these acquired provinces will be unwilling defenders of the mother country, to which they have no link to bind them. The old separated territory of Juliers and Berg and Cleves, is much in the same state of attachment. If all this useless military machinery of the disunited (I mean territorially disunited) provinces were set aside—if the money spent in training these triennial soldiers and nine year militiamen, were applied to making passable roads and good landing quays at the towns on the Rhine—if the town duties
on_the entry of meat, flour, and other articles of food were done away,-_
, then might these provinces become rich and attached faithfully to. Pruse, sia, and even produce a revenue, not burdensome to the people, which , would fill the coffers at Berlin. The Ministers of' the King of Prussia do not seem to understand that a well-filled treasury is a stronger defence than a country of trained soldiers not having an united interest to defend.
"A new system of fortifying the towns on the Rhine has sprung up, whether copied from Wer.r.ixoT ON'S defences at Lisbon, or from Da. you T'S works at Eamburgh, I know not ; but it has decidedly many advantages over the old VAUBAN plans. I need not say that a large fortified town was formerly defended by a circumvallation of works close to the outward houses, with double or triple ditches, and one or two horn-works to defend some weak angle. The consequence was, the utmost misery to the inhabitants at the very commencement of the siege, as the shells could be thrown into the very heart of the city before any parallels of attack were formed. The attackers had the inhabitants and soldiers compressed into the smallest space, and required thus fewer troops to invest the place against receiving supplies.
"At Mayence, Coblentz, &c. a chain of forts, each complete in itself, has been constructed at some distance from the town, on the most cornmending situation that could be found ; and the town itself is merely left with its old common wall, gateway, and single ditch. If the enemy invests, he must do so against each 'fort, and the townsmen are mere sI ectators of the conflict ; for the forts remove the enemies' advances beyond the range of shells, and indeed it is useless to expend them against a town thus disunited from the defences. The time required to make advances against three or four forts—the uncertainty of sallies from so many points—the extent of country that requires to be invested in order to cut off the communication—are all advantages gained by the defenders by this new style of fortification.
The works of the celebrated Ehrenbreitstein were blown up by the French ; and the Prussians have rebuilt the fort, stronger, as they think, than ever it was,—nay, they say, stronger even than Gibraltar. I am not a military man but I have doubts of this. The French bat.. tered the former fort man, a neighbouring height with some effect, though they never could breach it. On this height the Prussians have erected another fort, to keep off an enemy from this point of attack. This is bad work, I think ; thr if the fort be impregnable without any additional defence, why erect a fort not impregnable, which may be gained, and would be a point d'appui against the main fort ? Again, the old fort on the land side was confined to the plateau of the Hill. The new fort has its land defences extended below the plateau ; and in coming down upon the fort from the Nassau road, I saw into the interior of the fort. The guns on the land side are worked through port-holes, in two or three tiers in some of the batteries; but port-holes limit the right and left range of gulls ; and guns so placed are more readily dismounted, and the port-holes are liable to be choked by shot breaking down the. sides. Guns placed on walls en barbette are far more efficacious in de. fence than either in embrasures or in port-holes. A range of Martello towers connected with a thick upright wall, having a dry ditch, with cannon mounted en barbette—the towers bomb-proof, and serving stS casemates for the soldiers—would present, in my humble opinion, a much stronger defence than the present fort ; which I think a party of English sailors might scale on the land side at more than one place. Oa the Rhine side which is a precipitous rock of considerable height, the fort is impregnable, I have little doubt.
"But along the Rhine, the great European Powers seem to expect and are preparing against some second BONAPARTE that is to rise up in full disciplined array of tens of thousands against them. The little Princes of the Rhine have more wisdom. The Prince of Nassau, for example, has made, mid is continuing to make, the best Macadamized roads I have seen anywhere, equal if not superior to the best of England. He is planting his wastes and poor gravelly sods with oak woods, and encouraging industry throughout his well-regulated little territory. The taxes are light, and the people are devoted to him. Not less wise are the Princes of Hesse Hombourg, and Hesse Darmstadt, who follow suck examples. In their territories one is not troubled with police, or custom.. house searchers, and few or no soldiers are to be seen. They live without any affectation of stare, and see with their own eyes the condition of things in their dominions."
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