TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE SITUATION.
WE are entirely in sympathy with Mr. Balfour's expressed view, and with what we believe to be Sir William Harcourt's secret view, as to the vote of censure. Until they have an alternative policy to propose, the duty of any organised party in the State is either to support her Majesty's Government in foreign affairs, or, if they cannot conscientiously do that, to confine themselves, as Lord Kimberley carefully does, to suggestive criticism. The Motion which Sir William Harcourt wished to bring forward, binding the Ministry in advance, and without reference to circumstances, not to attack Greece, is not only injudicious, but, as we think, unconstitutional, for it would fetter the Government in action, which, being future, must depend upon events, and reduce to a wholly unprecedented degree its responsibility. Lord Salisbury should be allowed a free hand, subject to his liability, if he acts contrary to grave public opinion, to be dismissed from office. Otherwise the State will not act, as it ought to act, as a unit, and will lose, in what is acknowledged to be a dangerous crisis, half its beneficial influence. At the same time, we cannot but believe that both Mr. Balfour and Mr. Curzon underrate the strength of the doubt which pervades men's minds as to British policy in Eastern Europe, and deal with their critics, Mr. Balfour too defiantly, and Mr. Curzon too " high-sniffingly," to use Carlyle's word, for perfect statesmanship. The Liberals are not argumentatively crushed because they are afraid, in the divided condition of their party, to bring on a test division ; nor are the Unionists who, like ourselves, think that the policy of the Concert tends too much to Turkish advantage, the "knaves or idiots," or persons given up to emotion, which they appear to Mr. Curzon. It is a little trying to quiet men who are endeavouring to reconcile loyalty to the Cabinet with loyalty to British traditions in favour of freedom to have such epithets flung at them, not because they are abusive, for abuse matters little, but because the use of such exaggerated language suggests in the spokesman of a great Department, even when he is not speaking from his place, a want alike of judgment and self-control. And it is more than a little trying to be called on to admire steps in a policy like the " communication " which informs Greece and Turkey that if either of them declare war " the Powers " will not permit the offending State to benefit by the results of the contest. How do the' Powers know that they can help it, or what is the precise meaning of their menace ? Suppose for a moment, what is most improbable, that Greece defeated Turkey, and Turkey offered Epirus as the price of peace, are the Powers going to shell Athens ? Or suppose, what is at least possible, that the result of the war was to make of Crete and Macedonia independent principalities, resolved hereafter to federate themselves with Greece, would that be a defiance of the " communication," a reason for slaughtering Greek soldiers wholesale P A despotic Government might issue such a threat, and mean it, but as a menace from six Powers, of which three are friendly to Greek freedom, and could, if provoked, in six weeks sweep the navies of the world out of existence, a " communication" of that kind is almost silly. Nor—and this remonstrance we would address to Mr. Balfour himself—is it wise to forget, as the despotic Chancelleries do, the moral side of the question. It is a very serious thing indeed for agents of the British Govern- ment to be killing Cretans once a week for defending the right to their freedom which that very Government asserts and maintains on their behalf, without a declaration of war, and with a full recognition that the British people is in sympathy Cretan. Such conduct at least requires defence, and though it may be defended on the ground that a certain legislative right must be acknowledged as residing in the six Powers in order to prevent what we may define as " private war" in Europe, still those who cannot recognise that right are entitled to respectful treatment.
The point on which we, and as we believe a majority of Englishmen, while supporting Lord Salisbury as Premier, doubt both the wisdom and the righteousness of the policy he is pursuing as Foreign Secretary, is that it redounds too much to the benefit of Turkey,—that is, of a barbarous Asiatic State which ought at the earliest con- venient moment to be deprived of all power to oppress Christian Europeans We think that, while he should adhere to the Concert as long as possible, he should use the immense superiority of Great Britain in the Eastern Mediterranean to make conditions for his adherence, the central condition being that all steps taken should tend to the liberation of Christian provinces. That he should agree to make of Crete an autonomous province for the present, or should insist on guarantees for the safety of the Greek-speaking Mussulmans of the island, is wise and right; but why should he hesitate to demand that the author of the Armenian massacres should instantly with- draw his troops from Crete, which has boldly and righteously thrown off his rule ? That he should warn Greece that she cannot have Macedonia or Epirus at present is per- fectly justifiable policy ; but why should not both be declared independent principalities ? That would not affect the reversionary designs either of Russia or Austria any more than the liberation of the remainder of the Balkan States has done ; it is, in fact, a mere continuance of the policy which has enfranchised Moldavia and Wallachia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Eastern Roumelia, and Greece itself. The Concert would have been broken up i Would it, when it came to the point,—that is, would the Continental Powers have accepted a great war among themselves, with England looking on, rather than exchange a postponement of the grand partition, with the disputed lands under Turkish Pashas, for a postponement with the disputed lands under Christian Princes ? We cannot believe it ; and even Lord Salisbury would acknowledge that, as a matter of fact, the policy adopted has immensely strengthened the Sultan. Abd-ul-Hamid has been able to accumulate a most powerful army in Macedonia, to show himself to his people as a fighting Sultan, to prove beyond all doubt or argument that his policy of massacre has not alienated the Ottoman tribe, has not diminished the strength of his Government for war, and has not decreased the reluctance of Europe to upset his throne. We maintain that a result like that, Crete still in anarchy, with Bashibazouks killing Christians, Macedonia still enslaved, war between Greek and Turk still possible, and the exterminator of Armenians immensely strengthened to resist European demands, cannot fairly be described as successful, and to those who desire the downfall of the Turkish Empire must appear like failure. It is open, of course, to the Government to say that they desire no such thing, but if they do themselves such wilful injustice we shall not credit their assertions.
A great deal is made of the misconduct of Greece in landing troops in Crete, though that landing was not opposed by the European squadrons, and was eagerly desired by three-fourths of the island population. We have steadily blamed the Greeks for not declaring war when they despatched their troops, and see no reason to recede from that position ; but are not the strong con- demnations now expressed a little hypocritical? Nine Englishmen in ten approved the invasion of Naples by Cavour, no one blamed the occupation of East Roumelia by the Bulgarians, and the virtual annexation of Bosnia by the Austrians was publicly accepted and ratified by British diplomatists. No one outside Italy has remon- strated against the seizure of Tunis by France, all Europe sent England to occupy Egypt, and Thessaly was, under whatever forms, wrung by Mr. Gladstone from the Turkish Empire by force in time of peace. In every instance the justification was the same, that it was necessary in the interests of humanity and civilisation to rescue a kingdom or a province from a Government too evil to be borne any longer, or, which had become, as Mr. Gladstone described the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, an " organised negation of God." If there is ever a justification for violence, a Government of that kind, a Government which intends harm to its subjects and not good, is such a justification, and that the Turkish Government is such a one is written over the whole history of the treatment of its Christian subjects. There is not a good man in England who, if we had been able to advance in arms to the rescue of the Armenians—we entirely concede the inability—would not have exulted in such advance, and have quoted it in future as proof that Great Britain always performed her duty. That is precisely what Greece has done, yet because the Greek dynasty is willing to accept the Cretans' offer to become its subjects it is denounced as so selfish and hypocritical that it ought to be swept out of existence. Be it observed that even now, at the eleventh hour, it is willing to allow a plebiscite to be taken, or a vote asked for from a Cretan assembly, and will, if that plebiscite or that vote is hostile, instantly 4 retire. But, it is said, Greece in so acting broke the European peace, which is of such infinite importance. That is perfectly true ; and what peace did Prince Bismarck break when he tore Schleswig-Holstein from Denmark, or invaded Austria, or flung down the challenge to Napoleon ? It is very wrong to break the peace, but as we read history every Power in Europe has been doing it ever since Charlemagne died, and no one has been permanently blamed, unless it was too little to carry away much spoil. We yield to no one in our horror of war for inadequate reason, but if ever on earth a reason was adequate it is when Christians are governed by Turks and a "fanatical period " has set in.
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