CORRESPONDENCE.

THE STATE OF THE NAVY.—REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE OF THE FLEET.

ITO THE EDITOR OF THE " SPECTATOR."]

SIR,—The final debate on the Navy Estimates ranged over many subjects, more or less directly connected with the Shipbuilding Vote. Its real interest centred, however, in statements made by the Admiralty representatives in regard to the repairs of the Fleet. Mr. Robertson admitted that the subject "bad bulked largely in public discussion outside the House," and said " it had been alleged that the repairs of the Fleet had been neglected, especially in the Home Fleet and the special service vessels." Mr. Arnold-Forster said " he was told by a very large number of persons whom he believed to be impartial, and knew to be well informed, that repairing work had fallen greatly into arrears, and that there were many ships which, if ordered to go on a long cruise or to undertake the arduous duties of a campaign, would be found insufficient in their repairs." Mr. Balfour remarked that "as far as he knew the whole disquiet of the public mind related to repairs, and did not relate to what be might call the fundamentals of ship- building programme." In this statement Mr. Balfour virtually endorsed the view that has been set forth in previous letters of this series : there is good reason to be satisfied with the relative position of the British Navy vis-a-vis to foreign navies as regards ships and personnel ; but there are grave reasons for doubting if the completed ships on our effective list—constituting the force available for service at the present moment—have been maintained or are now really existing in a condition of full efficiency. If they are not, then our real force falls short of our nominal force, and those responsible for the defect should bear• the blame, while immediate steps must be taken to remedy the evil. If, on the other band, all is well, then the Admiralty, as Mr. Balfour urged, ought to bring disquiet in the public mind to an end by authoritatively stating " with regard to each ship criticised whether the criti- cism is accurate or not."

It is unfortunate that party politics should have been intro- duced into the discussion of this vital question, and that the present Government should have been credited with a "cheese-paring" policy in regard to repairs. Mr. Robertson easily disposed of this allegation ; in doing so he gave figures which deserve careful study, besides mentioning facts that are most suggestive. In the financial year 1905-6 about two millions sterling were provided in the Navy Estimates for repairs, but less than 21,582,000 was spent. In the next financial year the Estimates—prepared by Lord Cawdor's Board and accepted by Lord Tweedmouth—made a provision for repairs of only £1,628,100. The new Board, however, found it necessary to exceed this provision, and spent nearly £283,000—over seventeen per cent.—more than their pre- decessors had thought sufficient. For the present financial year about £1,800,000 has been provided for repairs, and Mr. Robertson told the House of Commons that "up to date (that is when only one-third of the financial year had elapsed) the Admiralty had overspent themselves to the extent of £44,250." It is obvious, therefore, that the present Government has been more liberal in expenditure on repairs than their immediate predecessors were ; but it by no means follows that the provision recently made is sufficient for the maintenance of Fleet in full efficiency. Leading authorities on the subject maintain that—on the basis of the numbers, types, and aggregate first cost of the ships of the effective list . of the Royal Navy—an average annual provision of four millions

sterling should be made for the repairs and maintenance of the Fleet. • The case has been stated in previous letters, to which those interested can turn ; but the discrepancy between the provision actually made of late in the Navy Estimates, and the amount considered proper by experts whose opinions, are entitled to respect, is very great and ought not to be lightly dismissed.

One may well ask the question,—Who is responsible for the provision made for repairs in our Navy Estimates ? The natural reply, of course, is that responsibility rests upon Naval Members of the Board, and in particular (under present Regulations) upon the First Sea Lord. Let us see, then, what Mr. Robertson has to say on the subject. He declared at the outset that " he would rather keep the Fleet in repair than buy new vessels,"—a policy that will secure uni- versal approval. Then, in allusion to the figures for the current financial year, he made the following important statement :—" The expenditure now proposed for repairs was larger than ,that which was proposed by the responsible pro- fessional officers, because he was determined to be on the safe side in respect of repairs, and at his • suggestion the sum was considerably increased." Already (as was remarked above) Mr. Robertson's action has been justified, as expenditure on repairs up to date has gone beyond the provision. But the sidelight thus thrown on the action of the "responsible pro- fessional officers" illuminates one of the dark places of recent naval policy.

Reverting to the figures given above for 1905-6, it is well to remember that the reduction of nearly half a million in expen- diture on repairs as compared with the sum inserted in the Navy Estimates—and by that insertion declared to be neces- sary in the opinion of the "responsible officers "—was made concurrently with the development of the " scrap-heap policy."

Further, it has been demonstrated in previous letters that the claims made to large economies on repairs because of the relegation of many valuable ships to the " scrap-heap" had no foundation in fact, and that the Parliamentary representative of the Admiralty did not dare to claim a saving of even £100,000 on repairs in 1905-6, because of the removal of ships from the effective list. Notwithstanding these unquestioned facts, the claim has been reiterated, and has impressed, not merely the general public, but Cabinet Ministers. It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that the reduction of expenditure on repairs of nearly half-a-million in 1905-6 was brought about chiefly by postponing work that should have been done in that year, and work which was regarded as necessary to bo done when the Estimates were framed. Next year the same policy was pursued, and the provision made was practically equal to the reduced expenditure of 1905-6. But the . game of nominal economy was ended that year, and the actual expenditure exceeded the provision made in the Estimates. • Throughout this period it is necessary to note that there was no change in the office of First Sea Lord, who is responsible, under the present Regulations, for the readiness and efficiency of the Fleet for active service, and to whom is attributed the initiation of the sweeping changes made since 1904..

All this is ancient history, no doubt, and the main question remains.. Is the Fleet to-day and are its Reserves in an efficient condition, ready for immediate service ? Necessarily in every Fleet at any moment some ships must be under repair, and consequently unavailable for immediate service.

It is equally true that every ship in service needs casual repairs from time to time. What is vitally important is to have the assurance that ships on the effective list are not merely capable of moving and fighting, but that in all their features, which are essential to fighting efficiency and sea- keeping capability, they are kept fully efficient. Armament, fighting equipment, and propelling apparatus must be main- tained in perfect order, whatever may be the cost involved, if the war-fleet is to have its full value. Here lies the crux of the controversy ; and it is apparent to any one who closely studies the statements made by Mr. Robertson and Mr. Lam- bert in the debate that for many of the ships named by them full fighting efficiency is not guaranteed by the official reports which were quoted. It is probable that Mr. Lambert inter- vened in order to assist Mr. Robertson, who is stated to have

been "indistinctly heard," and was apparently suffering from weakness. This is much to be regretted as the question lies outside Mr. Lambert's department, and Dir. Robertson has always impressed the House of Commons by the frankness

and clearness of his statements, and as a consequence has gained its confidence. Mr. Robertson dealt generally with the matter on the basis of official Reports, summarising the position as follows :—

"The fleets in commission fully manned are in excellent con- dition. A few vessels in the Home Fleet are becoming due for refit in ordinary course The special service vessels are all in good condition and ready for service except thoso actually in Dockyard hands (two in number). Provision has been made in the Naval Estimates for this year for thoroughly refitting all vessels which required it when the Estimates were framed, and this -work would be taken in hand during the year. The normal progress had in a few cases been slightly impeded by unexpected defects and accidents on important vessels, which were taken in hand and made good in preference to those in vessels of less importance. With this exception the programme of repairs was progressing quite satisfactorily."

All the " special service vessels "—with skeleton crews of about ten per cent. of full complements—are "reported ready at five days notice," with the exception of -two cruisers. The Home Fleet was ready for service except two battle-ships, one armoured cruiser, and three protected cruisers. This state- ment‘ would be very satisfactory if the phrases "ready for service," "no defects," really meant that the ships so described were in perfect order as regards armaments, fighting equip-

ment, and machinery. Unfortunately Mr. Lambert subse- quently -produced a detailed list of ships and quoted from

official reports thereon. His purpose was to " smash " the Standard articles on " Repairs of the Fleet "; but he greatly weakened the case presented by Mr. Robertson, and gave fresh

ground for doubt and anxiety, although he was unconscious of doing so.

Space fails for more than one or two examples. The 'Diadem' cruiser was reported on as follows : "In serviceable condition ; steams well." What speed can be obtained does not appear. But, it is added," She is in Chatham programme for general refit this year" ; which certainly qualifies the first sentence. The 'Niobe,' a sister ship, is also reported "in serviceable condition " ; but the statement follows that "she will be thoroughly examined later in the year to ascertain When she will require to be refitted." In this year's Navy Estimates a "conjectural" amount of £40,000 is given as the sum likely to be required to put the Niobe ' into good condi- tion, and over £36,000 is mentioned for the 'Diadem.' "Serviceable condition" hardly seems a proper description for these vessels in view of the official anticipation of such large outlay on repairs. Obviously there is not complete confidence in their condition ; and Mr. Lambert later on

explained that an extensive refit might occupy three months to nine months, or even longer.

Students of Navy Estimates know that each year a List of Repairs and Refits is given, the ships being named which it

is proposed to take in hand, and the estimated costs of the refits being stated. It is also a matter of common knowledge that this elaborate programme of repairs is frequently un- fulfilled in many important items, ships on which it is con- templated to spend large sums being left untouched or but slightly advanced. Without endorsing the detailed state- ments made elsewhere as to the unsatisfactory condition of our Fleet at home and in reserve, and while protesting once more against the tendency to make party political capital out of• this most important subject, it may be asserted that no one who studies the question as disclosed in Parliamentary Papers and Reports can fail to be impressed by the necessity for a radical change of system. Ample provision for repairs and maintenance, prompt action in dealing with individual ships, and careful scrutiny of expenditure are all essential to the preservation of the fighting efficiency of the- Fleet, and its readiness for immediate action.—I am, Sir, &c.,

Civrs.