Katanga
9-11IERE should be no doubt about the desira- bility of sanctions against the continued seces- sion of Katanga. What is by no means certain, however, is whether the banning of flights to Katanga and the black-listing of firms by the Congolese Central Government fit the bill. In the first place they have been introduced without warning. Tshombe, in fact, has recently declared that he is again ready to negotiate with the Cen- tral Government. In the light of Mr. Adoula's new federal proposals this should have been seen as encouraging. Of course it is just possible that in the face of the increasing threats of sanctions against him Tshombe may simply have felt compelled to make at least a gesture of con- ciliation and so further play for time. Yet even so, the sanctions could have waited until it be- came clear that his will to negotiate could not be taken seriously. As it is, the sanctions are likely to be ill-coordinated and lacking effective inter- national support. It had been agreed, for in- stance, that the best sanction of all would be the closing down of the Benguela Railway, the largely British-owned concern that links Katanga to the coast of Portuguese Angola and so in effect pro- vides Katanga with a large part of the copper revenues that keep her going. Sanctions less direct are only likely to provoke Tshombe to armed resistance, the very thing which the British Gov- ernment has been rightly trying to avoid. What is wanted in the Congo is a reform of the unwork- able Lai Fondantentale and agreement between Mr. Tshombe and Mr. Adoula. It would be a pity if, at the moment when the one appears possible, the other were to be postponed in- definiteT!, .
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