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CLEAR AS MUD
The claim that Europe must act because this was a European problem was little more than a play on words, a shuffling of a political term with a geographical one. It is not obvious why Portugal, Ireland or Den- mark — or the United Kingdom — should have any special duties to 'act' in Yugosla- via, let alone any special rights, merely by virtue of being part of a political group which calls itself Europe. The United States and Canada have large Yugoslav émigré populations whose concern in the matter is probably greater than that of the burghers of Copenhagen or Dublin. The countries with the most direct interest are the seven states which border Yugoslavia, only two of which are EEC members. There is also an ex-colonial power, Tur- key, which is both European and Asian; thousands of families in Bosnia and Koso- vo still speak Turkish, while remarkably few speak Danish or Irish. And since Bosnia, whose very existence is now in jeopardy, is a predominantly Muslim re- public, one could say there is an Islamic interest in Yugoslavia too.
The foreign ministers of the EEC should not be blamed for wanting to bring to a stop the present bloodshed and prevent a far greater disaster from succeeding it. But it is not enough to have good intentions; one must also have some clear ideas about how to carry them out. From the outset, the EEC 'troikas' who have visited Yugos- lavia have had no clear policy goals. Embarrassed, perhaps, by the EEC's pre- vious commitment to Yugoslav federalism, they simply ceased to express any opinion on the question of Slovenia and Croatia's status; their aim was to bring about a cease-fire, a moratorium, a deferral. They seemed unable to make any judgment, either about the status of the politicians they were dealing with, continuing to regard the federal government as the effec- tive authority in the country even while that body's control over the federal army was evaporating in front of their very eyes. The failure of these initiatives is not in itself dishonourable. Little more could have been achieved by any outside party. But there is something distasteful about the way in which EEC politicians have seized on the Yugoslav crisis as an oppor- tunity to display prowess, to save face after the shambles of EEC reactions to the Gulf. `If we pool our foreign policies,' 'runs the theory, 'think hdw much more influential, we can be.' One might as well say: if we pool all the colours in the paint-box, think how much more beautiful the resulting colour will be. Different members of the EEC have different attitudes and interests — legitimately so. While Germany wants to impose economic sanctions on Serbia, for example, Greece does not, because most of its overland trade crosses Serbian soil. A policy which satisfies both Germany and Greece, therefore, is a policy of the highest common factor, which in this case will be very low indeed. The process of common foreign policy-making tends to induce mutual paralysis.
If Britain were not locked into this system of institutionalised ineffectiveness, what could she do? Not much, but a little more than she is doing at present. Together with a few like-minded countries of our own choosing (Germany, Austria, the USA, perhaps) we could agree to recognise Slovenia and Croatia under cer- tain conditions — conditions which should include stronger constitutional guarantees for the Serbs in Croatia, and a promise by the Croatian government to have no truck with redrawing the borders with Serbia or Bosnia. (Once they start changing the borders, the Serbs will not stop, and the rest of Yugoslavia will be dragged into war.) Such measures on our part might still have little effect. But it is better to be ineffectual with a clear head than to pretend one is being effectual while com- posing a policy the colour of mud.
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