THE CRISIS OF THE NATIONAL STATE
Snt,—Except for a disjointed quotation, I have been unable to discover any relation between inY book on The Crisis of the National State and the book which Professor Brogan purports to review. Without giving any account of what the book is about, Professor Brogan attributes to it the following misconceptions: 1. That nationalism is a spent force.
2. That international trade and transport bring the world together.
3. Failure to understand the function of the national State in the nineteenth century.
4. Failure to see the adjustment of national claims in the light of the realities of today.
No reader could conceivably gather from Professor Brogan's observa- tions that—as every other reviewer so far has understood—the book is built up on the radically different assumption that nationalism is as alive as ever, though its social basis has shifted, but that the national State-4or I variety of reasons—is no longer able to contain it without catastrophic results. To take Professor Brogan's assertions, one by one: 1. A whole chapter analyses the growth of contemporary nationalism outside Europe, and another the resurgence of nationalism under the Impact of war.
2. I have never been "puzzled why a nation-State should have been thought normal in the late nineteenth century," but, on the contrary, con- trasted the reasons for its growth in the nineteenth with those for its decline in the twentieth century. For that very reason a book, which, to quote another review, "is careful to avoid the dangerous work of Prediction," but attempts an analysis of existing forces, could hardly have en written in r880.
3. Two chapters are largely devoted to showing how the decline in International trade and freedom of movement has favoured the rise of f-sufficient regions, of super-national dimensions. et. Briefly, the book envisages constructive progress on the lines of a development of the Grand Alliance, of functional reconstruction experiments, such as UNRRA, Lend,Lease, and—as a possible outlet for patriotism in modern conditions—the multi-national State, in the light of Soviet experience. I challenge Professor Brogan to say whether the complexities and practical difficulties of every one of these develop- ments are not stressed on every page, and whether the whole hook is not dominated by the conviction that there is no Utopia, but a choice between alternatives, some of which are grim.
For the insufficiency of the national State may I refer to the grave warning of a fellow Utopian, General Smuts (Guildhall speech)? The book, as it stands, offers enough scope for criticism. In particular, the contention that the middle classes are no longer the main supporters of the National State, and that Fascist Imperialism is destructive of Nationalism in Fascist countries, is bound to be controversial. I should greatly value Professor Brogan's views. Why did he choose instead to criticise a book of hi S own construction?—Yours truly, W. FRIEDMANN.
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