A SPECTATOR SURVEY

The Future of Parliamentary Reform

By ALAN WATKINS

AFEW years ago Mr Enoch Powell tried to revive the Victorian word 'hum.' A hum, so Mr Powell told us, was a popular political cry of the moment. In the current Political Quarterly, Professor W. A. Robson, in the course of an article on local government, touches on the same theme. How is it, asks Pro- fessor Robson, that an issue such as the rights of Negroes in America, or the economic im- balance between north and south in Britain, suddenly emerges as one of immense political importance, even though the basic facts have not altered? Very often there is no rational ex- planation. A cry simply gets taken up, only to be dropped a year or so later. The reform of Parliament is undoubtedly a cry of the moment, a hum. It is, however, possible to give some kind of explanation as to why the demand for reform has arisen at this stage.

The first phase of the movement was the early 1960s, the time when Britain was being berated by such writers as Mr Anthony Sampson and Professor Brian Chapman for being 'amateur' and 'inefficient' and 'old-fashioned.' The culmina- tion of this period was marked by the appearance of Professor Bernard Crick's book The Reform of Parliament.

With the general election, of 1964 we enter the second phase. The intake of new Labour MPs were impatient not only of parliamentary proceduralism, but also of the personal incon- venience to which, owing to the smallness of the Government's. majority, they were subjected. (The latter part of this sentence, by the way, is not written in any sneering spirit.) And, unlike previous generations of Labour MPs, they did not change their views. They did not, at any rate, change their views at once—for a fair pro- portion of the 1964 intake, though hardly con- verted to traditionalism, are now somewhat less radical on parliamentary reform than they used to be. One example that comes to mind is Mr Roy Hattersley. No sooner had the 1964 intake begun to mellow, however, than they were followed by the numerically larger intake of 1966, who were, if anything, even more enthusiastic about the reform of Parliament.

All this indicates that parliamentary reform is rather more than a passing fad. Indeed, since the 1964 election there have been no fewer than six reports on the subject from the Select Com- mittee on Procedure. Something—no one is clear precisely what—is clearly going to be done about it. Before going into these possibilities, however, it may be as well to spend some time discussing the purpose of parliamentary reform. At the outset we are confronted by a difficulty. The various supporters of parliamentary reform have different and sometimes inconsistent pur- poses in mind. It would be tempting to follow the Nonconformist preacher who declaimed : `And here, friends, I see a difficulty in our path. Let us look it fearlessly in the eye, and pass on.' However, the whole problem will be clearer, though its solution will inevitably be less tidy, if some account is given of the varying objects which contemporary reformers have before them.

Parliamentary reform, it is claimed, will `save time.' This is all very well until one inquires whose time it is that is to be saved. The Govern- ment's? Or the official Opposition's? Or the back-benchers'? Let us take as an example the second Report of the 1964-65 Select Committee on Procedure, which dealt with question time. Strongly supported—indeed, urged on—by the late Speaker, Sir Harry Hylton-Foster, the com- mittee gave forth a stirring call for a change of heart by Members in their attitude towards ques- tions. Questions, said the committee, should be shorter and supplementaries fewer. Under the present Speaker, Dr Horace King, the com- mittee's recommendations are being put into practice. One is tempted to say they are being put into practice with a vengeance. For Dr King takes the House through question time at a gallop.

Does this benefit the Opposition? Or the back- benchers? I am convinced that, appearances to the contrary, the real beneficiary of a speeded-up question time is the Government. For the Report of the Committee on Procedure was based on two assumptions: that every Member was en- titled to ask his fair share of questions and that the object of question time was to obtain infor- mation. The first assumption is unexceptionable but unilluminating; the second assumption is fallacious. Every MP knows that he will get better and fuller information by writing privately to the minister concerned. If a minister wants to conceal facts, conceal them he will. Question time is for publicising a grievance, for harassing the Government, for testing and maybe toppling a shaky minister. If an MP's right to embarrass a minister is curtailed—which is what the restric- tion on supplementaries really amounts to—then the beneficiary is the minister and hence the Government.

Or take again the proposal, which was ad- vanced in the first Report of the 1964-65 Com- mittee on Procedure, for a special committee, modelled on the Scottish Grand Committee, to consider the second reading of non-contentious Bills. At present all public Bills, exclusively Scottish ones apart, have their second reading on the floor of the House. In a second reading debate not only the contents of a Bill but also its underlying principles (if any are discoverable) can be discussed. The scope for discussion is much wider than at any other stage of a Bill's passage through Parliament. Why, then; deprive back-benchers of the opportunity to engage in such a debate?

The answers given by some witnesses before the Committee .on Procedure suggested that the time saved could be devoted to various causes close to the back-bencher's heart. One does not believe it for a moment. The. bulk of any time saved is likely to be appropriated by the Gov ern. ment of the day. Not that this is necessarily to be deplored: the claim that there are all manner of beneficial little Bills tucked away in the departments and waiting only for space in the parliamentary time-table is probably justified. This is rather different, however, from sainl, that the back-benchers as such will benefit.

• But quite apart from any question of ‘‘ho will benefit from. time that -may be saved. my .own view, which is shared by some Men-her,, is that the transfer of certain kinds of second readings ao a special committee is unnecessary. There is a simpler and more radical solution. This is to abolish the report stage and third reading of all Bills and to take the committee stage—including the committee stage of the Finance Bill—off the floor of the House. We would be left with two stages in a Bill: second reading (which could be renamed first reading) on the floor of the House and committee stage upstairs. Then some time really would be saved. However, this solution is much too clear-cut to be acceptable.

Another purpose of parliamentary reform. it is said, is to restore the prestige of Parliament. to strengthen the links between government and governed,- to improve Parliament's image—the same point can be put in a variety of ways. On some reforms most politicians are agreed. One is the introduction of proxy voting, which 1, (understandably enough) supported by the Government and Opposition Whips and +‘,“ recommended in the fifth Report of the 196445 Committee on Procedure. After all, no one sup- poses that the good name of Parliament is en- hanced by the spectacle of ambulances contain- ing sick Members piling up in New Palace Yard. And since 'nodding through'—the prac- tice of counting a sick Member's vote if he I; physically on the premises—is accepted, there does not seem to be any objection in principle to proxy voting. - But when one has gone through a few reform, of this kind, agreement stops. Some Member, such as Mr Emrys Hughes, believe that the prestige of Parliament would increase if Nxhat they call the mumbo-jumbo were done away with. (See Mr Hughes's recent book Parliament and Mumbo-jumbo.) Yet would the prestige of Par- liament increase? Let us draw a crude but serviceable distinction between physical and pro- cedural nonsense.

As far as physical nonsense is concerned- the Speaker's wig, Black Rod, the mace and so forth—one's impression is that to the majority of Members it does not greatly matter one may or the other. Most visitors,. however, seem to find the spectacle moving. Procedural nonsense is rather different. My own feeling is that poli- ticians, like journalists, find the whole subject extremely difficult, but that ordinary member; of the public do not bother their heads about the matter. Simplifications and rationalisations of procedure, however desirable they may be from the point of view of politicians, are unlikely to have much impact outside a small circle. It may well be, as Mr John Diamond suggested to the Committee on Procedure, that the annual Appropriation Act should be abolished; it may well be, as the Committee on Procedure itself recommended, that the rule that charges must originate in committee of the House should be repealed : but no one .should

expect the prestige of Parliament to grow or, for that matter, to diminish as a result.

But the real method of increasing the prestige of Parliament, one is told, is not to fiddle with procedure but to restore to the back-bencher the power and independence that he once possessed and has now lost. This is a view which- is particularly associated with Mr Michael Foot, though previous pioneers in the field include Mr Christopher Hollis. It is not perhaps entirely accurate to say that Mr Foot is against changing procedure. As he put it in a dissenting note (supported by Sir Martin Redmayne) to the fourth Report of the 1964-65 Committee on Procedure, 'a main purpose of parliamentary reform must be to restore the authority of the House of Commons chamber itself. For this purpose, measures should be taken to instil spon- taneity and flexibility into its proceedings, and to enable debates to be held over a much wider range and at much shorter notice than is possible under present arthritic procedures.'

Perhaps so; and yet, as I am sure Mr Foot recognises, the real remedy lies not in procedure but in the back-benchers themselves. They can regain their influence—which is, incidentally, exaggerated by parliamentary romantics—by speaking more often against their party and occasionally by voting against it. This most of them have not the slightest intention of doing. Moreover, if they did begin to behave in this way, government business would hardly pro- ceed smoothly and time would not exactly be saved. There does, in short, seem to be a con- flict—resolvable maybe, but a conflict none the less—between the ideals of a modern, efficient, time-saving Parliament and one in which the back-benchers have some real influence.

According to some observers, this is an over- simplification. Professor Crick fully accepts the two-party system and the necessity for party discipline: nevertheless, he believes that back- benchers could influence the Government much more extensively than they now do. One way of achieving- this, he and others think, would be to set up specialised committees of the House. The fourth Report of- the 1964-65 Committee on Procedure agrees in a muted fashion. 'Your Committee,' it says, 'have come to the conclusion that more information should be made available to Members of the way government departments carry out their responsibilities, so that, when taking part in major debates on controversial issues, they may be armed with the necessary background of knowledge.' The object of the committees would be 'to provide all Members with the means to carry out their responsibilties rather than to elevate any committees of the House to new positions of influence.'

There is, of course, no suggestion in the report that the committees ought to be set up simply to make life more difficult for the Executive. Indeed, reading it, one is slightly reminded of the utilitarian satirised in Dickens's Hard Times, who believed that human happiness would be increased by the accumulation of facts. Mr Powell, for one, disagrees with the fact-collecting approach. 'My feeling,' he told the committee, is that there is much misconception on this subject and that the effective control of the House of Commons over the Executive does not much depend on detailed examination or detailed know- ledge of administration.' However, Mr Powell's views, which have some resemblance to Mr Foot's, are not popular at the moment. The likeliest outcome is that the Estimates Com- mittee will be expanded by having several sub- committees, on such subjects as the social ser- vices, added to it.

But the committees will almost certainly be kept away from government policy and con- fined in their investigations to current adminis- tration. Nor, it seems, will it be possible for the committees to summon ministers before them. Whether anyone will really gain as a result of the setting-up of these committees remains to be seen—though the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries has shown that is is pos- sible, given astute chairmanship, to widen the scope of a committee to include policy matters. My own guess is that the committees will pro- duce detailed, valuable and unreadable reports which will be closely studied by the appropriate specialists but will rarely succeed in embarrassing the Executive. Which will suit most politician, admirably.

In conclusion, I hazard the following pre- dictions: (i) Parliamentary hours will remain un- changed.

(ii) Parliament will be televised. (My fellow contributor, Lord Egremont, is on June 15 initiating a debate on the experimental tele- vising of the Lords.) (iii) Standing Order 9, which deals with the granting by the Speaker of a debate on a matter of urgent public importance, will be interpreted more liberally.

(iv) A method will be found of distinguishing between Opposition time and back-benchers' time.

(v) A second reading committee for non-con- tentious Bills will be set up.

(vi) The form of the Estimates Committee will be changed. Its sub-committees, instead of being designated by letters of the alphabet, will con- cern themselves with particular topics such as science or the prevention of crime.

(vii) Proxy voting will be introduced.

And my final prediction is that, despite all this, the Executive will remain firmly in control of the House.