Commonwealth and Foreign
JUGOSLAVIA AND HER NEIGHBOURS
By A DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT
ON February 4th, Milan Stoyadinovitch, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Jugoslavia was compelled to resign. This event removes from office a personality whose extravagant methods and tendencies in home and foreign policy aroused strong opposition of public opinion throughout Jugo- slavia and the mistrust of European diplomacy. It seems worth while to examine the foreign policy of this man and to consider all the possibilities which are entailed by his depar- ture. From June, 1935, when Stoyadinovitch became Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, a fundamental change took place in the conception and methods of Jugoslav foreign policy. This change exerted a decisive influence on the international position of Jugoslavia, and produced readjustments in the power conditions in the Balkans, not only as regards each individual Balkan country, but also in their relationships with the Great Powers. Stoyadinovitch deserted friends and allies, just as a business man changes his wholesale dealer when he finds another who will let him have goods on more favourable terms.
Germany and Italy found in Stoyadinovitch an instrument for breaking up the peace efforts in the Balkans and Central Europe. Thus, he rejected the proposal for extending the Little Entente Pact of 1933 into a Mutual Assistance Treaty, and he curtailed systematic political and personal relations with France. In January, 1937, he unexpectedly signed a pact of eternal friendship with Bulgaria. He did not notify this to his Allies in the Little and Balkan Ententes, as he was under an obligation to do in accordance with the terms of these agreements. On March 25th, 1937, he and Count Ciano signed at Belgrade a pact of non-aggression, consultation and friend- ship, again without duly informing their Allies, and in June, 1937, he accorded a ceremonious reception in Belgrade to Baron von Neurath, the German Foreign Minister. In eco- nomic matters he systematically approached closer to Germany, with the result that the recent Jugoslav exports to Germany comprise as much as 48 per cent. of the country's total export trade. Every well-informed observer fully realised by now in what direction Stoyadinovitch was guiding Jugoslav foreign policy. Only the governments of the Western Powers looked on idly, while they were losing their important position in the Balkans, as they received entirely misleading information from the appropriate quarters.
What British Minister ever visited the Balkans to counteract there the visits of Neurath, Goering, Funk, Schacht, Baldur von Schirach, Ciano, Volpi, &c. ? And yet no other nations, except the people of Czecho-Slovakia, were so profoundly and sincerely devoted to Great Britain and France, and were so eager to arouse their interest, as the nations of Jugoslavia. Stoyadinovitch has fallen. While the Croatian question is the greatest and most urgent problem of Jugoslav policy, it was only one of several reasons for his resignation. He fell also on account of his foreign policy and his clumsy intro- duction of Fascist methods into the country of the Karageorge- vitch who rightly regard themselves as the sole authorised " duce " of unified Jugoslavia, and who will not allow their Minister to assume such a role. Prince Paul might well have been condemned to play just as passive a part as King Victor Emanuel. In order to judge the situation properly, it is important to realise that Stoyadinovitch was arranging further moves in foreign policy. Just as he betrayed Czecho-Slovakia, so he was ready to desert Rumania. This step was to have been prepared by the recent Belgrade visit of Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister. Jugoslavia was to draw nearer to Hungary under the guidance of Italy and at the price of sur- rendering Rumania to the pressure of Hungary, with the assistance of Germany.
At the same time, Ciano demanded the neutrality of Jugo- slavia in case of an Italo-French conflict. Information on this point differs ; it is asserted by some that Stoyadinovitch promised neutrality, while according to another version he refused to commit himself in advance. Thanks to the measures taken by King Carol and the advice from British authoritative
quarters, the scheme of Stoyadinovitch and Ciano was frus- trated. Prince Paul realised the danger, and he therefore finally allowed himself to be persuaded to get rid of Stoyadinovitch. Can we expect that the new Government in Jugoslavia will change the foreign policy of the country? The Government declaration of February t8th emphasised its intention to con- tinue the foreign policy which Jugoslavia has pursued success- fully during the last 4} years. This means that Prince Paul, who actually initiated and inspired this policy, will not depart from its fundamental tendencies. In particular, he is con- vinced that the Rome-Berlin axis deserves the credit for having removed the danger of Communism, and that it acts as a brake upon the spread of social movements in Europe, which Paul, like every member of the Balkan dynasties, so greatly fears. Then, too, Stoyadinovitch brought Jugoslavia into such a degree of dependence upon Germany that no Jugoslav Government today can venture on any appreciable divergence from the axis.
It is a matter of common knowledge that before the Jugo- slav elections the leaders of the democratic opposition parties in Serbia visited the German Legation in Belgrade and assured Von Heeren, the German Minister, that if the Opposition came into power they would not change Jugoslav foreign policy. Still less would Dragisha Tsvetkovitch, the new Prime Minister, or Tsintsar-Markovitch, the new Foreign Minister, venture on such a course. The latter, it should be noted, as former Jugoslav Minister in Berlin, was chosen in preference to pro- French statesmen such as Subotitch the former Minister in Geneva and Ivo Andritch, Deputy Foreign Minister. Thus, the Jugoslav Government has no opportunity of changing its foreign policy in the near future. Moreover, to judge by recent experiences, any such attempt would not meet with understanding or encouragement on the part of authoritative circles in Great Britain or France. Nevertheless, the departure of Stoyadinovitch means a considerable relief for the diplomacy of the peace-loving European countries, and, in particular, it gives the Western democracies a chance of revising their Balkan policy. That the Rome-Berlin axis has lost, its devoted adhe- rent in the Balkans is obvious from the fact that Italy and Germany were greatly perturbed by the fall of Stoyadino- vitch.
On the other hand, it is in the interest of Italy to co-operate with Jugoslavia, and she feels certain that, in case of war, Jugoslavia will not fight againFt her. A strong Jugoslavia will be able more easily to cope with German expansion, and accordingly Italy has become reconciled to the change of Government. For it should be noted that in the Balkans the Rome-Berlin axis does not operate. A hidden but stubborn struggle is being waged there to secure political and economic positions.
Great Britain and France now have a unique opportunity of restoring their traditional influence in the Balkans and of promoting the interests of peace, which will likewise be again served by the renewed co-operation and confidence of Bucharest and Belgrack. Jugoslavia's capacity for moral resistance would increase if she could rely on the support of the Western democracies. Her nations are eager for sincere friendship with Western Europe, and it is from this quarter that they would welcome encouragement. They are anxious to return to demo- cracy and to renew their independence as regard foreign affairs. These two aspirations are very closely connected. A demo- cratic Jugoslavia will not need to fear pressure from without, and can take a constructive share in the consolidation of peace. Her key position in the Balkans and as a neighbour both of Italy and Germany, together with her share of Mediterranean coastline, must be considered of special importance in their bearing upon the efforts to maintain European equilibrium. These are factors which must be reckoned with, and which can contribute substantially towards the success of a peace policy. At the same time, however, precisely on account of them, those countries with aggressive aims will be tempted to embark on active schemes for gaining a power-priority in the Balkans, which are therefore, if anything, a more impor- tant area than ever.
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