TOPICS OF THE DAY.
WANTED—A MEDITERRANEAN POLICY.
HAVE we a Mediterranean Policy, and if we have, what is it ? I confess to ignorance on the point, though I have often looked for guidance in the speeches and writings of our statesmen, Unionist, Liberal and Labour. Yet there can be no doubt that in the interests of peace, international stability and good will, quite as much as in those of the British Empire, we ought to consider and define our policy, and let other nations know our aims and aspirations with regard to what is the most important body of waters in Europe, and one of the most important in the world. We have, it is certain, no aggressive and no selfish aims in the Mediterranean. This fact, however, is not as clear to the rest of the world as it is to the British people. Their doubts as to our intentions and desires make it all the more essential to have a plain and understandable policy set forth in regard to the Mediterranean. If not, acts which are quite sound and reasonable in themselves may appear disturbing to Powers which are as vitally concerned with the Mediterranean as we are—and in their own view even more vitally. Take, for example, the rearrangements of our Fleets, under which in the near future the greater part of our sea forces are to rest upon a Mediterranean base. We ourselves do not doubt that in coming to this determination the Admiralty have shown wisdom and foresight. Properly understood, their decision should have the approval of all the friends of peace. It is an act of good intent, not of aggression. At the same time the underlying policy may, and we believe does, require to be explained.
Our interests are primarily based upon what is to us a clear necessity—the maintenance of the freedom of the seas. We are the greatest of sea-carriers, and the Mediterranean is, and must remain, one of the greatest of the passage-ways of commerce. It is even more than that to us. It is the highway by which the various portions of the sea-joined British Empire communicate with the Mother Country, and through her with each other. The nerves and sinews of our Empire run through the Mediterranean, and unless they can remain undisturbed we shall be placed at a great disadvantage. It is for this reason that we hold the quasi-island of Gibraltar, the islands of Malta and Cyprus, and Palestine and its shores. It is because of this that we have acquired such large interests, pecuniary and political, in the Suez Canal, and have felt compelled to reserve important rights in Egypt, even while we are establishing the complete independence of that country in the matter of internal government.
Our physical possessions in the Mediterranean are in fact based upon our overseas trade and our overseas communications. We hold our possessions at the western and the eastern approaches to the Mediterranean and our halfway-house of Malta as material guarantees for interests which are essential.
When we come to translate that policy into practice we have to consider our duties and obligations to the great States whose shores are washed by the Mediter- ranean, and whose rights and interests are as immediate and as vital as our own. We have no right and no wish to control the Mediterranean in our selfish or exclusive interests, or to regard our naval strength as an instru- ment or symbol of domination. We must act not by ourselves, but in unison with other Powers.
The first of the Powers which demands our considera- tion, not only for geographical reasons but on the grounds of long and well-founded amity and sympathy, is Italy. Italy is a Power which occupies an altogether special position in the Mediterranean. The freedom of those seas is more necessary to her than to any other nation. Not only has Italy the longest Mediterranean coast- line in Europe, but she has no other sea outlet. France, in the Channel and along her western shores, has plenty of doors and windows opening on the Atlantic. Spain, again, has an ample Atlantic coastline. Italy has but one sea-gate—the Mediterranean. Therefore Italy must always be specially considered, whenever any changes or developments take place in the Mediterranean.
We ought, in my judgment, never to take any step which concerns the Mediterranean except in consultation with Italy. It is for this reason that I deplore our oversight in not insisting that Italy should be brought into the negotiations in regard to Tangier and its hinter- land. I do not suggest for a moment that in settling the Tangier question we neglected or lost sight of the interests of Italy, but I hold most strongly that Italy should have been directly represented at the Conferences at which the pending scheme was drawn up. The African shores of the western gate into the Mediterranean must concern the most Mediterranean of Mediterranean Powers. We must also remember that Italy is a North African Power and a Red Sea Power. Both gates are her concern.
To what do these considerations point in deciding future action ? In my opinion, to action in regard to the Mediterranean analogous to that which took place at the Washington Conference in regard to the stabiliza- tion, in the interests of Peace, of the North-Eastern Pacific and the regulation and reduction of the naval armaments maintained in those waters. Why should not the British Government propose to Italy, France, Spain, Greece and Turkey the holding of a Mediterranean Conference in which, on the analogy of the Washington Conference, we should secure a local regularization and restriction of naval armaments, and so put an end to many fears, jealousies and doubts ? By this means we could prevent a progressive expenditure upon naval armaments. No one was injured by the naval agree- ment between Britain, the United States, Japan and France. No Power was made to feel insecure or left at the mercy of any other Power or Powers ; and yet a real check was given to that appalling naval competition in which the auction bids will in future be in units of battleships, costing perhaps ten or twelve million pounds apiece ! It is not suggested that any of the Powers should " scrap " their navies ; but, at any rate, let us stabilize the existing position and not start new building programmes. The Government, in order to benefit mankind in this way, must be willing to run certain risks and make certain sacrifices, as we did at Washington. It is Great Britain who should take the lead in the matter of what we may term proportional disarmament.
Could there be a place more appropriate for a meeting of such a Conference than Sicily—the place which through- out history was the clearing-house of Mediterranean trade and intercourse ? To Sicily came the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Romans, the Arabs, and even the Vikings and the Normans. Why should not representatives of the European World once more be gathered together at a Palermo Conference ?
The agenda of the Conference might be :—(1) The three gates of the Mediterranean—i.e., the Straits of Gibraltar, the Entrance to the Suez Canal, the Entrance to the Black Sea. (2) Proportional Naval Disarmament. (3) Mutual Guarantees for the Free Passage of the
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