Marine strategy
From Suez to the Cape
David W. Wragg
One of the more heartening factors of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been the realisation that a war in the Middle East is no longer a serious threat to world peace. A number of reasons may be behind this, including the interest in Arab oil of even the most proIsraeli elements, and the cynicism towards Russian help by the oil-rich Arab sheikhdoms, Which have to foot the bill for the arms supplied to Egypt and Syria. It is open to question whether American reluctance to supply arms or Russian reluctance to supply arms on credit is more important than the the improvement in the climate between Lne major powers. , But one important reason for the scaling down in importance of any Middle East conflict must be the absence of the Suez Canal as an issue. This prevents any of the Maritime powers being tempted to intervene to save the international waterway, closed !ince the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. It was, even tin 1967, a far less important asset than a liecade or so earlier, with 250,000-ton tankers N. ling via the Cape of Good Hope already eferlhg lower transport costs than 60,000-ton
Itqrs which just managed to squeeze L'Ird1mh the Canal. Bulk carriers with grain and mlherals are now following the tanker lead in terms of size, and so any real effects of the continued closure of the Suez Canal are rlow confined' to the dry general cargo trade, accounting for well under a quarter of the world's shipping tonnage. Nothing would be more dangerous than to Sit back and believe that, just so long as a new and bigger Suez Canal isn't built, everything Will be fine. The4png-term implications of the Cape shipping nbute are causing concern among shipowners, some interested governments, and among most navies in the West. Nothing is for nothing in this world, and the cost of using the Cape route is rather more IlIan just an extra 4,000 miles on a. London to
ombay voyage, or having to supply ships by nelicopter rather than put in to congested South African ports. The cost lies in the protection needed for our longest and most important shipping routes. While this may sound alarmist, the
fears are widely held, and have found exPression in recent years in suggestions that
the scope of the North Atlantic Treaty Or
pnisation should be extended southwards Ibrorn the Tropic of Cancer to at least the
cluator, or that a South Atlantic Treaty Or ganisation should be formed, with American, nritish, French and Portuguese participation. Behind these fears have been well-founded
suspons about the activities of the Soviet ..N:avY, which has not only been growing in
°"ze, but has expanded into the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Unlike the Royal Navy, the Soviet Navy has few real overseas trade routes to defend. The United States has not only recognised that this situation exists, and that the Soviet NavY can only be in existence to pursue old style gunboat politics, but has also effectively given its blessing to the formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The catch is that the United States does not have the same interest in the area as many European, South American and southern African states, and has no intention of meeting the maritime equivalent of its massive and costly concentration of men and equipment in West Ger many. The United Kingdom, with perhaps the greatest interest in the shipping involved, has a similar attitude, to the chagrin not only of senior naval officers, but also of army officers such as General Sir Walter Walker, the recently retired British commander of Allied Forces Northern Europe.
Perhaps the extent of the problem can be best judged by the fact that the Soviet Union now has more than 400 submarines opera tional on a worldwide basis, and this is ten times the number used by Nazi Germany to nearly cripple the United Kingdom in the second world war. Many of these submarines are nuclear-powered, and freed from the limitations suffered by the second world war submarine. Not only are the Soviet surface fleets growing in proportion to the submarine menace, but the vessels are more heavily armed than their Western counterparts. Russia also has two very large helicopter cruisers and is putting two aircraft carriers into service, at the time when the Royal Navy is running the Fleet Air Arm down.
One way in which to counter this threat while using the minimum manpower must be in an intensified maritime air coverage. Unfortunately, neither Portugal nor South Africa, two of the main powers involved, possesses modern maritime-reconnaissance aircraft, due to a shortage of funds in the case of the former, and British and American hesitation in the latter case. No South American state employs modern maritime reconnaissance aircraft, while the British aircraft are fully employed in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean — there are after all only thirty-eight Hawker Siddeley Nimrods in the Royal Air Force and the fate of a further eight is in jeopardy.
On the surface, the Royal Navy is fully stretched in the North Atlantic and Mediterranean, and is finding the Beira patrol off Mozambique rather more of a strain than should be necessary in peacetime. Few visits are now made to South Atlantic, Indian Ocean or Pacific ports by British warships, leaving the Soviet Union to show the hammer and sickle free from competition from the Union Jack. The cynics might laugh, but such things tell. The Chief Minister of the Seychelles has already expressed concern at the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean, but found only deaf ears in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Modern warships in the Argentinian and Brazilian navies are largely preoccupied in enforcing territorial limits which make those of Iceland seem decidedly parochial!
It is traditional to neglect our defences in peacetime, and to allow swaggering and arrogance on the part of our rivals to pass unchallenged, yet we have never allowed matters to reach their present state before. The need now is to start to spend more on the Royal Navy and to stop questioning the wisdom of arms sales to South Africa and Portugal — who would, after all, only be paying to defend our interests as well as their own. It is also important to take the initiative in forming n South Atlantic Tieaty Organisation, which should also take some interest in the Indian Ocean. Such matters, rather than cutting back on defence, should be uppermost in the minds of ministers as they consider just where cuts in government spending should fall — and if it is a question of swopping priorities within a fixed defence budget, shouldn't affluent Germany try to look after itself, with French help, for a change?
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