GUST'S WARS OF THE NLNETEETH CENTURY.* Is his two previous
volumes of the " Annals " of this century's. wars Sir Edward Cost had tracked Napoleon to the summit of his power and glory, and had sketched the faint, but signideent beginnings of Wellington's European career. These two volumes before us record the events which brought about the fall ef the French Conqueror and the ascendancy of the English General. For, as we remarked before, these two names shine out amid those of the host of officers brought to the surface of the history_ of the six years beginning in 1810 and ending in 1815. It is mainly their story which is the story of Europe. It was on the issues of their enterprises that the fate of Europe depended. Their lives epitomize the mighty strife ; and by a happy. accident they were brought face to face on the field where the bloody wars of the French Empire came to a sudden and perfect ending.
For in the spring of 1815, just when Napoleon was preparing to spring at a bound from Elba to Paris, the British Government were eager to send their great soldier to take command of the British troops in Canada, and bring to a close a war originated. in the interests of the slave-power. Had Wellington agreed to cross the Atlantic, how different might have been the issue in Europe! Without his influence in Vienna, without his skill and firmness in Belgium, it may well be conceived that the aides, would have been neither so prompt nor so successful.
At the beginning of 1810 Napoleon was the master of the greater part of civilized Europe. He had humbled the House of Austria, not only by defeating its armies, but by demanding and obtaining one of the daughters of that house as his wife. He divorced the faithful Josephine, made prize of the Austrian Archduchess, and thus, through the breach of Wagram, be entered the sacred precincts where legitimate dynasties keep high state. Who so mighty as lie ? Whose influence could contend with his? He was at peace with all the world except England. His soldiers, gathered from all nations, were free to come and go, to have and to hold, throughout Germany, and Italy, and Holland, and Belgium, and Switzerland, and the greater part of the Iberian Peninsula. He was master of the Pope and of his Church. He was the chief of the French Empire, and none could well say where the limits of that might be; and his flatterers likened him to Charlemagne, who, like himself, was not a Frenchman. There were but two Powers unconquered—the vast and sullen power of Russia, and the smaller but more active and unyielding power of England. On the sea the British were supreme. In their island home they were unassailable—nay, from this fastness they issued forth and vexed the Conqueror by driving his legions from Portugal, and presuming to disturb them in their work of subduing Spain.
Napoleon never seems to have appreciated the importance of the Spanish war. He had begun to cherish a fatal habit of under- rating his opponents, and he could not comprehend how his Marshals, with large forces in their bands, could not overcome the Sepoy General. So while he fed the war in the Peninsula, he meditated in Paris vaster conquests. There was Russia, twice beaten in fight, but not resentful. The friendship of Alexander for Napoleon, sueli as it was, the admiration of the lesser for the greater, might have been used to the detriment of Europe, had Napoleon's vanity permitted him to treat the Czar as an equal. But Napoleon did not choose to manage, he preferred to order the Czar. And while Wellington, never beaten in battle, yet experiencing strange reverses of fortune, contrived to frustrate, in succession, Soult, Victor, and Massena,—contrived to deliver Portugal and gain a platform whence be could work for the delivery of Spain, Napoleon, although he chafed under these affronts from -his old enemy, was thinking more of bending Russia to his will than crushing Wellington, and was meditat- ing that project which carried his eagles to Moscow. He was not permitted to foresee how strong a power would grow up under the fostering care of the British General. The fights at Talavera and Busaco, and Fuentes dOnoro and Albuera, were small affairs contrasted with the great. battles of the Empire. But Napoleon, of all men, he the conqueror of Italy, should have known what a great influence a capable man can exercise with small means. Perhaps it_was because he bad grown accustomed, with much to accomplish much, that he now despised one who was steadily accomplishing much with little. So lie left Welling- ton to first one Marshal and then another, while he himself revolved schemes of conquest in new fields, He summoned Russia, and as Russia, did not surrender, lie collected the armed
• Anna's of the Wars of the Nineteenth Century. By the Hon. Sir Edward Oust, D.C.L., Lieutenant-General in the British Army, de. Vole. III. and IV. London: Murray.
forces of all Europe, except England; and with these he felt certain that he should overwhelm the Czar. He crossed the Niemen in June, 1812, and in December he was in Paris and the Czar was at Wilna. The Grand Army in less than six months had been utterly destroyed. Within that six months his rival, in Spain, had snatched one more victory from the French, and had entered Madrid, and although the wretched resources placed at his disposal by the British Government caused him once again to seek shelter in Portugal, yet he had delivered Andalusia from Sault, and had fastened himself more strongly than ever upon the frontiers of Spain. In 1813, while Napoleon was in the heart of Germany, striking useless blows with the force of despair at the coalition of nations, and suffering ruinous defeats, Wellington's star rose never again to set, the shout of triumph from Vittoria was answered by the exulting cries of Germany liberated on the field Of Leipsic ; Wellington looked down on the frontier of France from the Pyrenees, and the Germans and Russians gazed eagerly across the Rhine. The contemned Sopoy officer was a thorn in the Emperor's side, yet he still contemned him. In another year, German and Russian, Briton and Portuguese, had rushed over the frontiers, and had dictated peace in the French capital. The man of small means had become one of the arbiters of Europe, and the unscrupulous slave of ambition had been provided with a refuge in the island of Elba. Military ditty had triumphed over military glory. In another short year the exile of Elba entered the lists again, and rode one more course for empire. It was misery to him to meet with utter defeat, but greater misery to meet with that utter defeat at the hands of the deliverer of Spain, the English Sepoy General whom he had thought beneath his notice. The "Annals " of these six years show how it came to pass that Napoleon fell and Wellington rose ; and, perhaps, it was not for their author to tell why. The reader, if he be observant, will be able to supply the deficiency, and trace the operation of the causes which ruined from pinnacle to base the edifice of Imperialism built up by Napoleon.
We wish we could say the story was well and accurately told. We wish we could reverse the opinion recorded in the notice of the two earlier volumes. The plan of the book is so good, and if faithfully done it would have been so useful, that we really grieve over the failure of its author. The faults are still the
same. Such a luxury of typographical error as exists in the third and, fourth could nowhere be enjoyed except in the first and second volumes. We say typographical, because it is impossible to believe Sir Edward Cust did not know better. But this does not excuse him. It is an insult to the reader to inflict on him this mass of misprinting. Names are misspelled on every page. Six months ago* we drew up a portentous list of errata. If it were worth while, that list could be rivalled. Here we have " Aqueda" for Agueda, " Valoz6" for Valaz6, "Bonet" for Bonnet ; '.Clarapede" again stands for Claparede, "Roguet" for Roguet, " Paylon" for Pahlen, " Paston- neaux" for Partonneaux, " Angereau" for Augereau, "Charles Altea" fur Charles Alten, "Gizon" for Giron, " Marassin" for Maransin ; St. Ouen is spelled " St. Onin ;'' M6nilmontant appears in two different shapes ; the same liberty is taken with the name of the Russian General Mezenzov, while another 'Russian is defrauded of his due share of glory by being set forth in print as " Pitsnitzki ;" France obtains a new river, the " Saal," and many of- her towns are named afresh ; the Bavarian Wrede becomes, in two different places, " Weide ;" and even the well-known patronymic of the late Lord Seaton is spelled like that of' a defunct publisher. But these are not the only errors of a careless reader. There are plenty of a careless writer. For instance, we read, page 63, Vol. IV., "Wellington happened to be on the bridge of Sauroren, accompanied by Lord Fitzroy Somerset, at the very moment that Clausal advanced along the brow of the bill from Zabaldica, whence, seating himself on a stone under the immediate range of the hottest fire, lie coolly pencilled an order," &e. Who is he ? Will the reader believe that the real he who wrote the order, not on a stone, but on the parapet of the bridge, was not Clause), but Wellington ? Again, he says, of Moreau, at Novi, " such was his activity that he had three horses killed under him during his endeavours to obtain the victory." Borrowing Napier's famous climax in his account of Albuera, Sir Edward turns it upside down, and actually makes the victors fly. Napier wrote that the French strove in vain to repel the fusilier brigade, and that the mighty mass of French, "breaking off like a loosened cliff; went headlong down the steep, the rain flowed after in streams discoloured with blood,
• See Spectator, March 7.
and 1,800 unwounded men, the remnant of 6,000 unconquerable British soldiers, stood triumphant on the fatal hill !" But Sir Edward says, "a mighty mass of 1,800 brave men, the remnant of the 6,000 who but a short time previous had deemed themselves victorious, fled iu disorder, and, like a loosened cliff; went head- long down the steep.' But the battalions on the fatal hill stood there in sadly diminished ranks." Surely the faculty of blundering quotation could not go much farther.
In actual errors of narration Sir Edward surpasses himself when he comes to the 'Waterloo campaign. He seems to have fallen somewhat under the dominion of M. Thiers. Thus we have a repetition of the assertion that Bourinont deserted on the 14th, causing thereby fresh dispositions on the part of Napoleon. Bourmont deserted on the morning of the 15th. It is asserted that on the evening of the 15th the French outposts were "near Sombreffe," whereas they were on the other side of Fleurus. Sir Edward tells us that " the cavalry and all the regiments left within the city [of Brussels] were ordered to march at four in the morning by the roads leading to Eughien and Nivelles." There were no cavalry at Brussels, and the troops there were ordered to march to Quatro Bras. By an inexcusable piece of carelessness Sir Edward makes Wellington ride from Quatro Bras to confer with Blucher at " Frasne," that is, in the camp of Marshal Noy! It is positively stated that Ziethen was attacked ou the morning of the 14th, when not a French soldier had crossed the frontier. Sir Edward adopts the story of Thiers, that Noy was ordered to push on to Quatre Bras early on the morning of the 15th, whereas at seven he was waiting for orders, and he only got them about ten o'clock. Wellington coining from Bry is made to bring up with him to Quatre Bras Van Merle's horse, who came up from Nivelles, that is, from the opposite side. The whole story of the brilliant action at Quatro Bras is most inaccu- rately told. Trusting blindly to M. Thiers, Sir Edward adopts his spick and span, but erroneous account of D'Erlon's movements, an account he might easily have tested by going to the original sources of information. So incurious is our author, that he even adopts the misprints in the first published version of " Welling- ton's Commentary on Clausewitz." As we proceed in the narra- tive the errors increase. The forest of Soignies is said to be "near Gonappe." The detached British corps at Hal, we are told, was composed of the troops of " Chasse and Cole," instead of " Prince Frederick and Colville." Picton is said to have besn charged with the defence of La Haye Sainte, instead of the Prince of Orange, who is described as being with the reserves at Merbes Braine. In one page we are told that Lobau's corps on the field consisted of three divisions, which is incorrect ; in another, that it consisted of two, which is correct. Vineke's brigade, which was half a mile away, is put in La Haye Sainte. After Reille's onsets upon EIougoumont, after D'Erlon'a whole infantry corps had been sent against the left, wo are told that 1:o attack had yet been made upon the position of Mont St. Jean. Nothing can exceed the confusion wo now get involved in. Horse and feet, on both sides, are misplaced and described as doing what they never attempted, and could not have attempted, being elsewhere. The fatal influence of Thiers, and of some other writer who must be as confused and erroneous as Thiers is clear and erro- neous, has evidently taken complete possession of the mind of Sir Edward, and it would require two or three pages to rectify all his misstatements. We have only pointed out a few. The names of places and men are printed more wi!dly than ever, and add to the confusion. And this is the sort of story of Waterloo which, at this time of day, is placed in the hands of the public on the authority of a British Lieutenant-General—a gallant old soldier, but very indifferent historian ! We must repeat that the innumerable misprints, time careless writing, and the absolute blunders of these volumes ought to preveut them from being accepted anywhere as authentic history.
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