THE GERMAN ARTILLERY IN 1870.* PROBABLY no campaign was ever
recorded so fully as that of 1870-71. Nor is it fullness alone which has been displayed in the many narratives. For the most part, they are distinguished by a laudable desire to set forth the exact truth, so far as it can be ascertained, while the German books published in King and Co.'s series, avowedly based on the Staff registers -and official reports made at the time, have the highest value for the student, especially if he be a soldier. Meanwhile, the main current of the wonderful story runs through the elaborate work compiled at the Imperial head-quarters, and is illustrated by a wealth of maps which are themselves a chapter of history. In this way, we have had the experiences of several armies told in precise detail, the infantry, as is only fair, obtaining the greatest attention. Now we have a really excellent account of the Artillery, as it was displayed in the actions about Metz. Had the famous Waterloo campaign been treated in this minute and comprehensive fashion within four years of its close, how many controversies would have been forthwith decided, and how many legends would have never seen the light I The military world, at all events, should be grateful to the Germans for pro- viding such a mass of instruction, or at least, authentic records of actual fact, which may serve as the basis of reasoning, and whence instruction may be drawn. Captain lIoffbauer's volume is cer- tainly not the least valuable which has appeared. As we have said, it deals with the actions round Metz down to the 18th of Augut, bestowing most attention, of course, upon the almost romantic battle on the 16th, and the stupendous conflict, so bloody and prolonged, yet so suddenly brought to a climax, on the 18th. Although the proceedings of the Artillery, down to minute details, occupy the author's pages, yet the reader is never allowed to lose sight of the battles in their main features. Indeed, while the batteries are the more prominent in the narrative, the author does not permit them to overshadow the other arms, nor fail to keep them in due subordination to the main limbs of the mighty strife. Naturally, an artillery officer never loses sight of the ground, and if the student, map in hand, follows the description so carefully supplied, he should be able to imagine the great landscape, and see it with something of the strictness of
* The German Artillow in the Balite near Metz. Compiled from the Official Reports of the Artillery. By E. Buff baser, Captain. Tranalated by Captain ilollist, London : Henry B. King and Co.
reality, and people it over again in his "mind's eye" with the dark array of hosts contending for mastery. At the same time, Captain Hoffbauer keeps his gallant gunners in exact relation to events, by furnishing succinct but lucid outlines of the strategic action which brought them to their work, and sums up each day with observations as valuable as they are modest. His book, indeed, is neither the pleading of an advocate, nor the judgment of a judge ; it is evidence for the jury, delivered with candour, simplicity, and clearness, and always in good taste. For all these qualities we heartily commend it, as one of the best among the German war-books published in an English dress.
After reading this volume, one is again impressed with what is not the least characteristic of the campaign in 1870,—the impromptu origin of the battles. Von Kamekke at Spicheren did not intend to fight an army corps; he merely laid rude hands on a supposed rear-guard, in the hope of causing delay and confusion. The action on the 14th of August, called Borny by the French, and Colombey by the Germans, was brought on by a I:brigadier, Von der Goltz, who flung in his brigade to interrupt a retreat to the right bank of the Moselle, plainly in progress under his field-glass. The sanguinary battle of Mars-la-Tour, unexpected, but not unwelcome, was the direct fruit of Rheinbaben's vigilance and Alvensleben's prompt decision. Even the decisive fight of Gravelotte was begun under a miscon- ception as to the limits of the position actually held by the French, and the error had to be rectified under fire. It is these facts which make the detailed narratives so useful, because they illustrate over again, with ever-fresh emphasis, those soldierly qualities which en- able even subordinate commanders to apply the principles of their profession to the facts, and to take instant advantage of any mis- take on the adversary's part, and to correct, in time, any errors of information or inference. Nothing but daily familiarity with the varied experience of warfare, derived from personal partici- pation or intelligent study, and driven home by the constant hand- ling of troops, can impart the readiness, sure judgment, fertility in devices, which are essential to success. Good troops may be always trusted to fight with vigour and obstinacy ; courage and hardihood are really the groundwork of all well-trained armies. But something more is wanting in a force organ- ised for victory, and that something is the active, cultivated intelligence of leaders in all ranks, so thoroughly educated, each in his degree, as to be ready for every emergency. The deeper we plunge into the minuter movements of the Franco- German war, the more we come to see how large a proportion of such leaders the German Army included, and the stronger be- comes the impression that true military reform must begin at the top, and that where the chief commanders and subordinates approximate most nearly to the highest standard of accomplished soldiership, there the great mass beneath them is sure to have advanced in a like proportion. Good troops have sometimes saved bad leaders from defeat and disgrace, but bad leaders never made or saved good troops. The lesson is not without its application to the British Army, which, abounding in the best materials, and always eager to do well, needs only the proper example as well as direction from above to equal any rival. But the power of directing must exist in the highest region, before it can be exerted ; nor exist only, but have ample support from public opinion against the pressure of interested parties. No doubt we have somewhat improved, but we are still a long way, not merely from any ideal standard, but from the level which plain, practical, average men have shown can be easily attained.
As regards the conduct of the German artillery on the great fields of Mars-la-Tour and Gravelotte, we must refer the reader to Captain Iloffbauer's pages. The principle acted on was to bring the guns into action as quickly as possible, to mass them in great batteries over the broadest available front commanding the largest spaces; to use them less as a defensive than as an offensive force, always taking hostile infantry as the object, if the alter- native lay between infantry and cannon ; suffering a cannonade unanswered, when the needs of battle required that every missile should be hurled at skirmishers or columns, at foot-soldiers or horsemen, yet not neglecting to cover adverse batteries with a storm of shot, and aiming chiefly at the horses and men. Ex- perience showed that batteries could, with cemparative impunity, change position from right to left of a line, repair damages under fire, and act in every way like battalions. As a matter of fact, the long line of guns between the woods of Trouville and the Bois de Vionvifie not only fought the opposing artillery, but aptly rendered support to their own infantry engaged on the far right and left, wheeling up on one flank or the other, as occasion required. Practically, although each captain fought his own battery, the
great mass was under the eye and control of one superior officer, and acted with the combined force of individual and central direction. Fear of risking capture did not prevent batteries from taking very forward positions, nor did it drive them from the ground when the risk was imminent Perhaps the most instructive fact, in relation to future warfare, which is brought out in these pages, is that the loss inflicted on the batteries was mainly the work of chassepat and rnitrailleur, both fired from really very long ranges ; and that the French artillery was really less effective than rifle fire. Here is great encouragement for the infantry, and some support to General Sheridan's paradoxical-looking opinion that a good army without artillery could defeat one less good, yet having an ample supply of guns. As a fact, we know that the moral effect of artillery will always make it an essential arm, and that ever and anon, its physical effect in battle surpasses any- thing save infantry fire at very short range. Nevertheless, the details of the Metz battles show that riflemen, cool, intelligent, and resolute, can fight batteries, and drive them away. The battle of Mars-la-Tour is, in some respects, the most remarkable combat of the war, because it exhibits so great a variety of tactical com- binations, was uncertain from opening to close, brought out not only the steady qualities of an infantry by no means wanting in enterprise ; showed, plainly enough, that the uses of cavalry, even on pitched fields, remain in full vitality ; displayed the German artillery as fully up to the new demands of actual warfare ; and exhibited, on a large scale, that thorough cohesion and identity of spirit in the German Army, as modelled by the King and Von Moltke, which make it so formidable. Nowhere better than in these pages can the student see what we may call the anatomy of Mars-la-Tour, and as regards the artillery, of course, bone and sinew ; and we repeat, that Captain Hoffbauer has written an extremely useful book, which Captain Hollist, himself an artillery- man, has done well to translate. Should a second edition be called for, we recommend the accomplished translator to revise the proofs, and especially look to the spelling of names, both in the text and on the maps.
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