THE LOCARNO CONFERENCE
TT IGH hopes are turned towards the Conference at Locarno, not because any serious student of foreign affairs thinks that the negotiations will be easy, but because the atmosphere of Europe is better now than it has been at any time since the Armistice. There is a will to fashion a permanent peace. M. Painleve made an extremely welcome and significant statement last Sunday when he declared that " the reconciliation of France and Germany is the corner stone of European civilization." M. Poincare would have been incapable of saying that, and his whole policy was indeed a negation of it. Another point to the good is that the idea of the Pact receives on the whole a public blessing from all the countries con- cerned. This seemed to be an almost impossible thing to hope for immediately after the rejection of the Protocol, when many of the champions of that scheme said, in effect, " If you won't have the Protocol you shan't have any- thing."
It is truly remarkable that this promising situation should have come about as a result of an unexpected proposal from Germany. We cannot praise too highly the sagacity with which the British Foreign Office in- stantly appreciated the importance of the German move and responded to it, while France was still inclined to belittle and even deride it. One would have thought that the readiness of Germany spontaneously to sign "away all future claim- to Alsace-Lorraine was a proof of good faith. We have -always been surprised, though thankful, that Germany went so far. Nations, like private 'persons, do not generally state at the beginning the full price they are willing to pay for something. The explanation no doubt is that Germany has almost as much fear of France as France has of Germany ; she is terrified lest there should be another Ruhr invasion, and in order to rule it out she offers as a pledge of peace the chief bone of contention between the two countries in the past.
If Germany is, as we believe she is, anxious to make EUrope safe for peace, life must be made safe for Germany. We know perfectly well that it is useless to ask France to rewrite the Peace Treaty. The very suggestion would -make her resentful. Without, however, formally chang- ing the Treaty it is possible to supplement it, to reinterpret it, and so to change the character of its incidence. It can be made tolerable while remaining nominally un- changed. Thus, by slow degrees, we may transform an imposed peace into an agreed peace. We look for a considerable step in this direction at Locarno.
Mr. Austen ChAmberlain made- an excellent start when he emphasised the fact that all parties were meeting on an equal footing. Germany may give a wry smile and tell herself that there can be no question of equality so long as she is disarmed and her enemies remain in any part of the Rhineland. How could she speak with Any weight in the League, so long as she had no arms, no aeroplanes, and no army to speak of ? Nevertheless, she would be unutterably foolish if she harped on this note at the Conference. The reason why she would be very foolish is the simple fact we have already mentioned, that France will never consent to a deliberate or formal revision of the Peace Treaty. Much the best plan for Germany is to enter the League with the good will of France and every- body else, and then to make use of the frequent oppor- tunities which her new position will provide for obtaining what she regards as justice.
Exactly the same principle applies to Germany's mis- guided plea that she should be allowed to withdraw her signature to her confession of guilt as the author of the War. For our part we think that the exaction of that Signature was a mistake, guilty though we believe Germany to have been. The whole dispute, however, is one that could never be ended. All of us who believe in Germany's guilt say no more than that she refused easy opportunities of remaining at peace ; we may, none the less, admit that international relations, spread back over generations, were in a wider sense the cause of the War. If Germany can avoid her customary clumsiness in diplomacy she will leave this question severely alone. There is only one judgment in such a matter which is worth anything, and that is the verdict of posterity. Neither Germany nor ourselves can do anything now to affect or deflect that judgment. France, of course, is disappointed that Great Britain is unwilling to bring Eastern Europe directly under the Pact, but we trust that Mr. Baldwin's Government will give no countenance whatever to the idea that we should ever be willing to guarantee the vague and risky arrangements which France has made with Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Let us concentrate on the one point of guaranteeing the eastern frontier of France. If this is done a nucleus of safe territory will be formed, and it may be hoped that a peaceful influence will spread outwards like the ripples on a pond. M. Chicherin's spectral appearance, first at Warsaw, and then at Berlin, is something to make us afraid, not indeed of M. Chicherin, but of the consequences which may follow if we do not placate Germany by bringing her into the League, and by making her the friend of France as M. Painleve wishes. An unplacated Germany would, no doubt, be tempted to do just what M. Chicherin's haunting of the scene suggests—she would be driven to ask herself whether, after all, she must not join up with Russia in order to defend herself against such unrelenting enemies as live in Western Europe. We cannot seriously ask Germany to agree permanently to her eastern frontier— which is an unreasonable one. It is thought that if, as Great Britain intends, nothing more is done in the immedi- ate future than to guarantee the eastern frontier of France and, for the rest, to furnish the Pact with arbitration' treaties for Europe Czecho-Slovakia will be satisfied. Whether Poland will be satisfied is another matter.
It is essential, not merely from a selfish British point of view, but in the interests of peace, that our pledges should keep' o a bare simplicity, and that we should not undertake more responsibilities than arc plainly implied in the Covenant. To accept vague responsibilities which cannot be exactly measured or defined is one of the surest ways of getting ourselves into future difficulties and being accused ultimately of faithlessness and disloyalty. When we make promises it is necessary to know, first, exactly what it is that we promise and, secondly, that we shall .certainly be able to abide by our pledges.
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