THE MIDDLE-EAST FRONT
By STRATEG1CUS
WHILE the mind is torn between hopes and fears about V V the "gigantic operations" which Hitler announced as being in progress on the Russian front it is easy to lose one's grip on the scale and purpose of the preparations that are being made farther south. There is no precision about the defini- tion of the new offensive. To suggest that it is being directed against Moscow is to say no more than might have been said of the operations of the first phase of the campaign. The present attack presumably threatens Moscow immediately. It was always likely that, in conformity with the whole of German training, an attempt would be made at a double envelopment of the capital from the north and from the south. But the scanty news scarcely suggests that development, but rather an assault along the direct line of approach with a subsidiary thrust against the extreme left of its defensive line. Moreover Timoshenko, who had secured the initiative on the central sector, has been strangely quiet for a week or two, and the probability is that he has seen what was preparing and made his counter-preparations. So it seems likely that the fight- ing here may reach a violence that may be outstanding even in a campaign that has been notable for the severity of the blows delivered and suffered. This is not, of course, to pre- judge the development of operations which can so vaguely be discerned. What we know of a certainty is that so far the famous Guderian has been roughly handled on this sector by the same armies he is now striking at desperately. For about two months the initiative has been in Timoshenko's hands, and the indications are that they are singularly capable hands. What we must assume is that Hitler, having so blatantly announced this new offensive, has accumulated all the weight he can con- centrate to- press it to complete success.
But it would be a mistake to imagine that this sector stands or falls alone. Before another heavy blow is struck at the southern flank, that has already suffered so much, time is needed ; and while this assault is driving towards Moscow the preparations are being pressed forward,. so that very soon we are likely to see the drive for the Caucasus and the east reopened,—and this involves the danger to the flank that, as Mr. Churchill said, in covering India would stretch from the Caspian to the Nile. That is, of course, merely the defence of India ; and this flank in reality stretches as far west as the Libyan-Egyptian frontier and beyond. The measures concerted between General Wavell and the Russian commander in Iran and with General Auchinleck have an undoubted importance. They may be said to have immediate importance. If the southern flank of the Russians gives much farther it will at once involve this new British flank, and there is here a pos- sible weakness that may have to be considered before very long. The writ of General Wavell runs as far as the western frontiers of Iraq, where General Auchinleck's jurisdiction begins ; but the junctions of armies are weak points that exer- cise an inevitable attraction upon German generals. No one is likely to forget the peril that overshadowed the Allied cause in the last war when the Germans were approaching Amiens. The danger was that Main would retreat on a line diverging from that of the British forces, and the Germans would have effected the break-through that they wished. In case of attack across the Caucasus General Wavell's line of retreat would be towards the east, whereas that of General Wilson, who now holds the command-in-chief in Syria, would be towards the south. The operations could not reasonably be directed from London, and hence it seems likely that the Syrian command Would need to be attached to that of General Wavell. At all costs a new and promising redrafting of the eastern defensive roust be proof against the sort of challenge it is most likely to meet.
Apart from this, the new scheme has advantages that may appear to be belated. It has always seemed wasteful to base the operations on this part of the front upon Britain and not upon India. It now appears to be designed to base them upon India, and that is a gain of importance almost beyond exagger- ation. If the industrial capacity of India can be developed to supply this great theatre of the war it will be an immense gain to the whole of the Allied war plan. Shipping can be econ- omised, the war-potential of the Allies greatly increased and operations should ride much more easily. The Indian Army has already played a magnificent part in the war. The strength is to be expanded, according to The Times, to a million men "fully equipped for mechanised warfare." With Australian and New Zealand troops as well as a vast British Army this Indian contribution may well exercise a decisive influence upon events if, as Field-Marshal Smuts has suggested, the war should enter upon major operations in the Middle East.
Blit of course no one expects that the army of Egypt and the western desert will remain upon the defensive for ever. The enemy is frenziedly attempting to reinforce his concentration in Libya, and we pay far too little attention to the losses he is suffering in the Mediterranean. Indeed, we hear a great deal too little about them. It was only last week that the detailed story of the destruction of a Panzer division in April was given to the public ; and for some reason these losses on the sea are minimised in comparison with those upon land. Up to the present moment the enemy has suffered very heavily in Libya ; but not the least of his losses has been the destruction caused by the Mediterranean squadrons. These have been steadily taking their toll of the enemy's shipping, munitions, armoured units and men. The aircraft which assiduously raid the Libyan ports have been adding to the loss. It is impossible that so many raids upon the comparatively few ports can have failed to inflict considerable damage on shipping, to the port- apparatus that loads and unloads it and to personnel.
These, however, are merely the overture, and the audience grows impatient for the main theme. It may be that history will judge that a great mistake was made when the advance last February halted in Cyrenaica. There is much to be said on both sides of the question and, while it is certain that it would have been better to clear the Italians out of Africa altogether and to hold the Sicilian bottleneck, our resources were insuffi- cient to continue that campaign and at the same time to take part in the Balkan struggle. The resumption of the task now will undoubtedly make much heavier claims upon our resources. The Italians have been very considerably reinforced, and they seem to fight much more strongly when they are strengthened by their ally. There are many picked German soldiers now in the colony, and they have been successful in accumulating a considerable strength of armoured units, in spite of everything an overworked British Navy could do.
As against this we have to set a much more extensive experience of disert warfare and a strength which should be in excess of any they have been able to concentrate there. We know, moreover, from the interesting German diary recently published that, despite their sound morale, the Germans will enter a struggle against us with the conviction that they are fighting against heavy odds. That cannot be disregarded in warfare ; and, now that the fighting-season is approaching, the enemy will be keyed up with expectation. We have no know- ledge of the Allied plans ; but presumably they include hostilities against Libya. The enemy so clearly expects them that no one can do harm in discussing them. Italy is the Achilles' heel of the Axis ; and if we can drive through Libya to Tripolitania we can arrive opposite the island that once before saw a British occupation. Sicily was in our hands during the Napoleonic wars, and from. Tripoli it could be invaded again. The mere threat of invasion keeps Italy on tenterhooks and prevents her sending further reinforcements to Russia. In this way the Libyan front plays its part in the main strategy of the war, but it is to be hoped that it will play a greater very shortly, to provide some further relief to Russia.
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