Quemoy
The Communist Chinese bombardment of the Nationalist island of Quemoy, which commands the sea approaches to Amoy, may be the prelude to an invasion. Combined with the threats to Formosa now pouring from Peking, it may even be the prelude to something more serious—an attempt, perhaps, to pick a quarrel with the United States on an issue where it regards its vital interests as involved. But the evidence at present points against the possibility that China is anxious to risk a war with America over Formosa. In the first place, Mr. Dulles has been at some pains to explain that he does not necessarily regard Quemoy as an integral part of the defences of Formosa. Unlike the Pescadores Islands, Quemoy has no permanent American installations, and from a strategic point of view it is much more important for the Communists that it should not be in Nationalist hands than it is for the Americans to prevent it falling into Communist hands. Once before, in 1950, Communist forces tried to invade the island; then the garrison of 40,000 men successfully repulsed a Com- munist force of 15,000 attacking in junks over three days. If, now, the Communists decide to make a Dieppe-like raid on the island, it seems. possible that the Nationalists may hold it again; if not, it seems improbable that America will regard it as a casus belli. In the second place, it seems most unlikely that Chou En-lai would venture on anything which he thought the Americans might regard as a casus belli. The only intel- ligible explanation why he agreed to divide Indo-China at Geneva was that he feared that the United States might go to war. Nothing has happened between now and then to prevent the same calculations applying to Formosa—nothing, that is, except a slight weakening in the Western, front. If there is a moral for the West in the Chinese threats to Formosa it must be to consolidate their ranks and to clarify their intentions.
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