The Oporto Liberal jouinals, to the 31st ultimo, have been
received since our last, and bring with them Don PEDRO'S official statement of the series of engagements, of which we gave, front private and consequently unauthentic sources, the account that appeared in our last Number. The official aecount modifies con- siderably.our anticipations of the result of the action of the 23d. It was by no means' so decidedly favourable to the invading-army as we had reason to believe it had been. There was,.as the private - letters stated, a severe affair of outposts on the 22d; in consequence - of Don PEDRO'S having pushed forward a reconnoissance to Val- longo. The glory of this day is given to a certain Captain TAHORDA, who, having allowed himself to be surrounded, cut his way back to his friends through the opposing enemy; and to .a. Major, DA COSTA E SILVA, who commanded the artillery. , The reconnoitering party seems to have been driven back; or, - as the account has it, they retired on the Tinto. VILLA FLOIL was immediately Ordered to advance to cover their retreat ; and Don PEnao, who was proceeding to visit the posts on the south' of the Douro, on the intelligence of the reconnoissance being- worsted, took the same route as his General; and in this way, the reconnoissance, the troops .under VILLA FLOR, and the R Staff, seem, to have reached theTinto at the same mome remaining bands that were in the 'rear at Oporto, and t cms-Whgrj.„-t!)., had advanced on the Vol./go:road towards Coimbra, wIlahLy directed on the same point; and the bridge of commtinieptioltwitlk:. Villa Nova was ordered to be destroyed, to prevent intentition cits2-; that side.
On the 23d, the invading army marched to the field incRiree2e07,,.• lumns,—the right commanded by Colonel DE BRITO, tl)escent . by M. DA FONSECA, the left by Colonel HODGES. The del - gari about eleven o'clock. In the commencement, the rifle 4— MDR PEDRO were suddenly charged by a squadron of the enemy's 'cavalry, and compelled to retreat : the left, which was early gaged, appears also to have been hard pressed by the Miguelites. 2'he entire line was speedily i action, and continsted so until dusk; when POVOAS was forced to retreat to the heights in his immediate sear, and afterwards to retire, by the Baiter road, upon Penafiel. The invading army occupied the field of battle on the 23d; and on the .24th, they pushed forward a reconnoissance, which enabled them accurately to ascertain the new position of the enemy. Instead, however, of following up his victory—and this is the most suspi- cious part of the intelligence—we are told that PEDRO, having discovered that POVOAS had retreated to Penafiel, immediately directed his own troops to fall back on Oporto. Why he should 7retire before a defeated and dispirited enemy, we in vain seek to ..discoVer. In the engagement of the 23d, PEDRO acknowledges a loss of 300 men ; the loss of POVOAS he estimates at 1,200. On the 28th, a party of light troops marched on Carvalhos and Grijo; of which the Oporto Chroni ea says they took possession without difficulty. The same journal of the 30th speaks of the volunteers and militia ,of Povoss's army as having been entirely dispersed, and his whole force as being reduced to four regiments and a part of a fifth, with about 200 cavalry and five guns. His advanced posts, however, even then, seven days after the battle, were still at Penafiel, his ain body having fidlen back on Almarante. The doubts entertained of Ps oso's success, which these accounts ao not remove, were on Monday considerably strengthened by the unexpected arrival, in London, of the Marquis PALMELLA, Psmito's Prime Minister. The object of his mission was of course ot known ; but it was readily concluded, that only some very pressing and serious matter could have taken him, at such a ma- sment, from his royal master's side. PEDRO is said to be grievously =provided with cavalry ; and to his weakness in that arm of war is attributed his unaccountable stay in Oporto, where he has already whiled away three weeks, and effected little or nothing. To the same cause is attributed his not having been able to follow .ap the success of the 23d. Certainly, without cavalry, victories can rarely be gained, and if gained, much more rarely secured : but this fact being notorious, the question naturally arises—why did PEDRO invade Portugal without cavalry, or the means of getting them? A vessel has arrived at Brest, which, according to the French journals, brings fifty-eight French soldiers and officers, who had left Don PEDRO in disgust, and who are represented as giving very indifferent accounts of his state and prospects. The Courier cof last night says there were but twenty-seven of these soldiers and officers, and that they were dismissed by Don PEDRO for bad conduct, and are not therefore likely to give favourable accounts sof him. The Lisbon journals of the 28th say nothing of the action of the 23d.
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