THE RUSSIAN NAVY
By W. V. EMANUEL
THE Soviet Union occupies such a vast portion of the earth's surface that her fleets, like her aircraft, can operate against all three Axis Powers simultaneously. She has separate fleets in the Baltic, Black Sea, White Sea and Pacific, and not inconsiderable flotillas on the Caspian and the Amur River. This fourfold division has disadvantages, as was tragically shown by the belated reinforcing of the Far Eastern Fleet by Rodjestvensky's ill-fated Baltic Fleet in 1905.
But the internal communications of the Russian naval " fronts " have much improved since then. A network of canals now makes the transference from sea to sea of submarines and destroyers at least a comparatively easy matter. Moscow has become a great inland port; as long ago as 1933 the Stalin Canal linked Leningrad with the White Sea ; warships from the Baltic can now travel to the new ice-free base at Poliarnoie, near Murmansk, during five months of the year; and foreign cargoes, in particular coal from the Russian-worked mines at Spitzbergen, can reach the heart of Russia without having to run through a possibly hostile Baltic.
Moreover, the new Arctic route along the North-East Passage, that mirage of the Elizabethans, can now be kept open for at least three months by means of a wonderful system of icebreakers, aircraft and fuelling-stations. This enables ships to steam direct to the Far East or back by a way which is not susceptible to bombing and almost halves the distances covered on the Red Sea or Panama routes. It is possible that submarines con now cross the Arctic Ocean even in winter by travelling below the frozen sur- face, for Sir Hubert Wilkins used this device for Polar exploration some years ago.
All this greatly improves the position of Russia's Far Eastern Fleet as compared with 1904-5, when Port Arthur became its death-trap. Vladivostok, the present fleet base, is still strung out at the end of communications 5,500 miles long, but the Trans-Siberian Railway track has been doubled, numerous feeder lines, including the valuable Turk-Siberian, have been built, and however vulnerable these land com- munications may be, the new sea and air routes have turned Vladivostok from a commitment to an asset. In contrast to 1904, Russia's Far Eastern Fleet now contains no ships larger than destroyers, and is clearly incapable of taking on Japan's battle fleet of ro battleships and 35 cruisers. On the other hand Russian submarines at Vladivostok number at least 70, and are reliably reported to be increasing by one a month. The equally numerous torpedo craft and minelayers should also have excellent opportunities of reducing Japan's superiority if she attempted a blockade. The submarines, by no means all of which are coastal types, could operate also against Japan's long lines of com- munications and very vulnerable seaborne trade.
A similar task would fall to the sixty or seventy Russian submarines in the Baltic—the Soviet's submarine fleet of at least i6o is the largest of any navy in the world. In 1914-17 anti-German offensive action in the Baltic was mainly confined to submarines, and especially to British boats sent through the Sound and based on Russian ports. For example, in August, 1915, H.M.S. ' E-i's ' successful torpedo attack on the Moltke led to the Germans abandon- ing their whole scheme of combined operations in the Gulf of Riga and saved that town. But, if recent manoeuvres and articles are any guide, Russia's surface ships also will be more active in the Baltic than they were in 1914-17. The two battleships, five modern cruisers, dozen flotilla leaders and 15 destroyers based on Leningrad will not spend all their time there. The battleships are of pre-War design, but between 1929 and 1935 were rebuilt and given new boilers and anti-aircraft batteries ; one of them, the Marat,' made a good impression at our Coronation Review. Though their i2in. guns would probably be no match for the -in, of Germany's new battlecruisers, they could, if well led and aided by scouting aircraft, act as the spearhead of most damaging raids on the absolutely vital German iron ore traffic from Sweden. The by no means negligible Polish Navy should also be useful in this connexion, provided it could use a Russian base.
One should also remember the unusual mine-laying resources of the Russians, who have always, perhaps because of their very weakness in surface ships, excelled in under- water warfare. For instance, the first efficient mines which our own navy used in the War were shipped from Vladi- vostok. Every Russian destroyer and many submarines and small craft are fitted with mines, and in the Baltic alone are ten special minelayers.
But mines and torpedoes tend to be the weapons of Powers that are conscious of weakness and rely on a defen- sive naval strategy. Such a strategy has gone out of favour since the "purges," and the Soviet Press has recently been advocating an " offensive " policy and a big navy, based on the new battleships, now begun, which are badly needed as the proper backing for the considerable light forces. In February M. Frinovsky, then Commissar for Naval Affairs, wrote that Russia was going to have a Grand High Seas Fleet capable of destroying an enemy fleet in enemy waters.
How far these doctrines would find expression in action depends on that essentially unknown factor, the personnel. In the past the Russians have shown no great gift for mari- time enterprise, and the passivity of their sailors impressed Nelson. Yet the State-owned merchant marine is now extremely efficient, and a new pride in the sea is being aroused by skilled nropaganda, culminating in last month's "Soviet Navy Day." The traditions of an Imperial Navy which dates back to Peter the Great are being revived: Pravda, for example, recalls the navy's heroism, even at such defeats as Sebastopol and Tsushima.
Besides the comparatively recent encouragement of nationalist tradition, party fervour is strong in the Navy, especially since the " purges " which two years ago removed every single fleet commander. There are Political Corn- missars in every warship, though these are not necessarily non-sailors. Last year fifteen times as many students at the Naval Academies were admitted to Party membership as in 1937.
With so incalculable a people as the Russians it is impossible to say whether this strong infusion of party enthusiasm into a combatant force makes for increased efficiency. Judging by the effects on the French Revolu- tionary Navy one would think not, yet the armies of the French Republic and the Red Army itself proved effective fighters against the interventionists, in spite of gross inefficiency in material. It is true that in April complaints of bad discipline began appearing in the naval journal Krasni Plot. It was alleged that in some ships Officers of the Watch had failed to carry out a thorough inspection of liberty men, so that ratings were detained by the garrison patrol for being improperly dressed. In a certain Black Sea destroyer, it was said, leave-breaking was going unpunished owing to the officers' slackness. One rating who was absent without leave for 48 hours escaped punish- ment by making up to the ship's Commissar, and so on.
In view of the way in which the " purges " must have undermined the authority and initiative of the officers, such a state of affairs is scarcely surprising. On the other hand the frank criticism of defects in a service journal is encouraging and shows a hopeful outlook. So do the latest decrees limiting the Commissar's powers and raising the period of service from four to five years. If drawbacks of administration exist, as they do in all navies, the fighting spirit of the Russian sailor will probably rise superior to them, as it did at Tsushima. But then the material was hopelessly inefficient. Today the material is without question much better, and the value of the Russian Navy correspondingly greater.
Previous page
