Commonwealth compromise
Nicholas Ashford
Lusaka 'I found that President Nyerere and I were astonishingly close,' declared Mrs Margaret Thatcher in Lusaka this week, shortly after the Commonwealth Conference had adopted a new peace formula for Rhodesia. She was not, in fact, referring to a barbecue given the previous evening by Malcolm Fraser, Australia's Prime Minister, at which she 'was seen with her arm around the Tanzanian leader's shoulder, but to their respective positions on the difficult and protracted question of what to do about Rhodesia. It was a remarkable statement from a woman whose party — or at least a large section of it — would regard President Nyerere as the high priest of humbug in black Africa. And it is even more suprising considering the gulf which was supposed to exist between Mrs Thatcher on one hand, and President Nyerere and other black leaders on the other. Yet the speeches which she and President Nyerere delivered to the conference last Friday at the beginning of the Rhodesian debate were so similar in parts that one observer remarked they could have been written by the same speech-writer. So who has changed position? Mrs Thatcher or Nyerere and the other black leaders? Or is it possible that both positions had been misinterpreted in the first place?
Throughout the week Mrs Thatcher's and Lord Carrington's advisers were at pains to tell everyone — and they were continually questioned on this point — that 'there has been no change whatsoever'. Conscious of the MPs on the right of the Conservative party waiting to devour her when she gets back to London for 'selling out' to African opinion, her advisers (and eventually Mrs Thatcher herself) sought to persuade doubting journalists and commentators that what she was doing in Lusaka was entirely consistent with what she had said in the final Parliamentary dellate before the Commons rose for the summer holidays — and that it was even consistent with the party's election manifesto.
That manifesto, which was very brief on the question of Rhodesia, laid down three basic points at which a Conservative government should aim: to return Rhodesia to a state of legality, lift sanctions, and 'do its utmost to ensure that the new independent state gains international recognition.' It can be argued, therefore, as Mrs Thatcher did very cogently, that the Commonwealth plan for a new Constitution (to be drafted by Britain), an all-parties Conference (to be hosted by Britain) and a new set of elections (to be supervised by Britain) does not shift from the Conservatives' pre-election position. But there has, in fact, been a marked shift in emphasis in the Government's approach to Rhodesia. Initially, as everyone knows, Mrs Thatcher was ready to lift sanctions and recognise the newly-elected government of Bishop Abel Muzorewa. After all, Lord Boyd's report declared that the April Rhodesian elections were not only 'free and fair', but were also tantamount to a referendum on Rhodesia's controversial new constitution. However she was dissuaded from precipitate action by Lord Carrington who was aware of the probable consequences — as was illustrated on the eve of the conference, when Nigeria decided to nationalise British Petroleum. The emphasis has now fallen on the third part of the election manifesto, and the need to ensure that the new state gains the maximum amount of international recognition. What happened in Lusaka, and also during Lord Harlech's and Richard Luce's consultative tours around Africa during the past two months, was that Mrs Thatcher was told in clear terms that there would be no such recognition unless the present Rhodesian Constitution was amended in order to remove the whites' blocking power in Parliament and unless new elections were held.
So, to that extent Mrs Thatcher has 'sold out' to African opinion, although it would be fairer to say that what she has done is in the fine old British tradition of political compromise — an art which that peculiarly British institution, the Commonwealth, seems to have inherited. However the Africans could also be said to have 'sold out' to Mrs Thatcher. After all, President Nyerere for the first time admitted that there had been a political change in Rhodesia as a result of the April elections. That was a significant admission. The whole tone of his opening speech was exceedingly moderate and conciliatory. In addition, the sevenpoint communiqué on Rhodesia contained some important gains for Mrs Thatcher. Above all, it recognised Britain's constitutional responsibility to grant legal independence to Rhodesia. In effect, what the Commonwealth leaders have accepted is that it is Britain's responsibility to resolve the Rhodesia problem — not that of the United Nations, nor of the Organisation of African Unity, nor even of the Commonwealth. Mrs Thatcher must now prove to the world that she can succeed where Wilson, Heath, Home, Callaghan and Owen have all failed.
Probably Mrs Thatcher's greatest success was to prove to Commonwealth leaders that she was not quite the monster she had been made out to be. She may have an iron will but she has a soft heart, she told a meeting of the Lusaka press club — some of whose members only a week earlier had been writing about her 'racial bias' and 'arrogance'. Her performance was almost faultless. It remains to be seen, however, whether the rapport which was established in Lusaka will survive the difficult months of negotiation and horse-trading that lie ahead. Mrs Thatcher's first task, after she has held her special Cabinet meeting on Friday, is to draw up a new Constitution and decide whom she is going to invite to the conference. The drafting should not be too difficult; Britain has had ample experience of constructing Independence Constitutions. But the next stages will be more so. First, there is the matter of who should be invited. Obviously Nkomo and Mugabe will have to be there, as well as Muzorewa, although the Patriotic Front has announced that it will not sit down with 'traitors dedicated to the destruction of our nationhood.' But what about Sithole, Chikerema, Ndiweni and Chirau? And will Ian Smith be there, too? There is a danger the conference could become even more ungainly than Geneva. And there is also the danger that one of the main participants may refuse to come. Britain will then have to depend on third parties to do some judicious armtwisting — the `front line' states in the case of the Patriotic Front, and South Africa as far as Rhodesia is concerned. Mrs Thatcher has said that she is confident Nyerere can deliver his side of the bargain, but will South Africa? Its Foreign Minister, Pik Botha, has said that the outcome of the Lusaka meeting was unacceptable and there has also been strong adverse reaction in Salisbury itself.
Muzorewa's problem is that, even if he does decide to accept the new settlement proposals, he has to have the approval of the whites. This will not be easy, since many of them were reluctant to accept even the existing Constitution, despite all its built-in safeguards, and are only too aware of what happened to minority rights in other parts of Africa. The British hope that the white Rhodesians will see the advantages of going along with a plan which will lead to legality, recognition, a lifting of sanctions and an end to the war. But this could prove a slim hope as the whites have singularly failed to recognise the advantages of becoming 'legitimate' in the past. But the biggest hurdle of all remains the question of the armed forces, particularly during the transitional period leading to elections. This issue, more than any other, sunk the Anglo-American initiative and could well destroy this one as well. The Patriotic Front are still insisting that the 'settler forces' be dismantled and be replaced by the 'liberation army' (although the word 'armies' might be more appropriate). This is totally unacceptable to the Rhodesians— and probably to the British as well. Mrs Thatcher and l„.,ord Carrington were not prepared to broaeh this question in Lusaka, contenting themselves with bland expressions of hope that, if there is a ceasefire, then the question of an army will not arise. But someone has to enforce a cease fire, and Mrs Thatcher has been adamant that British troops will not be called in to Perform this task. So who will?
As the flags were hauled down outside Lusaka's Mulungsuhi Hall, where the conference was taking place, the feeling of euphoria, which prevailed immediately after the agreement on Rhodesia was reached, began to be replaced by one of déjà vu• 'We have been in this situation more than once before,' remarked a Patriotic Front official. Even Mrs Thatcher's earlier enthusiasm became somewhat tempered. Overconfidence is not my forte, but I'm a Jolly hard tryer,' she said in her best school-marmish tones, when asked why she thought she might succeed where others failed, Even Nyerere began talking about this being a 'last chance' for a peaceful settlement. These final misgivings, however, should not be allowed to distract from Mrs Thatcher's remarkable achievements in Lusaka. Even her most ardent critics were impressed by the skill of her performance, if not always by what she was advocating. And these same critics are conceding that she may finally succeed in settling the problem which has bedevilled Britain's relations with Africa for the last 14 years.
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