THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT IN EGYPT.
IT is not perhaps to be regretted that the Government will, for another six weeks at least, be free from the necessity of defending its foreign policy in Parliament. The steps it has just taken in Egypt require time for deliberation, for the accumulation of knowledge, and above all, for the settlement of a decisive and intelligible policy as to details. It will be necessary for the Cabinet to explain not only its policy with reference to the Suez Canal, which is explicable, and will not, we imagine, be assailed in the way which endangers Governments, but the precise relation which it conceives itself to hold towards the Egyptian Government. That relation, as matters stand at present before the world, is not a little confused. It will be quite vain to say in Parliament what may possibly be said with truth in diplomatic correspondence, that the British Government stands to the Khedive merely in the relation of an intimate and in- fluential friend. Our Government has purchased nearly half the shares in a water-road across Egypt, which the Government of Egypt will never be allowed to shut ; it possesses, we may rely on it, through English share- holders, a controlling influence on the remaining shares ; and it will be regarded by all the world as responsible for manage- ment, for tariffs, and for rigidly careful maintenance of the way. This possession of itself makes its position in Egypt different from that of a mere friend, and it is strengthened by
the recent intervention in Egyptian financial affairs. The Government has selected a Privy Councillor, recently holding a Ministerial office, to advise the Khedive on finan- cial matters,—to assume, in fact, though not in name, the office of financial " Resident," that is, Envoy whose advice must be taken—and it has given him a large staff, every member of which has been selected from the Govern- ment Offices. Colonel Stokes, in particular, whom the public seems to have forgotten, is an officer who was the British Commissioner for the management of the mouths of the Danube under the Treaty of Paris, and in that capacity transacted with remarkable tact and patience some most deli- cate and complicated diplomatic and financial business to the entire satisfaction of Lord Palmerston. The British Government is not accustomed to waste officers of that- kind, and in selecting such a man they have given a proof that they are seriously interested not only in the improvement of Egyptian finance, but in knowing all about it. Mr. Cave has, of course, not gone out without the fullest assurances of support from the Khedive, and the fullest guarantees that he shall know everything ; and he will, there is no doubt, exercise for a time a sort of Visitatorial authority in the Egyptian Treasury. That position, irksome for any foreigner, will be humiliating for an agent of the British Government, unless it is made effective, and if it is made effective, in what relative position does it leave the two Governments immediately concerned ?
It is upon this point that inquiry in Parliament will cer- tainly be pressed, and upon this point that Government must be prepared with an intelligible and decisive statement of its policy. A mere whittling-away of the significance of every step—a "minimising policy," as the theologians call it, of which we regret to see some signs in the reports from the different capitals, will never content the country, which ex- pects a large and even dramatic course of action, and will certainly not be satisfied to hear that it has engaged in most serious affairs, accepted new responsibilities, and lost for a time the friendship of France, in order that the most powerful vassal of the Sultan may, if he likes, remain for a little longer tolerably solvent. A new catastrophe on 'Change was not, of course, to be desired, but the British Government has not risked war or even diplo- matic "complications" to avoid the bankruptcy of another considerable debtor. If it could interfere for the holders of "Egyptians," it could interfere for the holders of Spanish Bonds, and its steady policy, especially after its Mexican ex- perience, is not to interfere with an independent State for any such cause. That argument will not pass even in the House of Lords, with all the Peers' readiness to respect necessary
reticences ; and the Government, if it wants support in the Commons outside party lines, must state its course with a cer- tain audacity of frankness. Mr. Disraeli is quite equal to that task, if only his policy is decided ; but then, is it decided, and what is it ? Will he adhere to the line which the country from the first announcement of the purchase understood him to be taking,—that England, with the consent of the Khedive, would assume and defend a Pro- tectorate of Egypt more or less formal, a Protectorate intended, if necessary, but only if necessary, to pass into sovereignty. Is Egypt in fact—to use words which Lord Derby, of all men, thoroughly understands—to be as the Deccan, or Guzerat, or Travancore, a State possessing complete autonomy, but with no foreign policy, and indeed no haute politique of any kind, except that of the British Empire ? If this is the policy adopted, it will be thoroughly understood and approved in England, but then it remains to make clear the method by which the consent of the Sultan and of Europe will be secured to that arrangement. If, on the other hand, this is not the policy to be adopted, how much less close is the rela- tion between the two Governments to be ? Do we, for in- stance, merely " assure the independence of Egypt ?" That is intelligible on paper, but what does it mean in fact ? The Khedive is independent now of anybody but the Sultan, but then his dependence on the Sultan is one of the most embar- rassing facts of his situation. It will be the very first of the perplexing data laid before Mr. Cave. If dependence meant only a fixed tribute, it would be manageable, but it covers a much more real authority than that of a first mortgagee. The Sultan can and does give the Khedive any order necessary to• the general welfare of the Turkish Empire. He can and does order him to send up his contingent to any part of the Turkish dominion. He can, and he did the other day, in the Cretan matter, throw all Egyptian finance into confusion, by ordering Egypt to send a fleet and an army to put down a rebellion outside Egypt. He can and he does summon the Khedive to visit him at Constantinople, where a Mussul- man out of favour needs and must use an invisible panoply of gold. He can and does exact enormous presents in addition to the tribute, and finally, he can and does so employ his vague authority as Suzerain that the Khedive, to protect himself, is obliged to secure unusual information, and his expenditure of secret-service money in Stamboul is believed to exceed the whole secret expenditure of many European Governments. A bat cannot fly in the Seraglio without recognition of the fact in the Khedive's palace. If this system is to con- tinue, it must paralyse all serious effort at reform on lines such as Mr. Cave would propose ; and if it is not to continue, what
is to be the substitute What arrangement, in short, will enable the Khedive to put his finances straight without danger that Constantinople will make of his prosperity a pretext for new exactions ? The Government will be obliged, we conceive, to explain these points, or by falling back on the " next-friend theory, to create an impression that it has—while really doing a small thing which involves great responsibilities—taken credit for doing a very large one securing advantages equal
to the risks to be incurred. That the Tories will be ex- posed to attack from the Liberal party as a party is im- probable, that party containing many men who hold that it is Egypt, and not Turkey, with which we are concerned ; but that they will have to defend themselves carefully and boldly is most certain, and to do this they must make their policy one the nation can appreciate. It is not likely that Mr. Bright, for instance, who addresses his constituents in January, will let them off very lightly ; and quite certain that if their action is weak, if it does not attract the imagination as well as convince the judgment of the country, they will, after his speech, be pelted with a criticism which will encourage resist- ance from every foreign Court. It was the unanimity of the nation in its applause which struck the Continent, and that unanimity is never produced by assurances that a step, perhaps as important as any taken in modern times, is in reality, as the telegrams put it, only a "precautionary financial operation."
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