THE NAVAL SKIN GAME.
THE Admiralty, it is said, are demanding that new capital ships shall be laid down. Other reports Say that there is a party of opposition in the Cabinet. Evidently the matter is in suspense, and we desire to look at it frankly from the point of view of our national interests. The argument for fresh ship-building is obvious enough. The United States and Japan are both going in for con- siderable navies ; the United States is planning to build twelve capital ships, and Japan sixteen. All these ships will be of the post-Jutland type—that is to say, ships incor- porating the lessons learned at Jutland with regard to the need for speed, for larger guns, and for armour with greater resisting power. Every one knows that when naval power is reckoned up only the latest type is supposed to count for the purposes of battle, but against these pro- grammes Great Britain has not laid down a single. 9 at- Jutland ship, though the 'Hood,' which is being m • ed in certain respects, may perhaps be described as a post- Jutland ship. It is declared, therefore, that within a very .few years Great Britain will have sunk to the third position as a naval Power. The Admiralty case is, as we have said, obvious enough.
Opposition to the Admiralty programme may take either of two forms or even both forms. It can be argued that as the secrets of Jutland are not yet fully revealed, it is by no means certain that a Fleet of post-Jutland capital ships would be our best weapon of defence. Opposition may also come from those who, though they would not criticize the Admiralty programme on its bare merits, hold strongly that we ought not to spend a great deal of money on new ships (at all events, until the necessity is absolutely proved), partly because we cannot afford it, and partly and chiefly because under the Treaty of Versailles we profess to be engaged at this very moment in building not ships but a theory of international relations in which the competition in armaments will play no part.
Now to revert to the first of these two lines of opposition. We should be rather surprised if the Admiralty, on what we have called the bare merits of their programme, were not able to establish a good case. Dire though the submarine peril was through the greater part of 1917, and nearly as Germany came to clearing the seas of merchantmen and winning the war, an answer to the submarine was after all found. It was proved that destroyers equipped with hydrophones and with depth-charges were more than a match for the submarine. The Grand Fleet, surrounded by destroyers, could at last cruise with impunity in the North Sea. The destroyer, by reason of her light draught, need not greatly fear tor- pedoes; a torpedo to be effective has to travel at a depth of about fifteen feet, which is more than the draught of destroyers. Again, with the help of the latest hydrophones, the position of a submerged submarine can be placed with accuracy. When this has been done, the depth-charges dispose of her almost as a certainty. But it may be said that though an answer was finally found to the submarine, would capital ships be safe from the air ? We might remark that a Fleet steaming in line ahead or in line abreast presents a very small target for aeroplanes which would have to manoeuvre at a great height. When both ships and aeroplanes are moving, the aiming of bombs is very difficult. Moreover, some kind of answer is invariably found to every new danger, and if it be conceded that the huge floating platform for gun-fire—in other words, the capital ship—is the best form of naval offence and defence, an answer to the danger from the air would no doubt be found. It is not, then, for such reasons as we have pre- sented that we are heartily opposed to the Admiralty programme of building capital ships.
This brings us to the second ground of opposition to the Admiralty programme—a ground upon which we wish earnestly to take our stand. We believe that it would be utterly wrong from the point of view of good faith and of national interests to enter into a new competition in ship- building. This skin game would ruin us financially, it would postpone indefinitely the hope of controlling international relations by conciliation and, in the end, it would not even give us the physical safety which, of course, we all desire. It must be understood that since Germany was defeated the whole situation has changed. While the German menace existed, no one more ardently advocated adequate ship- building than we did. As our readers know, we never doubted the evil intentions of Germany, whether on land or on sea. On land she built her system of strategic railways along the Belgian frontier, and they could have had no conceivable purpose except to violate Belgian neutrality and facilitate the invasion of France. As for her naval policy, she was evidently not building ships for fun, or to establish an interesting naval museum, or to admire them as showy toys. She meant business, as was proved by,the fact that, whenever we offered to reduce our naval programme, Germany found an excuse for refusing to deal. In spite of all those grim and patent signs, some people m this country were foolish enough to believe that Prusaianized Germany was more to be trusted than Liberal France. When those same people are deploring the fearful toll of slaughter, they really ought to remember that their own share of the blame is not the least considerable. But that is all past history, and the situation is now wholly changed. We have not a single naval enemy in the whole of Europe. If, therefore, we entered into the skin game once more, against whom should we be building 2 Let us be quite clear on this point. We should be building either against -America or against Japan. We should not be building against both, for an alliance between them against Great Britain is inconceivable.
As regards America, we want to say most emphatically that, in our opinion, a competition with America would be absolutely disastrous. We hope that the nation will never consent to it. The Americans, like ourselves, are a deter- mined and undaunted people ; they are so obstinate that, if hard put to it, they would rather die in a ditch than fail to do what they had set themselves to do. To encourage them to a competition would be of all foundations for a policy of British self-defence the most silly. The Americans can now spend more than we can on a hobby, and as the years went on they would be able to spend even more. More- over, even if we could establish a slight margin of power over America in a desperate rivalry, it would not satisfy any British naval expert. "Two keels to one" used to be the motto for the competition in capital ships against Germany. Imagine such a motto inspiring a rivalry with America ! The whole thing does not bear thinking of. It is quite true that the Americans are not at present such good ship-builders as we are, nor have they a genius for the sea, but their defects might be turned into positive achieve- ments if they were pushed. History shows many examples of nations deliberately recognizing their weaknesses and making them good We must not found our policy on the possibility of a war with America. Let us rule that possi- bility out altogether, and save our energies and resources for co-operating with America in the new era of international relations which can alone save civilization.
We pass to the case of Japan. We may be reminded that Japan is still our Ally, and that we could call her to our aid if ever we were threatened by America. All we can say in answer to that is that if ever we joined with Japan in fighting against the English-speaking people of the New World, we should have sounded the knell of the British Empire. No doubt Japan, when she has her new capital ships, will be in a tremendously strong position in the Far East, but we must remember that Japan and America, so far as they are building against anyone in particular, are building against one another and not against us. There will always be that .restraint upon the Japanese will in the Far East. If it came to a dispute between Japan and ourselves in the Far East—a dispute which concerned nobody else except, of course, China, and she would probably be passive—we should not wish to enter upon an adventure which, if carried on on a grand scale, would mean trans- ferring most of our naval power to the East, and would require Eastern bases and docks on a scale corresponding to the hugeness of the effort. All that is very unpleasant to think about, and we mention it only because we want really - to face the situation. Fortunately, we can end with a much more agreeable note.
Have those Englishmen who advocate a great new Navy reflected upon the possible alternatives! Japan has been our Ally for several years, and has been a loyal Ally. If the reports of the League of Nations at Geneva do not mislead us, the Japanese representatives there were as deeply interested, as helpful and as sincere as those of any other nation. Japan, we are convinced, is on the side of civilization. Is there any reason for supposing that if we talked the matter over with the rulers of Japan, they would not be found to be as eager as we are to preserve the peace of the world, and to enter upon the new way of .life ? We have suggested the right roads to explore, the best roads to safety. No doubt there must always be risks in this troublesome world when we are dealing with men of other races end of temperaments different from our own. But the most risky, the most false, and the most ruinous policy we have yet heard of is that we should immediately enter again upon the game of naval competition.
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