TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE POLL OF THE PEOPLE.
IT is with the greatest satisfaction that we record Mr. Balfour's memorable statement (made in his speech at the Constitutional Club on Monday) in regard to the Referendum, or, as we are glad to see he also called it, the poll of the people. It ought, he declared, to be a per- manent part of our Constitution for dealing with "great differences of opinion between the two Houses of Parlia- ment." So long as that view was held by the Unionist Party, and if it was embodied, as he hoped it would be embodied, as a permanent part of the machinery of the Constitution, "it would be found almost both impossible and inexpedient to exclude from its purview certain great questions on which the two Houses may be fundamentally agreed." Mr. Balfour next dealt with a point upon which we have often insisted in these columns—namely, that it must not be supposed that the Referendum is "the proper machinery for dealing with normal Budgets." The normal Budget is essentially an administrative and not a legislative act, and therefore not as a rule suitable to be submitted to what is properly a popular right of veto over legislation. But, though this must be the general rule, there is no reason why as an exception a Budget which makes funda- mental changes in fiscal policy should not, by general agreement, be submitted to the electors. To put it in another way, though it would be absurd to submit annual alterations in the degree of taxation to the voters, a great and presumably permanent change in principle might well be submitted. Here, then, we have the fixed policy of the Unionist Party. They do not mean to rest satisfied until they have given the people the right of veto over fundamental -changes in legislation, and they are also of opinion that, as a matter of exception, a great change in our fiscal policy, about which there is considerable ground for doubt as to the popular will, should be included among subjects upon which the people are to be consulted. In this particular we are following the path which Switzerland has already marked out for us. As a rule the financial arrangements of the Republic are not submitted to a Referendum. When, however, some years ago a new and far-reaching tariff was proposed for the Federation, it was thought advisable to make an exception and, to refer it to a poll of the people.
While we are dealing with the question of the Referen- dum, we desire to draw. attention to one or two points which are too often lost sight of. In the first place it should be remembered that one of the great advantages which flow from the adoption of the Referendum by the Unionist Party is that when they are returned to power, as unquestionably they will be, sooner or later, they will be able through the Referendum to get rid of the dangers and diffi- culties involved in the virtual establishment of Single- Chamber Government which the present Ministry pro- pose. Even if we assume that the Veto Bill is carried without any amendment, the Referendum will automatically, and without any repeal of that measure, provide a complete remedy. If the Referendum be adopted as part of the Constitution, the House of Lords, or whatever is the Second Chamber in existence, will not feel the restrictions of the Veto Bill. The reason is plain. When the Second Chamber differs from the House of Commons, and no agreement can be reached by mutual concession, what the Second Chamber will do will be to refer the matter to the decision of the country. They will, as we have so often pointed out in these columns, pass the Bill subject to a Referendum clause, under which it cannot come into operation till it has been endorsed by a poll of the people. This method of obtaining a key for a deadlock would get rid of the whole of the oppressive machinery for three passings in two years, and so forth. It would at once invoke the voice of the common master of both Houses to settle the problem in dispute. Thus, as we have said, the injury to the Constitution done by the Veto Bill would be completely and immediately repaired by the Referendum. If, then, we can only feel sure that the Referendum will be adopted, we need not regard the Veto Bill as more than a temporary evil, though we admit that that temporary evil may have very grave consequences if, as unfortunately seems to be the case, the Liberals are determined during the interregmfm between the passage of the Veto Bill and the establish. =cent of the Referendum to use their temporary majority to dissolve the legislative union with Ireland, and to snatch a party advantage by ertablishing the principle of one man one vote without at the same time adopting the principle of one vote one value. Had the Unionist Party not been willing to make the passage of the Referendum their first aim and object, it would have been impossible to meet the arguments of those who despair of the stability of the Constitution. As it is, the adoption of the Referendum provides an antidote to the poison.
Another point to be remembered by those who are turn- ing their minds to the subject of the Referendum is that it is an entire delusion to say that the Referendum is a piece of Unionist partisanship, a device which will only affect Liberal legislation and will never be called into use when the Unionists are in power. Those who use that argument are either very ignorant or very unscrupulous. We in these columns, and, what is vastly more important, Lord Lansdowne and now Mr. Balfour, have repeatedly pointed out that, to make the Referendum fair to both parties, a minority of the House of Commons should be allowed to call for the use of the popular veto. Though as a general rule the Referendum would be used to decide deadlocks between the two Houses, provision should be made that even when both Houses are agreed the Refer- endum can be invoked. Not only should the people be protected from the dangers of Single-Chamber legislation, but also—though no doubt the danger is much less—from the risk of both Houses joining to pass legislation to which the people object. We would allow a minority in the House of Commons to demand that a particular Act should not come into operation before it had been submitted to a poll of the people. The question must next be asked, What should be the size of this minority? It is clear that, excellent as the Referendum is as a politi- cal institution, it should not be applied to unimportant matters or set in motion on frivolous grounds. That being the case, it seems to us that it would be reasonable to enact that the minority in the House of Commons em- powered to demand the Referendum must number not less than one-third of the House. This would prevent the application of the Referendum on vain pretexts. The practical effect of the proposal would, be that the Referen- dum could not be demanded unless the official Opposition, which may be assumed to act with a, certain sense of re- sponsibility, was willing to demand it. People sometimes talk as if this would mean that the Referendum would be demanded on every Bill which a Liberal Opposition failed to stop in the Commons and which got through the House of Lords. We do not believe a word of it. The official Opposition would not demand a Referendum unless they felt pretty sure of being able to defeat the Bill. The trouble and expense of an ineffective reference would be a. sufficient bar to a frivolous or purely speculative use of the Referendum.
In our opinion, and granted that we have a reformed House of Lords—which we certainly shall have if the Unionist Party have their way—a sound but not undue use of the Referendum would be made in the manner described above : that is, either in the case of differ- ences between the two Houses, or of a demand by one- third of the House of Commons. By this means we should secure the use of the Referendum on vital issues, and yet, owing to the unwillingness of either political party to risk an unsuccessful appeal to the Referendum, we should not get too much of it. If, however, it is thought that in addition the people ought to be consulted upon matters of great magnitude, even if both parties might be agreed upon them, it would not be difficult to schedule certain constitutional subjects, such, for example, as the Union with Ireland, the Union with Scotland, and altera- tions in the franchise or the redistribution of seats, and declare that, in any case, Aets dealing with such scheduled matters must be submitted to the people before they could come into operation.
One more point should perhaps be made, though it is one which we believe the public for the most part under- stands already. There must be no submitting of abstract propositions to the electors, after the manner of the French pialisciles. That, as experience has shown, is at best a. futile. and at worst a very dangerous, proceeding. The proper way to use the Referendum is as a right of veto over legislation. Voters must be asked not questions to which there may be half a dozen answers, but a definite question to which it is always possible to give a " Yes" or "No" answer: "Are you for, or are you against, this particular Bill coming into operation ? " It is hopeless to ask people whether they want the Millennium or not. They can only answer by another question: "How do you propose to bring the Millennium about ? " What we can ask them is : "Do you, or do you not, approve of this particular and specific attempt to improve the law of the land—an attempt already discussed in Parliament ? " Then a man can express his opinion—be it right or wrong. He can always say whether he does or does not want a particular measure to become law.
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