THE OUTLOOK IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS.
PERSIA and Turkey were the countries almost exclu- sively discussed in that part of the debate on the Address which treated of foreign affairs. Neither the Persian nor the Turkish question may be easy to deal with, but we cannot assent to the opinion that the solidarity of the Triple Entente is so sensitive an organism as to be affected by every move made by a European Power in connection with a Turkish concession, or the treat- ment of non-Moslems in Macedonia, or a Persian railway or trade-route. We shall explain our reason for saying so presently. Meanwhile it is evident that the British Government are anxious to be saved from the necessity of intervening in Persia and are willing to watch events, hoping that, even when the spring advances and the operations of marauders are less hampered than now, the increase of security which traders have enjoyed lately will be maintained. We are ready to admit that if only a handful of Anglo-Indian officers were introduced into Persia to organise a local gendarmerie events might make it very difficult to withdraw them. It might even be that the efficiency of the organisation would require it to be extended in directions which could not at first be fore- seen. We trust, therefore, that no circumstances will ever force us into an occupation of Persian territory. We do not want or need more territory ; we have quite as much as we can manage already, and our policy abroad should be chiefly concerned with keeping all doors open to trade. A new land frontier marching for thousands of miles with that of Russia would be simply a vast anxiety to us, greatly complicating the strategical theory of the Empire. At the same time British trade interests which are ancient and considerable in Southern Persia cannot be allowed to be permanently sacrificed. That we have a right to make demands in this case, and to support them by practical measures if necessary, we are sure. The argu- ment that we contemplate interference only because the Persian Government is weak, and that we should not dream of making similar claims in Germany or France or the United States, is sufficiently answered by the consideration that in the latter countries such claims would not be necessary. It is irrelevant and hollow to compare an interruption of British trade abroad owing to strikes or revolutions with the interruption of trade in Persia. In Germany, France, or the United States the Government of the day has the power ulti- mately to restore order, and earnestly desires to do so for its own sake. In Persia there is no such power of renova- tion apparent, and no such guarantee. It is true that, if Persia were strong, instead of weak, there would be no question of interference, because a strong Government is, first of all, strong in its own household. But we do not think of intervention merely because Persia is weak ; because there is an "opportunity." To say that we do is a most topsy-turvy argument. Indeed, in our judgment, the inconveniences of intervention would be just as great as though Persia were strong. What, then, is the true policy for those who desire to see the integrity of Persia preserved ? It is, obviously, to do everything in their power to urge her to police the Southern roads. We imagine that Sir Edward Grey does not expect anything like perfection at once ; but he judges that the ordinary revenue of Persia is sufficient for the purpose, if only the Government, under the new Regent, whom we wish every success in his task, will make a resolute effort to win respect, and show that it is master in its own house. We sincerely hope that the friends of Persia here will point out to the Persians how they may help themselves, instead of ministering to apathy by telling them in effect that, whatever their efforts may be, the die is cast, and the rapacity of the West cannot be stemmed. We pass to Turkey. We remember writing, when the Young Turks established the Constitution, that if English- men expected that the adoption of Western ideas would suddenly sweep fanaticism out of existence they were probably preparing a disappointment for themselves. That disappointment is now being experienced by a good many. It is said that no amends have ever been made for the Adana massacre, or punishment visited on the insti- gators; that the Albanians suffer considerably more now than in the reign of Abd-ul-Hamid; and that the floggings and tortures of non-Moslems in Macedonia have recently been as bad as ever they were. It is well to let it be known that these things are observed. At the same time it cannot be fairly argued that we ought to shift our attitude of benevolence towards the Young Turks unless it can be shown that there is a practical alternative to their rule.
We know of none. The Young Turkish Government is in possession, and we must continue to hope that the good and enlightened spirits among them—there are unques- tionably many—will be able to get the upper hand and to direct affairs wisely where wisdom is needed at the centre, and to control the underlings where these have disregarded instructions. Turkey is the pivot on which South Eastern Europe revolves in a condition of relative stability.
All the Powers are agreed that her integrity must be main tained. None desires this more strongly than Great Britain. At this moment we are engaged in negotiations with Turkey about affairs in the Middle East ; and we are glad to think that we now have an opportunity of proving that, while we can never be blind ti intolerance and cruelty, we recognise the difficulties of the Young Turks, and have no thought of in creasing them by doing injury to their prestige That prestige depends, as it happens, chiefly upon the power of the Turkish Government to defend its claims to territories which are demonstrably Turkish. We can prove our goodwill, then, by making it clear that in all negotiations in the Middle East we shall consult the wishes of Turkey above all where Turkish interests are equal to those of any other Power. A further reason fot patience on our part is the rising in Yemen, which threatens the very existence of the Young Turks. A revolt in Yemen is nothing new ; indeed the province has nevei been fully conquered. The Imam Yahya is once more besieging Sanaa, the capital. The port of Hodeida is once more threatened. These menaces might safely be over- come, as they have been in the past, but there is a new cause of anxiety. The province of Assyr, which lies between Yemen and Hedjaz, is also in revolt. The central figure there is Said Idris, a new Malidi, and, according to the information of the Times, he is co-operating with Imam Yahya. A glance at the map will show that the border of Assyr is near Mecca. If the revolt were successful, Mecca might pass temporarily out of the possession of the Turkish Government, and the Young Turks' title to credit and respect in the Moslem world would instantly vanish into thin air. That is why it it no exaggeration to say that the existence of the Young Turk regime depends upon the outcome of the revolt.
Military service in Yemen has always been intensely unpopular, yet it is now necessary to send large drafts to the war, and meanwhile the governors of the European provinces will be less well able than before to deal with the resulting dissatisfaction. All this looks threatening enough, yet, on the whole, we fancy that the lucky star of the Young Turks will still preside over them, and one more Yemen revolt will gradually fade into comparative tranquillity. Whatever negotiations may be undertaken between the Great Powers and Turkey and Persia, they need not, as we suggested at the beginning, be watched with feverish apprehension as threatening the Triple Entente. If the Triple Entente existed to achieve some policy of expediency, and one or more of its members discovered that some new policy was likely to pay better, then it might break up at any moment. But it does not exist for that reason at all. It exists out of necessity. Great Britain, France, and Russia are attracted together by the gravity of circum- stances. If Russia entered into all kinds of unwise negotiations with Germany in the Middle East. she still would not be able to let go of the hands of Great Britain and France, because her first need is to be as independent as may be of the commanding influence of Germany. The Triple Entente is a league of security. One has only got to examine its origins to per- ceive that this is so. Several times lately the Temps has written of the Entente between France and Great Britain as being inoperative because of the sterility of their policy in Turkey and the Balkans. It might or might not be a desirable thing that there should be a strict Anglo-French policy in that part of the world, but we are as certain as we can be of anything that whether our co-operation with France, and with Russia, be fruitful and positive or only passive, it must continue because circumstances require that it should.
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