What's left of Lebanon?
The events of the past week in Lebanon have again raised the spectre of the final destruction of that country. Anti- government militias have conquered West Beirut, and the Lebanese president, Amin Gemayel, may not have enough of an army left to take it back. Beirut has returned to that pre-Israeli invasion chaos which Presi- dent Ronald Reagan said would be one of the two conditions under which he would consider withdrawing the US Marine con- tingent of the multinational forces. The other, less likely, condition was peace. This latest round of the conflict occurred because of mistakes made by the Lebanese president, bad advice given him by the Americans, Syrian actions to prevent Lebanon from falling into either the American or Israeli spheres of influence and Israeli insistence that it be rewarded for its 1982 invasion of Lebanon. The ship of the Lebanese state was too fragile to survive the stresses put upon it.
When President Gemayel assumed the presidency in the wake of the Israeli inva- sion, he had a chance to save his country. The Palestinian backbone of the leftist- Muslim coalition had been removed by the Israelis. Syria had been weakened political- ly and militarily by the invasion. The United States stood behind him, and he was in a position to unify the people, if not the land, of Lebanon. He lost the opportunity, first, because he did not put pressure on his late brother's militia, the Lebanese Forces, to evacuate the Chouf and Aley regions while they were still occupied by Israel. The Lebanese Forces' presence was an irritant to the Druze community there. He did nothing to control the Lebanese Forces in Christian East Beirut at a time when the Deuxieme Bureau of his army was arresting hundreds of Muslims and suspected leftists in West Beirut. He did not seek all-party talks with the Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, or the leading secular Shiite leader, Nabih Berri. If he had invited them then to join his government of national uni- ty, they would have been more ready than tney are now.
This is where American advice played a crucial role. The United States believed that Gemayel would first have to create a strong army, negotiate with Israel and Syria their withdrawals and then discuss pOlitical com- promise with Lebanese factional leaders. But a strong army cannot be built on weak foundations. When it was put under pressure in 1976, it divided. There was no reason to suppose this would happen again. The United States failed in its promise to force the Israelis to withdraw from Lebanon, proving again — if proof were needed — that the US has no influence on Israel, even when it wants to. Instead, the Secretary of State, George Shultz, negotiated his one and only peace accord, the 17 May troop withdrawal agreement. Not surprisingly, Syria rejected it and
pretended to be hurt at the thought that the Lebanese government equated the Israeli presence, as an invading force, with its own, as invited peacekeepers.
With the signing of the 17 May agree- ment, Syria decided to begin again the Lebanese civil war. It armed Walid Jumblatt and other opposition figures. Through them, it planned to regain its influence in Beirut. With Soviet help, Syria rebuilt its army. When the chance came to intervene decisively in Lebanese affairs, Syria was handed the opportunity by Israel.
Israeli policy in the Chouf more than anything else destroyed Gemayel's hopes of rebuilding Lebanon. The Israeli army played Christians against Druzes through- out its 15-month stay there. When it withdrew last autumn, a resumption of civil war was inevitable. Walid Jumblatt won the battle. After the ceasefire, Gemayel agreed to all-party discussions in Geneva on Lebanon's future.
By the time the factional leaders met in Geneva on 31 October, power sharing be- tween Christians and Muslims had ceased to .be the issue. The only topic of importance was the 17 May agreement. Syria said it had to go, and the US said it had to remain even if it could never be implemented. The meeting broke up, perhaps never to resume.
Berri and Jumblatt now find themselves in the position Jumblatt's father, Kamal, found himself in early 1976. The Maronite militias had been driven back into East Beirut. Power was Jumblatt's for the ask- ing, if he had been prepared to com- promise. He was not, even after President Suleiman Franjieh offered structural changes to give Muslims more power. Jumblatt ultimately failed, because Syria would not let him have a complete victory. It decided that a balance was necessary in Lebanon for Syrian interests, so it interven- ed on the side of the Christians. A year later, it was probably Syria which assassinated Kamal Jumblatt. Syria turned on its Phalange allies, just as it last year turned on the PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat. Jumblatt and Berri must know that any alliance with Syria is precarious, and that if they become too strong or show any independence, Syria will turn on them too.
For now, American policy, and therefore the policies of its multinational force part- ners, is a shambles. The strong army policy failed. The ignominious withdrawal of the Marines will not be enough to salvage it. Syria needs incentive to permit discussion on power sharing to resume. The United States can admit defeat in this round and abandon the 17 May agreement, perhaps even abandon Gemayel, to allow the talks to resume. Or it can admit defeat in the war and abandon Lebanon to Syria. Like Cam- bodia and Cyprus, Lebanon is paying for American mistakes and for being weak inside when neighbours outside are so strong.
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