AMERICAN BOASTFULNESS.
To THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR."
New York, June 21st, 1863.
SIR,-1[11 the Spectator of May 30th, in the first leading article, you say, "it is no doubt shocking to English ideas, accustomed to the esprit which springs up in old armies, to see New York Zouaves claim their discharge on a field like Chancellorsville ; but it is. folly to forget that this very regiment fought to the last moment of its contract, and marched homewards out of the smoke, leaving seventy-five men out of every hundred in their graves ;" and you add, that as it was manifestly not cowardice which sent them away, "the feeling which dared in such a scene to enforce a con- tract remains simply unintelligible." As you have thought the incident to which you refer of significance enough to make it the subject of special comment, and as the view which you present is. at variance with the facts of the case, I, remembering the manly candour with which the Spectator is conducted, and acknowledg- ing that even the affairs of this country receive such treatment at its hands, ask, without apology, the opportunity of correcting your error. When I add that my nearest kinsman was adjutant of the regiment in question, and, his two superior officers having been wounded early in the day, led it at Chancellorsville, and also remind you that the officers were, of course, not at all involved in a movement which was based only upon the term of enlistment of the men, you will see that I have some right to speak in the mat- ter, and that I am without any special prejudice upon it.
Upon what degree of misinformation your statements and your
judgment were founded you can gather, when I tell you that the regiment did not claim its discharge upon the field of Chancellors- ville (or rather, the Wilderness) ; that it did not fight to the last moment of its contract, except in so far as such a statement is warranted by the regiment's going upon the battle-field ten days after its contract had expired, and that it did not march homeward out of the smoke. The facts are these. This regiment was the first that volunteered from New York. It enlisted for two years, the men supposing, as we all then supposed, that they would be- back in six months at most. It had fought in every campaign in Virginia, earning an honourable name by fidelity to duty and gallantry upon the field. It was mustered in on the 22nd of April, 1861, and its term of service therefore mg iring at that date in 1863, the men were making their calculations for a brief visit to. the homes which they left so suddenly, and which they had not seen for two years. They were ready to a man to re-enlist, and to continue their regimental organization. They knew nothing of the coming campaign. But the Secretary of War did, and, wishing to. retain the regiment for service, he was guilty by a single order at once of the quibbling, the distrust, and the insolence which have marked his course since he took office. Under similar circum- stances a year and a half ago General Scott frankly asked three regiments (three months' men) to stop a few days over their time, and was answered with cheers that they would stop just as long as their services were needed. Not so Mr. Stanton. He trusts neither the army nor the people, and insults and deceives both. It accidentally happened that although this regiment was mustered in on the 22nd of April, a part of one company did not arrive to take the oath until the 7th of May ; and taking advan- tage of this circumstance, an order was sent from the War Depart- ment that, as the regiment was not complete until the latter date, its term of service did not expire until the 7th of May, 1863, and that it must do duty until that day. This quibbling away their rights did not suit "Englishmen in shirt sleeves" (would it suit Englishmen in coats ?)—so in spite of the order the men stacked their arms on the 22nd. The emergency was great ; the example most injurious. So the Division General instantly took very severe measures, and issued stringent orders enforcing the order from the War Department. But the men stood firm till the regimental officers were entrusted with the secret. Then the word went round, "Boys, Fighting Joe has got Lee in a tight place, and there's going to be a battle. Shall the 1st New York back out now ?" With- out another word the men resumed their arms, and a week after-
wards went into the battle in which, though suffering frightfully, as you relate, they drove back the enemy at every encounter. The day after the last fight they, in obedience to orders, retreated with the rest of the army to their old camp on the north of the Rappahannock, and there, by order of the War Department, were mustered out of service and sent home. The men, disgusted at their treatment, now refuse to re-enlist while Stanton is Secretary of War. Is this conduct either un-English or unintelligible ?
Here any claim that I may have upon your attention ceases; but, if I may presume upon your kindness and the space you can afford me, I will add something &propos of the same article which is the occasion of this letter. You say that our generals " boast like Gascons, but it is after a defeat," and soon after you add that there may be something very strange or very contemptible in the easy serenity with which New York takes the intelligence of a great defeat and the loss of 10,000 men." As to the serenity—if you could but have seen us instead of our newspapers ! We were bowed down with sorrow and quivering with excitement. But though cast down, we were not destroyed ; and even we, personally, as well as our newspapers, bore ourselves as unmovedly as possible. Remember that we have among us a desperate, reckless, ably led, and ever active faction—the pro-slavery wing of the Democratic party, which is bent upon getting into power again, and effecting some sort of union with the slaveholders ; and that this faction seizes upon every disaster, every mistake, and, above all, every in- dication of dissatisfaction or disheartening, and then, perhaps, you can understand why we put a good face on everything. Did you ever understand Othello answering Iago's probe, "I see that this hath dashed your spirits" with "Not a jot, not a jot?" If you have so understood the Moor's careless words, you may, perhaps, understand our easy serenity after Hooker's failure.
Our generals do boast, if not like Gascons, at least so much that our cheeks tingle as we turn away from their orders and des- patches, in shame at their big-wordiness. Why they do so I could explain to you, but will not now. I will say, however, that such boasting is repulsive to the people here—to all of them who are born and bred in this country. Here is a proof of what I say: General Hooker's order, issued before the battle of Chancellorsville, in which he boasted so largely of what he had done and what he would do, was published in New York three days before we heard of a battle; and among -the numbers, the great numbers, of all sorts and conditions of men whom I heard speak of that order, there were only three who were not grieved and disgusted at it. Not -only so ; they all, with those exceptions, expressed a fear of failure, because of Hooker's boasting. Yet again, General Pope, who is chief bouncer to the nation, has been known in the army from his boyhood as "Lying John Pope." Not because he bears false -witness against his neighbour, for his personal honour (so to speak) is unquestioned, as also are his bravery and fidelity, but because he is constitutionally addicted to bragging. Now, among Gascons gasconacling does not get a man the distinctive appellation which Pope has borne.
As to boasting after a defeat, you manifestly have in mind Gene- ral Hooker's order after his retreat. The good taste of that order will certainly be questioned among gentlemen ; but its statements, strange as the assurance may seem to you, were literally true. Hooker failed, as he admitted in that order, to "accomplish all that was expected ;" but he also did take" five thousand prisoners and fifteen colours," and "capture and bring off seven pieces of artillery ;" and, in short, all his other assertions were true— even that one, that "wherever we fought we inflicted heavier blows than we received." Why, then, was Hooker obliged to retreat ? Simply from one of those failures of co-operation which so often affect the fortunes of war. His left wing rested on the Rappa- hannock; but his right, which most directly threatened Lee's com- munications, was "in the air," and without support. It was to have been covered by General Stoneman's cavalry, many thousand strong. But Stoneman failed to cut the enemy's communications in time to effect the junction he was directed to make (for which failure he has been relieved of his command), and Lee, quickly seeing and seizing his opportunity, threw Jackson, with every man -that he could spare, upon this right wing, overwhelmed it, broke it, and Hooker found himself with his flank turned, the enemy in his rear, without the cavalry on which he had counted, and a storm coming on which would deluge and destroy his camp, and by the flooding of the river cut him off from his base of operations. He had to retreat. Yet, as he says, "not a rebel dared to follow him ;" the reason being, in his words, that "we struck heavier blows than we received." For every two men that we lost, the enemy lost three. But at this cost he broke our right wing, turned our flank, and the position became untenable, as Lee
knew that it would then be—for he is a very able general. lie is Stonewall Jackson. Jackson was but the earnest doer of his work.
You may care to know that the rebels fight in column, we, in line. Their column is not the deep parallelogram of Continental tactics, but a series of battalion formations, from six to ten deep, and these they move upon our line in swift succession, trusting to break us by weight and recklessness, and choosing with great skill, as far as Lee is concerned, the point at which success in this manoeuvre becomes strategic defeat for us. They are utterly reckless of the lives of their men so long as they carry their point, and they shoot down every man who attempts to skulk or to straggle. This I know, not only from orders, but from eye-witnesses, and from rebel prisoners with whom I have talked. For example of their way of fighting :- In the attack on our right wing at Chancellormille Jackson ordered that a battery of field-pieces, with which we held an im- portant point, should be taken. A regiment moved upon it in column such as I have described. It was torn to pieces. Another, and another, and another came, and, as the battery was supported but by a single regiment of infantry, the charge of a fifth rebel regiment at last forced our exhausted men, not to abandon their guns, but to carry them off and give up the position. And this was done before there was time to bring up sufficient support. Here they carried their point, but they lost ten to our one. Again, on the centre they massed a very large body at a certain point to intercept our movement upon another. They were covered by a wood, and a gully lay between them and us. Their object seemed merely to hold the position, for they had but little artillery there, and they did not attack, although in great force. We brought up many guns, soon silenced their few, and, with grape- shot and shell with short fuse at point-blank range (for the gully was very narrow), cut them all to pieces in spite of the wood. Apparently, because they were unable to endure this any longer, rather than by orders, they rushed out of the wood in a confused mass, and, yelling like demons (their men yell, ours cheer), they made across the gully at the guns. But these were well supported, and they went back faster than they came, at the roint of the hiyonet, were dislodged from the wood and driven poll mell ; and we carried this point and that which it was held to protect. But very soon orders came to retreat, inexpli- cable at first, but soon explained by the fact of finding the enemy on flank and rear. At this point our loss was comparatively small ; theirs, enormous. Yet the result was that our victorious right cen- tre had to fight its way back at once, or enough men would have been massed around it to take it prisoners. Strange management this, on our part, you will say, and with apparent reason, until you learn that this Wilderness is so wooded that in many parts of the position reached by our centre the officers could not see half a mile either way, and consider that the rebels knew the country and we did not. So you will see that the result of Hooker's move- ment was a signal failure, but not "a great defeat."
Let me add that the opinions formed on your side of the water about us are very frequently based upon as great a misapprehen- sion of fact as that which this letter is mainly written to correct. I could tell you, I think, how this happens, and make the matter clear to you ; but would it be worth my while or your space ?
AN ENGLISHMAN IN SHIRT-SLEEVES.
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