EUROPE AND POLAND IN 1815 AND 1863. T HE very remarkable
record of secret negotiations concern- ing Poland in 1814 and 1815 just presented to Parlia- ment, reveals a very curious resemblance and a still more remarkable change, in the view taken of the Polish question by the Powers principally interested, since the end of the great war. On the one hand, it shows us Russia and Prussia almost as much in concert on the matter as they now are, and not, perhaps, for very different reasons; while Austria and England were, then as now, anxious, though unable to run any risk for that purpose, to see the re-establishment of a really indepen- dent kingdom of Poland. On the other hand, the motives of fear and hope principally governing the situation are almost entirely different ; and, as a natural consequence, the policy of the Poles themselves is in curious antithesis to the policy of the Polish patriots at the present moment. Then, Russia was completely in the ascendant, and as she herself was fully conscious of this, as she kept a large army under Bennig- sen on the Elbe, and was always referring, as we find from Lord Castlereagh's notes, to her perfect readiness for war, and to the sacrifices due to a Sovereign who had so many troops "ready for service," all the efforts of the other Powers, even of Prussia, were founded on a wish to keep this• mighty Empire in check, and to prevent it from penetrating, as Lord Castlereagh says, "into the heart of Germany." That was the sole key to the situation in 1815. England cared for a really independent Poland (which, how- ever, she regarded only as a dream) because it would hare been the best restraint to Russia, and the best bulwark for Germany That being obviously, to Lord Castlereagh's eye, impossible, the next best thing was to get the secret treaty of Reichenbach (27th June, 1813), and the treaty of Tiiplitz (9th Sept., 1813), for the partition of the Duchy of Warsaw into three parts, one for Russia, one for Prussia' and one for Austria, fairly carried out ; so that there might be no danger of letting all the military power of Poland fall into the hands of Russia. Accordingly, this was the practical object of Lord Castlereagh's diplomatic efforts, which he never professes to disguise. The ideal he sighs after is a great and substantially independent Poland; but the danger he really fears is a Poland united in herself, but really loyal to the Czar as her constitutional King, and, therefore, adding indefinitely to the military force of Russia, and throwing an advanced Russian corps right into the heart of Germany. It is against this terrible vision that he schemes, and prays, and protests. Ile will sacrifice anything to get Prussia and Austria to unite heartily with him in demanding the triple partition of the Duchy of Warsaw. He seeks to compose their differences about Saxony, to smooth over all the jealousies between them in order to compass this, and when he fails (owing chiefly to the quick, self-interested eye of the Prussian Minister, Prince Hardenberg), his sole idea is so to stimulate the national Polish feeling in Galicia and in the Polish pro- vinces of Prussia, as to excite the jealousy of patriotic emulation in the neighbouring Polish provinces of Russia, and so render them an ineffective military instrument in the hands of the Czar. In short, Lord Castlereagh's one idea in these negotia- tions is to limit the military force of Russia; and his sole fear is that the assumption of the crown of Poland by the Emperor of Russia, and'the apparent favour with which he was treat- ing the national ideas of Poland, would gain him a new and very powerful military organization, full of gratitude and loyalty, which it would be in his power to employ against a divided Germany. In the private letter accompanying the able British memorandum of October 14th, 1814, Lord Castle- reagh most anxiously guards against the idea that he practi- cally objects even to considerable Russian acquisitions from the Duchy of Warsaw. All he asks for is fair play to Austria and Prussia in the division of the spoils. After reciting the recent gains of Russia in Finland, in Bessarabia, and on the Persian frontier, Lord Castlereagh adds, "If I now find my- self compelled in this, the fourth instance of Russian aggran- dizement within a few years, by a sense of public duty to Europe, and especially to your Imperial Majesty, to press for a modffication, not for an abandonment, of your Imperial Majesty's pretension to extend your Empire further to the westward, I persuade myself that I may do so without being considered by your Imperial Majesty as in- fluenced by any other sentiments than those which it becomes me to entertain as Minister of an allied State." And, again, he adds in the same letter, that a redivision of Poland perfectly satisfactory to England may be agreed upon, "leaving your Imperial Majesty in possession of the greater part of the Duchy of Warsaw, whilst your allies will obtain that species of frontier which no independent power can forego either with dignity or safety." And when, owing to the sagacious apathy of Prussia and the nervous apprehensions of Austria, the designs of the English Minister fail, all be thinks of is to paralyze the Duchy as a military instrument of Russia's, by making the Poles of Austria and the Poles of Prussia more content than the Poles of Russia. His great fear is that the Poles may "rally round the Emperor of Russia's standard for the renovation of their kingdom,"— that "new hopes and animation" will be given "to that light and restless people ;"—and this, he thinks, can only be avoided by Prussia and Austria "adopting a Polish system of administration" in their Polish provinces "as a defence against the inroads of the Russian policy." In a word, Poland is utterly uninteresting to Lord Castlereagh, except so far as it may increase, or be made to cripple, the mili- tary force of Russia. If he sighs vainly for a really independent Polish kingdom, it is purely because lie thinks it the best barrier against Russia. That being impossible, he schemes only for the partition which will give the best frontier to Germany and the least resources to Russia.
But the Prussian Minister, Prince Hardenberg, saw a great deal further into the matter than even Lord Castlereagh, able as he was. In a confidential memorandum communicated to Lord Castlereagh on the 21st of November, 1814, Prince Hardenberg writes :—" The more I reflect, the more I feel that on our side we should do well to yield on the political question, because I see in this course much more of profit than of danger to the repose of Europe in general, and to the neighbours of Russia in particular. I see the strength and power of the latter rather weakened than added to by this new kingdom of Poland, under the sceptre of the same sovereign. The Poles will enjoy privileges which do not belong to the Rus- sians. Soon the spirit of either nation will be altogether oppo- site; the jealousies will hinder unity ; embarrassments of every kind will arise, and an Emperor of Russia and Poland at once will be less an object of dread than a Sovereign over the Russian empire who should unite to it the greater part of that country his claim to which is not disputed, in the form of a province. I have no fear lest the subjects of Austria and Prussia, formerly Poles, incessantly wishing and striving to join their countrymen, should create disturbances. A wise and paternal administration will readily remove all apprehensions of this nature. In a word, the deepest conviction has been formed in my mind that in endeavouring to hinder the Emperor from re-establishing a kingdom of Poland under his sceptre, we are working against our own interest." And for these reasons Prussia,—wisely enough in a selfish sense,—entirely foiled Lord Castlereagh's purpose to bring a strong pressure to bear on Russia for the purpose of a more equal division of the Duchy of Warsaw. Austria's part in the transaction was less one of policy than of languid compromise. "In descending from his war language," says Lord Castlereagh, "Prince Metternich appeared to me to fall into the other extreme, and to think only of compromise." He offered, indeed, to give up Galicia if Russia would con- sent to the constitution of a really independent Poland ; but, like Prussia, he is not very anxious about this apparent in- crease to the Russian power, and cares more about the Aus- trian acquisitions in 111yria and Italy than about Poland.
But it is in the views of the Poles that the greatest change has taken place. Seeing that none of the Powers had any serious idea of constituting an independent Poland, and that the choice for them was between a final dissection, and a union under Russia, they vigorously supported the Russian project. Lord Castlereagh tells us that the bitter Russian reply to his first memorandum was not written either under the inspiration of the Emperor, or at the wish of Count Nesselrode, but by the Polish adviser of the Emperor, Prmco Czartorisky. "The sentiments of the Emperor's own mind," he says, "certainly neither led him to feel any umbrage at my communication, nor to think of giving an answer to it till his Polish advisers pressed it upon him, probably with a view of pledging his Imperial Majesty more deeply to their schemes." It was, for them the last chance of a united Poland. But even before the end of the negotiation they began to tremble for their schemes. In February, 1815, the Duke of Wellington gives an account of a curiousinterview with Prince Radzivil, in which, after reading to him the promises made by the Emperor as to a unionbetween Warsaw and Russian Poland, Prince Radzivil said "he was apprehensive that his Majesty would be under the necessity of departing from his promises, to please his Russian subjects, and that, even if the system should be completely carried into execution in the Duchy of Warsaw, it would not be extended to the Polish provinces which had, been under the dominion of Russia before the war." Under these circumstances, Prince Radzivil expressed a wish that the question should be taken up again in the conference of the Five Powers, and that the Duke of Wellington should propose that the Emperor should govern all his Polish subjects as King of Poland. The Duke declined to re-open the subject. "I could not discover," he shrewdly remarks, "whether Prince Radzivil had or had not been sent by the Emperor," but "I conclude that these communications are quite unauthorized, and are made by the Poles with a view to bring the Emperor's sincerity to a test by our means," —which the Duke did not choose to do. - The situation now is curiously similar, and yet curiously changed. We still have Austria rather indifferent, but willing to promote an independent Poland ; Prussia entering with selfish instinct into the views of Russia, and Russia anxious for her own aggrandizement. But, on the other hand, England no longer fears the great ascendancy of Russia, and enters into the question only to put an end to the calamity of a chronic revolution; and the Poles themselves are as eager for the final disavowal of all recognition to the Russian con- stitutional dynasty in Poland, as they were then eager to ob- tain European consent to it. Prince Hardenberg's cynical view is entirely substantiated. Poland as a kingdom has been far more paralyzinc, to Russia than Polish provinces. Galicia has been almost loyal to Austria ; West Prussia and Posen are only disaffected to Prussia ; but the Warsaw king- dom is a thorn in Russia's side which neither Prussia nor Austria much care to extract. The Poles are half looking to Austria for help, and, hoping for Galicia as the germ of an independent Poland; and they only ask France and England to tear up the treaty of Vienna so far as regards Poland that they may be justified in throwing off the yoke which they were once deluded enough to court.
We wish our statesmen had audacity and penetration enough to comply with this request. The history of the last fifty years, especially in Poland and Austria, abundantly shows that a nationality such as that of Poland or Hungary is one of the strongest forces with which politicians deal, and, more than this, that there is no wise alternative between absolute incorporation and substantial independence. Prince Hardenberg was right that no attempt can be more fatal to peace or power than a via media between these two methods. Galicia and Prussian Poland are no sources of strength to Austria and Prussia, but they have been nothing like the actively weakening sores which the kingdom of Warsaw has been to Russia. If we renew the old arrangement, as England professes to wish, it can only be wisely done in the cynical spirit which animated Prince Hardenberg in 1815.
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