MR. GEORGE HOOPER ON ARMY ORGANIZATION.

[TO THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR."]

SIR,—Will you allow me, through your columns, to state some con- siderations which should be taken into account by Ministers and by Parliament, whenever, aided by public opinion, they seek to re- model our military institutions? In this remote part of the Empire we are by no means indifferent respecting the changes you may make, for, except to a few Hindooized Europeans, the honour and the power of old England are as dear to the English in India as they are to the English at home. My anxiety on that score, not unknown to you, must plead in justification of my presumption to speak on the subject at all.

First, let me remark that the great war, just closed, sup- plies no new and sound argument for changes which were as needful ten or twenty years ago as they are now. There is nothing to be said for change now which was not said or could not have been said in 1851. No new interest has been created, no new danger has arisen. The victories of the Germans furnish no ground for an increase either in the numbers or the mobility of our armed forces which did not exist before. The collapse of the French Empire was brought about by some causes on which every virile nation can count, but some, and these not the least, or the least effective, which were special and adventi- tious, and such as no nation by art, or management, or educa- tional apparatus can secure. The special causes were the existence and combined operation of three such men as the King, Von Moltke, and Bismarck, who joined their intellectual and political forces to execute a national policy which led them to the ramparts of Vienna and gave them the fortifications of Paris. Upon the possession of three such men at the same time, or of one such, say Von Moltke, no nation has a right to count, and though they have been the most potent factors in achieving the great issues of the war, so far as the example of that war operates as a warning or lesson to other nations, they ought to be struck out, because they appertain to what is accidental, and not to what is permanent. That which is permanent, that which any nation can secure, existed be- fore the war, before 1862, before 1851,—the broad bags of education, the extensive and useful military training, the complete organiza- tion, and discipline as a national habit. But men of genius worked on this basis, developed it, and from such a broad groundwork produced an army unsurpassed in modern military history, and that this army with these leaders walked over the French empire 1 do not deny ; but I do say that the startling fact should not influence England one way or the other in deciding the question of her military institutions. To illustrate this assertion, let us suppose, I will not say that a Napoleon I., but a Moreau or a Massena had held supreme command, and that the French army had only been what it pretended to be, a well-armed, well-organized body, 750,000 strong, giving 500,000 men as field force. Is it not easily conceivable that the campaign of 1870-71 might have ended in a drawn battle ; and in that case where would have been the lesson it conveyed to England ? The Emperor Napoleon III. proved to be infinitely inferior to Von Moltke, and singularly justified Colonel Hamley's estimate of him based on the Italian campaign ; but he might have been the equal of Von Moltke,- that is a matter of what we call chance or accident, the possession by a nation of a Harry V., a Marlborough, or a Napoleon I. The lesson would have been limited to a practical enforcement of vital considerations existing before and independent of success or defeat, and to numbers. But the question of numbers is nothing new. Long before 1870 it was notorious that con- tinental Europe was a huge camp, that more than two millions of men were liable to be called under arms, and that they actually did go forth to battle in their hundreds of thousands. I do not mean to say that the war has not supplied a stimulus, that it has not stirred men to thought, that it has not raised a feverish desire to have "something done," but I do mean to say that we shall make a great mistake if we allow the purely accidental fact that the Germans rode over the Empire in a month, and the bereft Nation in six months, to lead us into an imitation of the Prussian or any other system. What England wants, and has long wanted, is a set of military institutions suited to her very peculiar status, not only in Europe, but in trans-oceanic lands, to the character of her people, and to her internal political condition. To obtain this result she need not trouble herself to study the accidental issues of this strikingly romantic war.

Perhaps the first question to be decided is, what does England want to do ? If she wants only to defend herself at home, main.--

tam her colonies and dependencies, and take no part in European politics, the changes needed in her military institutions are not very great. A powerful and well-armed fleet would alone suffice to keep off any enemy likely to arise for the next generation.

An army for foreign service, strong in artillery and cavalry, and a moderate Militia, would meet all her probable requirements.

But nations no more than men can limit their liabilities to their wishes, and England has incurred some heavy liabilities, given very valuable hostages to fortune. She cannot keep what she has got by merely limiting her exertions to its defence ; she must be prepared to take the offensive, and fight for the common good as well as her own ; to wage war beyond as well as within the fences of her big domain. Thus rightly considered, the question is not so much what England may want or wish or hope to do, as what she must do ; and the means and appliances, therefore, should be proportioned to incumbent and reasonably probable necessities.

To foresee these is the work, the difficult, almost impossible, work of statesmen ; but there are certain broad obligations no one can overlook. There is the duty of defending our Eastern Empire and the roads to it, and of seeing that threatening positions on the flank of those roads do not fall into hostile hands. There is the duty of defending the Dominion, if, unhappily, mischance should bring us into collision with the United States. There is the obligation to preserve the independence of Belgium. All these, beyond and above the contingencies of wars of interest or honour with Continental States.

• If such are our obligations, defined and contingent, do not prudence and self-respect dictate the expediency of placing our- selves in a position to perform them ? None the less so because the pressure of these obligations, in some important particulars, is diminishedby the Franco-German war; diminished because France is weakened, diminished because Germany will tell on our side in the Eastern question. But nothing is more certain than that France—still the strongest, most compact, most elastic, most ambitious nation in Europe—will, during the next decade, resume her formidable position, set to work afresh on the policy of Louis. XIV. and Napoleon, and league with Russia to carry it out_ And England should neither frame a policy nor institutions for- this year or next year, but for at least a generation should look ahead, and, basing her arrangements on the actual conditions of her being, make them broad, elastic, and strong.

To do this effectually we should not imitate any nation what- ever, no matter how successful, but form an army in accordance with our political, social, commercial, and industrial state. There- is no absolute model of enemy, no absolute right or wrong in things military. All is relative ; and that form is best which fits inmost easily and aptly with the exigencies of the nation to whicl. it is applied. Study the complicated society which we call the- British nation, and ascertain what military institutions will bring. out and render available its fighting force with the least friction and the largest incidental advantages. Consider the "classes," as we call them, and see if they do not suggest the forms into which their contributions will most effectively fall.

First, it is necessary that we should maintain a Regular Army for foreign service. It should be raised, as now, by voluntary en- listment, and officered by men who would make a soldier'a life their profession. The purchase system would have to be abeliahed,

either at once or gradually, a purchase system being incompatible with professional soldiership. The number of officers should be -diminished, the pay increased, and ample but not excessive employ- ment found for them, by making the officers of a company drill, train, teach, and in every way manage the company. The amount -of drill inflicted on the soldier now is excessive, and great part of the time devoted to drill should be spent in raising the intellectual, moral, and industrial status of the soldier ; so that not one should leave the Army without being able to read, write, and sum. As -far as possible, and in accordance with his aptitudes, each soldier should be taught some trade or calling, if it were only the art of -digging or embanking ; while those already acquainted with trades should be kept in practice. Thus, the time supposed to be lost to the productive forces of the nation by service in the Army would be partially regained ; the Army would be -a school, one of the best and most useful schools in the empire ; -and when a soldier took his discharge, his services as a trained -disciplined piece of human force would be competed for, -on account of his worth. If this were done, the British soldier -would be far more effective as a fighting and marching quantity ; and dismissal would be the most severe punishment in the military -code. Depend upon it, the more moral power you can get into the ranks of your Army the more formidable it will be. Of course, such a system would require real leaders and trainers of men for -officers, and it would no longer be possible to lounge into and out -of a military career for the sake of the status, the pleasant company, -diversity of quarters, and a chance of engaging in the exciting work of war. It would be a material relief to the Army were it found practicable, as I believe it desirable, to reconstitute the -Local European Army in India. The saving that would effect in India disbursements would be immense ;. and a new field would be opened to a class of men who, as a rule, will not enter the _Regular Army.

Next to the Army should come the Militia, which should be strongly and carefully organized. . All men who were not effective Volunteers should stand the ballot for the Militia. On being -drawn for the Militia at the age of 19, the recruit should spend a year with the colours, so that he might be well grounded in drill, -and taught the virtue of obedience. Nor should his time be wholly taken up with drill. He, too, should go to school if he could not read and write ; and if he could, to some employment, by preference his own calling, if he had one. After the year was -up, he should only be called out at stated times for a certain period, and on leaving the battalion should pass into a reserve, liable to be summoned for service in case of invasion. The -officers of the Militia should be also trained as rigorously as the -men; and the whole apparatus rendered as fit for warfare as is -compatible with what, compared with the Regular Army, would be its inchoate condition. In time of war, Militia battalions should be -allowed to volunteer for service as battalions, and a certain propor- tion of every army sent on active foreign service in Europe should consist of Militia battalions, so that something of the fine spirit -we call honour and a tradition of gallant services should fall to the dot of the Militia.

The Volunteers should also be made into soldiers, and the -officers should be compelled to learn their business. The Volun- teer battalions should not be allowed to become mere holes of Tefuge from the rougher work of the Militia ; but, providing both -officers and men really learnt and obeyed, the strict rules of red tape should not be applied. Nevertheless a War Minister who did not enforce genuine discipline would not fulfil his duties. No Volunteer should receive pay in cash or in kind. He should be 'found in arms, butts, and head-quarters, and a staff should be paid, —nothing more. The country should be conveniently divided into districts, and all troops in those districts should have their ,place in brigades and divisions ; and, as much as possible, should work together and all on the same system.

If the Army, the Militia, and the Volunteers were considered as -so many Schools for the training of men, so as to bring out within the limited time allowed the best result of moral and physical effort, society would gain, not lose,—gain enormously by the acquisi- tion of a quantity of disciplined force, and our military institutions -would take rank as reproductive agencies.

Neither on this nor on any other model is Army Reform possible, -so long as the Purchase System exists, so long as the Army is in the hands of a domineering military club connected with the Court. Nor ought the nation to sanction any extension of liabi- lity to military service, or any change or permanent increase in the Infantry and Cavalry of the Regular Army, until it has ceased to be a Court and until it has become a National Army. I have no jealousy whatever of the aristocracy, or even the plutocrats. If they can really furnish the best officers, the posts of command are theirs by right of quality. If they cannot, the places must be for those who can fill them with credit and usefulness. But nowhere should there be any bar to solid ability and high character. The Germans have compelled their aristocracies to become good offi- cers; we must compel ours, or they must give place to soldiers by birth, by aptitude, by instinct. An army so trained and officered would represent an amount of stored force of great value to the State in time of peace, invaluable in time of war.

Into this sequestered nook comes a rumour that more second battalions are to be raised. Unless the Government is going to war at once, and even then it would be better to increase the strength of existing regiments, this move looks marvellously like an attempt to retrench the stronghold of the Court party. The more battalions they can get on the present model, with its over supply of officers, its purchase system, and its high scale of living, the more difficult they make it for the reformer to work. Raising more second battalions is only a mode of bringing in more men who will have to be bought out ; and, unless we are to fight at once, the move should be steadily resisted.

I have set down these brief observations, moved thereto by an interest 1. have long felt in the great subject, but with no hope whatever that any possible Government will adopt so radical a reform.-1 am, Sir, &c.,