Though, as we have said, it is possible that Kuropatkin
may escape from the trap which is just closing on him as we write, it is far more likely that great fragments of his army, both on his left and right, may be broken off, and either forced to surrender formally or else be destroyed as fighting forces, and that only a portion of his force will be able to retreat in the direction of Kharbin. Again, it is conceivable that practically his whole force will be hemmed in, as that of Bazaine was hemmed in at Metz, and that he may be unable to keep his communications open to the north. If that happens, his army is doomed. On the whole, however, we consider the destruction of only a portion of his force the most likely of the three alternatives. But even so, the fall of Kbarbin, and then of Vladivostok, will be assured, though the reduction of the latter will take time. We have pointed out elsewhere that though the world expects peace to follow if only Kuropatkin's defeat is severe enough, we are by no means certain that this will be the result. For Russia to withdraw beyond the Amur while maintaining a nominal war with Japan would not be worse than peace for her, though certainly worse than peace for Japan. But to injure Japan through exhaustion by keeping her army in the field, and possibly by tempting her to follow her enemy beyond Lake Baikal, would naturally appeal to the Russians. They never forget that though Charles XII. of Sweden beat Peter the Great again and again, he was rash enough to press his victories home and to penetrate to Pultowa, and that there the victorious invader met his fate. In our belief, the Japanese are much too wise to imitate the Swede; but the Russians may well hope that they will prove unable to resist the temptation.
