T HIS struggle in the Far East has a fascination for
Western minds which upon certain important points may possibly impair their clearness of perception. It is not only that the forces engaged have been collected upon a scale of which this generation has had no experience ; or that the latest "battle," as it is called, rages over an area of ninety miles by fifty; or that before it finishes the slaughter will probably be greater than has been known in the history of the modern world. The universal feeling is that, apart from these elements of interest, the contest is leading up to changes which will affect the whole future of the world. The Czar himself admits that the dominion of the Pacific Ocean is but one of the tremendous issues at stake. Apart altogether from all that may follow the rise of an Asiatic Power to a first-class position, and the consequent check to European predominance in the Eastern world, the public perceives that the whole strength of Russian militarism is being put forward in the strife ; that all the qualities, good and bad, of the Russian people are being exhibited under intolerable light; that we are getting hints as to the future career of the great Slav race, now the most numerous of European tribes, which almost amount to prophecies. The vastness of Russian resources ; the astounding capacity for endurance which is the note of her toiling people ; the inferiority of her governing class, whether in uniform or out of it ; even, it is now said, the underlying ground-fact of Russia, the inadequacy of her food-supply,—all these things, hitherto only suspected by experts, are being brought home to the huge masses of observers. The pit can see as well as the boxes, and the pit is still capable of enthusiasms. Russia, hitherto so nearly an unknown quantity to all but a few diplomatists, is now revealing herself to all man- kind, and the revelation of a great country in one of her hours of agony has much of the bewildering effect of a natural catastrophe. There are points, however, upon which the revelation does not conduce entirely to enlighten- ment. For example, it is conceived that the defeat of Russia in the " battle," or rather series of battles, each of them greater than Waterloo, now raging, must end in immediate peace.
That view is possibly, but-not certainly, correct. It is in accordance with most historic precedents, the impact of a great lost battle being almost unintelligibly great, and the liability of a nation to be cowed by such an event having been proved by a hundred instances. The mastery of the world was decided at Pharsalia ; and not only was Napoleon beaten down at Waterloo, but the volcanic forces which for fifteen years had lent to him their strength. We cannot, therefore, venture to say that the battle which will • be known in history as the battle of Mukden may not compel the Romanoffs to make peace, but the certainty with which that result is expected is far too unqualified to be wise. The Czar, we may take it for granted, will not make peace if he can help it, and his resources are not so exhausted that he must accept peace from sheer inability to go on. Let the Japanese be as successful as any expert imagines, they cannot advance into the old dominion of the Czars, and it is within that old dominion that the true resources of Russia are still concentrated. Nicholas II. may think, and is indeed reported to have said, that he has only to fall back behind Lake Baikal, refuse to make peace, and rebuild his forces, as France did in worse circum- stances, until he is once more ready for aggressive action. Englishmen think this policy impossible; but the Emperor has many motives for believing that, of the courses open to him, this would be the easier. In his own judgment, and apart from the internal question, he has only lost an India, which in the future may be regained. He is, it must be remembered, the head of a military despotism, and in the Army upon which his throne rests the haughty resolution that such a decision would indicate might recement allegiance. To be beaten by Europe as that Army was in 1855 involved no more dishonour than to be worsted in a duel ; but to be beaten in Asia may involve to men of the Russian training something of inexpiable shame. The Czar may well think that his danger from continuance of the war is less than the danger to his dynasty, and still more to himself—for under a despotism there are palace revolts as well as revolutions—which would arise from peace, and may harden his heart, like Pharaoh, from mere dread of being left defenceless in presence of his people. We all foresee for him an internal situation in which he may be no longer pos- sessed of his free will ; but the fact that autocracy may give place to the ascendency of a Parliament is not of itself a proof that that Parliament would be in favour of peace. Parliaments do not always love peace, and the wound to the pride of Russia arising from a peace on severe conditions must be terribly galling to a race which for two hundred years has had for consolation the expansion of its dominion. And yet the Japanese terms must necessarily be severe, may include, for example, con- ditions which would fetter the use of warships in the Pacific as warships are fettered in the Black Sea. That a Russian Parliament would submit to huge sacrifices, to still further additions to taxation, to further and huge supplies of food for cannon, may be most improbable; but it may insist on what it would regard as an armed truce, and an opportunity for complete reorganisation of the Army such as followed in Austria the collapse after Sadowa. That every one in Russia is asking the Czar to stop the war is true ; but " every one " means in Russia every one except the peasants, who are not yet audible. The con- scription is a cruel burden even in the rural districts ; but so it is all over the Continent, and a hundred years of conscription have nowhere produced a successful refusal to be conscribed. The revolution may arrive in Russia, as all Western men believe it will; but one has heard of revolutions which did not leave the populations en- franchised entirely opposed to war. The industrials of 'Russia are suffering horribly ; but it is not the industrials or the intellectuals, but the regiments, and those who fill them, whom the Czar has to conciliate. A Pretorian Guard has more power in a true despotism than a million of- civilian taxpayers.
We are not, be it remembered, affirming that peace is hopeless, but only warning our readers against the belief that because Kuropatkin has been defeated peace is certain to ensue. It is not certain. The Czar, we may rest assured, will not make it unless he is compelled; the Japanese cannot compel him ; nor is there any irresistible evidence that anybody can, except the Army, which may decide on a long truce as preparation for a continuance of the war. We believe ourselves that a great change within Russia in the direction of more liberty is a certain consequence of the anarchy now prevailing,—that is, of the continued defeats of a twelvemonth, of the discontent among industrials, of the hunger of the peasants for more land, of the weakness of the autocrat, and of the impaired conviction that he wishes the welfare of his people. But 'that liberty will be gained in some way not yet foreseen, and will not, if history is any guide, involve a permanent paralysis of Russia. It should produce, if modern convictions have any basis of truth, a new invigoration in every fibre of the Empire ; for Empires, just as Byron described Lara's serfs-
" Fresh from their feudal fetters newly riven, Defying earth and confident of Heaven "—
• are apt to find one relief for their energies in a new assertion of their fighting force. All that, however, is for the future. For the present the only conclusion at which we can arrive is that there will be a bitter struggle before the Romanoffs consent to make peace, and that if the Romanoffs are powerless, no one can foresee the teni- perament or the designs of those to whom power may fall. Russia may split into fragments, or Russia may become a volcano.
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