THE ARMENIAN MEETING.
WE wonder who it is that had the choice of speakers at the Armenian Meeting in St. James's Hall, and on what principle the selection was made. If we look at the majority of the speeches, they were just and reasonable. If there was sound, there was also sense. But these good qualities were neutralised by an extraordinary outburst from Lady Henry Somerset. Of the rhetoric of the speech we have nothing to say. We presume that Lady Henry Somerset's oratory has its admirers, and if so, we can only congratulate them on the rich banquet provided for them on Tuesday. But the good sense and judgment shown in asking Lady Henry Somerset to speak does call for some remark. In a serious meeting assembled for a serious purpose, it is only fitting that some regard should be paid to the effect which a speech is likely to have. Lady Henry Somerset's leading object was to show that one main cause of the persecution of the Armenians is their monogamy ; "that their home had one central figure rather than a group of women despoiled of their choicest heritage, —the lifelong fidelity of one man to whom their own had been faithfully pledged." And she further described herself as standing on the platform as the representative of the "holy indignation and burning love" which a hundred thousand women who wear the White Riband feel on behalf of "their sisters yonder in the clutch of the harem-despot of Constantinople." So far as these words were anything more than words, they were directly calcu- lated to defeat the object for which the meeting was called. In themselves, indeed, they had nothing whatever to do with that object. That a man has four wives, or forty, or four hundred, is no reason why he should outrage and murder the wives of other people. But this want of connection will not be noticed. What will be noticed—at least we fear so—is that Lady Henry Somerset, one of the chosen speakers at the great English meeting, identified cruelty with poly- gamy. If some astute friend of the Porte had wished to give it the means of representing the Armenian agitation as really directed against the principles of the Mahom- medan religion, this is precisely the sort of speech he would have wished to be made. The purport need only be communicated to the Turkish people to create in them a temper of ardent resistance to any proposed action on the part of England. Such action, they will say, is not prompted so much by pity for the Armenians as by hatred for us. England wishes to restrain our lawful liberty in the matter of marriage. She cannot even observe the decent civility which is due to a foreign Sovereign. He becomes, in the language of Lady Henry Somerset, "the harem-despot of Constantinople, and, if she has her desire, he will promptly be given notice to quit. It is much better for us, these same Turks will say, to meet threats by threats, and to prove to a West which seeks to impose Christian morality on a Mahommedan population, that it can only do so at the sword's point. We do not blame Lady Henry Somerset. Misplaced, and therefore mis- chievous, rhetoric is so natural to her that she could not restrain it even if she would. But we do blame those who invited her to speak, and thereby evoked those "loud and prolonged cheers," every one of which made the action of the English Government more difficult and less likely to be supported by other Powers.
Lady Henry Somerset had not a monopoly of unwisdom at St. James's Hall, for there were other speeches which raised questions which, in the interest of the Armenian people, had better have been let alone. But the fault of these other speeches was chiefly that they said things which it is not well to say any sooner than can be helped, though it may be necessary to say them some day. What is really important at this moment is to make the English Government understand that it will be warmly supported in bringing all necessary pressure to bear upon the Sultan, in order to make any repetition of these Armenian horrors impossible. No language can be too strong which helps on this end. But some of the speeches on Tuesday seemed expressly directed against this end. The speakers were more anxious to end the Turkish Government than to mend it. What they look forward to with most satisfac- tion, is the ruin which is to overtake the Turks when they refuse to listen to our remonstrances. Now if the English Government is supposed to be simply seeking a good excuse for washing its hands of the Eastern question, two things are likely to follow. The first is, that the Sultan will be encouraged to resist any pressure that England may use to secure the Armenians against further cruelties. He will argue that he has nothing to do but to go on as he has been doing to ensure a larger measure of liberty, at all events, so far as England is concerned. We do not deny that the recent action of the Ottoman Government has given us ample justification for withdrawing the pro- tection we have hitherto given it. We do not deny that, if it should prove that we have absolutely no means of obtaining from the Ottoman Government the guarantees which we are bound to exact, it would be our duty to withdraw that protection. But we are not at all sure that if the Sultan believed that this would be the worst thing that could happen to him if he refused these guarantees, he might not be tempted to refuse them. The Turk is seldom unwilling to trust to the chapter of accidents, and the prospect of being left to make his own terms with Russia, might seem less terrible than the necessity of satisfying England as well as Russia. The second consequence of any threat on the part of England to retire from the position she has hitherto main- tained on the Eastern question, would be an immediate lessening of the interest of Russia in the present aspect of that question. Russia naturally wishes a free hand in South Eastern Europe. The purport of some of the speeches on Tuesday was to suggest to the English Government to tell Russia that, unless adequate securities against a repetition of the recent massacres can be obtained from the Sultan, we shall give her that free hand. But if Russia does not heartily co-operate with England it is very doubtful whether England will succeed in extorting these securities. Consequently, to proclaim beforehand what steps we shall take if we fail in obtaining them, is to make it appear the direct interest of Russia to withhold her co- operation. By that means she will drive England into withdrawing her protection from the Turks, which is the very thing that would most advance Russian policy.
The outcome of all this is that the true policy of England in the matter—the policy that ought to be most strenuously urged upon the English Cabinet—is to exert all the force it can command at Constantinople, and to exert it in the first instance in the most intimate combination with Russia and France. Nothing will do so much to ensure the co- operation of these two Powers as the belief that if we cannot obtain it we shall try what we can achieve by acting alone. We may be sure that Russia will not care to leave the protection of Christians under Turkish rule to a Protestant Power. It would be contrary to all her traditions and to the most deeply-rooted sentiment of her people. We may be equally sure that France will not care to see England playing a great part in the Mediter- ranean while she herself repeats the blunder which deprived her of her share in the administration of Egypt. Provided therefore that England continues to urge the adoption by Russia and France of the demands which she proposes to press upon the Porte, and at the same time leaves them in no doubt that though she would prefer concerted action she will not shrink from individual action, she stands a very good chance of bringing round Russia and France to her view of the question. Nothing, on the other hand, could be more inimical to the ultimate adoption of her policy than language which encouraged Russia and France in the opinion that if they interpose sufficient delays, England will retire in disgust, and leave Turkey to her fate.
In formulating an Ultimatum to the Sultan, more will depend upon the nature of the guarantee than upon the precise terms guaranteed. It would be easy for the Turkish Government to frame an Armenian Constitution which should embody the more important provisions of every Constitution in Europe or America, and in the end be as worthless as a dishonoured bill. The one essential condition is that the Governor of Armenia should in effect be appointed by the Powers, and be irremovable, except with their consent. There would be no need to make the real independence of the Sultan which this high functionary would really enjoy, unnecessarily visible. On the contrary, it would be expedient to spare the susceptibilities of the Sultan in every possible way. Provided that he was willing to appoint the person recommended to him by the Powers, their share in the transaction might be kept completely in the background. It is necessary to deprive the Sultan of all real power in Armenia, but assuming that this condition is satisfied, his nominal power might be left undisturbed. Whether the Governor be a Christian or a Mussulman is, to our thinking, a secondary point. It would be far better, for example, to have a Mussulman removable only by the Powers than a Christian removable by the Sultan. The character of the Governor's rule will in the end be determined by the character of the authority to which he is responsible. Other things being equal, it would no doubt be better that he should be a Christian. It would give the Armenians a greater sense of security, and be, to some extent, a compensation for their past sufferings. But the qualification, " other things being equal," should be strictly insisted on ; the Sultan should not have any concessions made him in such matters as appointment and revocation in consideration of his undertaking to nominate a Christian. The best security for good government the Armenians can possibly desire, is the knowledge on the part of the Governor that his tenure of office depends on his ruling so as to merit the confidence of the Powers, while it will be wholly unaffected by the favour or displeasure of the Sultan.
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